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The circumstances in English tort law in which one person may he held non-vicariously 
liable for the acts of another have been quietly expanding in recent years, to the point 
where third party liability can now he said to constitute a distinct category of tortious 
liability. As an ohvious(v exceptional form of liability, it is subject to special restrictions 
designed to strictly limit the specific instances in which it will he recognised. 
Unfortunately, however, the exact substance and scope of these restrictions are far from 
clear, for there has been a systematic failure on the part of the courts in deciding third 
par(yliahility actions to articulate with any precision the grounds upon which their 
findings have been based. As a result, the law on third party tort liability has developed 
on an ad hoc basis and has become conji1sed and incoherent. 
The specific purpose of this thesis is thus to seek out the foundational principles 
governing the existing categories of liability in tortfOJ' the acts of third parties, with a 
view to identifYing a coherent basis upon which such liability can develop in the future. 
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XIV 
INTRODUCTION 
The circumstances in English t01i law in which one person may be held non-vicariously 
liable for the acts of another have been quietly expanding in recent years, to the point that 
there can now be said to exist in our legal system a bona fide and self-contained category of 
t01tious liability known as third party liability. Distinguishable from the regime of vicatious 
liability in that it relates to a fonn of primary liability predicated upon the personal fault of 
the defendant, third patty liability is by all accounts tmly exceptional in terms of both its 
nature and substance. For the very notion of making one person responsible for harm that 
has been committed by another obviously runs counter to the basic idea of individual moral 
responsibility that lies at the heart of our corrective-justice-led tort system, and tlli.s has 
necessitated the application of special controls designed to strictly limit the specific 
instances in which such liability can arise. Unfortunately, however, the exact substance and 
scope of these control provisions are far 1iom clear, for there has been a systematic failure 
on the part of the courts in deciding such actions to mticulate with any degree of precision 
the actual grounds upon which their findings are based. The result is that these controls 
have developed on an entirely ad hoc basis and this whole area of the law has become 
rather confused and incoherent. Furthem1ore, until now, no real attempt has been made to 
identify the common principles underlying the various recognised instances of such 
liability. Indeed, largely ignored, the law on third party liability as a subject in its own right 
has never received any sustained analytical treatment. 
The specific purpose of tlli.s thesis will thus be to seek out the foundational 
principles governing the existing categories of third patty liability, with a view to 
identifying a coherent legal basis upon which such liability can develop in the future.' For 
there are, undoubtedly, specific fom1s of third party liability whose existence in our legal 
system it is possible to independently justify, so that there can be said to be a place in tort 
law for an actual regime of third party liability, provided its scope is strictly limited. It is a 
case, therefore, of clarifying the law so as to be able to control it. 
1 It is, of course, recognised that there is a broader, ongoing debate conceming the viability of the cunent tmt 
system generally: see e.g., PS Atiyah, "Personal Injuries in the Twenty First Century: Thinking the 
Unthinkable", in P Birks ( ed.), Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty First Century, (Oxford Clarendon Press, 
1996), p. I and PS Atiyah, The Damages Lotte1y, (Hatt Publishing, 1997). It is assumed for the purposes of 
this thesis that, for the foreseeable future at least, the CtliTent system will continue to operate in more or less 
its present fonn. 
The approach taken to this task will be a very straightforward one. There can be 
identified from the relevant case law a number of different categories of third party 
liability, relating to the factual situations in which such actions typically arise, and each one 
of these categories will be analysed in turn. A distinction will also be made for this purpose 
between actions against ordinary legal persons and those against public authorities, for 
special legal principles and considerations apply in respect of the tortious liability of the 
latter that wanant separate treatment. Before looking at any of these individual categories 
of liability, however, it will be necessary to address a specific conceptual difficulty that is 
inherent in the issue of third patty liability as a whole; that of liability for omissions. 
Finally, for comparative purposes, there will also be a chapter devoted to the French 
law on liability for the acts of others. The French system stands out in this respect because 
it operates an extremely advanced regime of third party liability that is both well 
established and well documented. That it has been the subject of a nwnber of very recent 
and very dramatic developments means, moreover, that it is also an area of particularly 
current importance, and cmcially, one that seems to have entirely escaped the attention of 
the English lawyer. In terms of achieving the overall aims of this thesis, it is anticipated that 
this patticular comparative exercise will prove to be highly instmctive. 
2 
CHAP'fER ONE 
Omissions 
Central to the issue of third party liability is the so-called 'no-duty-for-omissions' 
rule. Itself being a source of much confusion in the law, it is submitted that fundamental 
misconceptions surrounding the proper application of this rule lie at the heart of the cunent 
state of unintelligibility of the law on third patty liability. Logic therefore dictates that by 
addressing these misconceptions concerning omissions, greater clarity may be imported 
into the law on third party liability. To this end, not only will the current rules on omissions 
be clarified, but the purpose and utility of the general principle against liability for 
omissions will also be considered. Specific focus will obviously also be placed on its 
particular relevance to the issue of third party liability. 
The confusion surrounding the omissions issue may, first of all, be traced to a deep 
and widespread misunderstanding ofthe essence of the actual distinction between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance. While the problem is, to a large extent, merely 
temtinological and may be tackled by restating the distinction using very strict and precise 
terms, at its core there would appear also to exist fundamental conceptual misapprehensions 
surrounding its nature and substance. 
The most basic explanation that can be given of the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction is that it relates to the difference between, on the one hand, making things worse 
and, on the other, simply failing to make things better. That this is not a straightforward 
application of the distinction to be drawn between the notions of activity and passivity is a 
point that cannot be overemphasised. The greatest mistake to make about legal ontissions, 
and indeed the one that is most commonly made, is to assume that the categorisation of a 
given factual scenario as an instance of either misfeasance or nonfeasance is determined 
solely on the basis of whether or not the defendant can be said to have acted, in the sense of 
having engaged in positive bodily movement. Such an inquiry can only provide an 
appropriate answer in the simplest of cases, where the plaintiffs claim clearly relates either 
to positive misconduct on the part of the defendant directly resulting in the harm 
complained of or to an outright failure on his or her patt to take a ce1tain course of action to 
prevent the hann. Where, on the other hand, the relevant course of conduct contains 
elements ofboth action and inaction and there are other factors at play, such as the 
3 
intervention of a third party, which prevent the harm from being linked so clearly and 
neatly to the defendant, this line of inquiry is utterly useless. 
In these problem cases, it is necessary to approach the question of how to qualify the 
defendant's behaviour from a completely different angle. Rather than launching straight 
into the issue of how the defendant's actual overall conduct is to be categorised, the initial 
focus should instead be on the nature of the allegation of negligence made by the plaintiff. 
To what aspect of the defendant's wider course of conduct does the plaintiff's claim 
actually relate? What is the cmx of the allegation? If he or she is to stand any chance of 
succeeding in court, the plaintiff must be able to state in concrete terms what exactly it is 
that the defendant has done or has failed to do that has resulted in the hann complained of 
and for which it is sought to hold him or her liable. Given the way in which they interrelate, 
the mles governing duty, fault and causation can only meaningfully be applied by judges if 
they have in mind specific allegations and can consequently direct their attention to 
relevant instances of action or inaction. 
This contention is, in turn, based upon a very strict view of the way in which the duty 
concept is supposed to work. It is submitted that the duty question must be framed in very 
specific terms relating to the type of hann suffered by the plaintiff and to the way in which 
it was inflicted. For example, was the defendant under a duty to take reasonable care not to 
cause the plaintiff personal injury by serving her a bottle of ginger beer containing a 
decomposing snail? Was the defendant under a duty to take reasonable care not to cause the 
plaintiff economic loss through the preparation of inaccurate company accounts upon 
which the plaintiff would later rely to make financial decisions? Was the defendant under a 
duty to take reasonable care to ensure that adequate security measures were in place to 
prevent a small child in its care from wandering out of the premises, onto a nearby road and 
into the path of the plaintiff's lorry, thus causing the plaintiff to suffer personal injury? 
An insistence on such precision at this stage will oblige claimants to exercise great 
care over the way in which they frame their negligence actions. Obviously, it would be in 
their best interests to avoid the notorious omissions mles altogether. If they can base their 
legal arguments upon something that the defendant has actually done, that is, if they can 
isolate conduct that is exclusively positive and in relation to which they are reasonably 
confident that they can satisfy the requirements of duty, breach and causation, then they 
should go ahead and make this conduct the sole focus of their claims. In this way, the 
liability mles goveming negligent acts can be applied by the court to detennine the duty 
4 
issue. If, however, the defendant's positive conduct is not in itself capable of forming the 
basis of a sustainable claim, in that it would not satisfy all the elements of negligence, 
perhaps because it is too far removed from the actual hann complained of, then the claim 
will be dependent upon the further argument that, in the particular circumstances, there was 
also something that the defendant should have done that he or she did not do. If this is the 
case, then the mles goveming omissions must apply. These hybrid cases will differ from 
those involving 'pure' omissions, that is, those in which the negligence allegations centre 
solely on the defendant's failure to take a particular course of action, in that the existence of 
the background positive conduct may make it easier to justify the imposition of a duty of 
affirmative action. 
If, as has just been argued, the tem1 'omission' should be reserved exclusively for the 
purpose of refening to the alleged source of the defendant's negligence and so to the type 
of liability at stake, rather than to characterise his or her actual conduct, then it would seem 
pmdent to set out specific tenns that could be used to describe the actual conduct involved. 
To this end, it is suggested that appropriate descriptive labels may be derived from the idea 
of viewing conduct as being either positive or negative in accordance with the nature of its 
causal relationship to the victim's injury. Active bodily movement that results in the direct 
infliction of ham1 or in the exacerbation of existing ham1 may be refened to as a positive 
act. It will, of necessity, give rise to the application of the mles goveming liability for 
negligent acts. Movement that is positive only in the sense that it has contributed in some 
way to the creation of the risk of harm, so that it forms only an indirect causal link with the 
hann, may be described as positive contributory conduct. It conesponds with the active 
conduct involved in the hybrid category of negligence just discussed and will clearly give 
rise to the application of the mles goveming negligent omissions. Finally, the conduct 
involved in 'pure' omissions cases, consisting as it will of a complete failure to act, will 
then obviously be described as negative conduct since it will have only a negative effect on 
the causation of the ham1. 
Having established what an omission is and when the rules goveming liability for 
omissions will apply, it is proposed to address one more source of temunological confusion 
in this domain before moving on to look at the actual substance of these mles and how they 
apply in practice. The issue in question is that of the proper categorisation of the kind of 
duty of care at stake in an omissions case. In general tenns, the duty may always be 
accurately referred to as one of affim1ative action. At a more specific level, however, it is 
5 
possible to distinguish between different types of affim1ative duties on the basis of the 
circumstances from which they derive. The tendency in academic circles, however, has 
been to refer indiscriminately to all affirmative duties as examples of a duty to rescue. For 
the sake of accuracy and clarity, it is submitted that the use of the tem1 'duty to rescue' 
should be confined to true rescue cases which, applying the ordinary commonsense 
definition of rescue, means those involving a sense of urgency and immediacy. To cover 
non-emergency situations, other tenns better describing the type of affirmative duty at stake 
should be used. 
In deciding which terms would be most appropriate in this respect, it is necessary 
first of all to have regard to the type of situations that commonly give rise to duties of 
affirmative action. In this respect, it is suggested that a broad distinction may be drawn 
between those cases in which it is sought to hold the defendant liable for failing to protect 
the plaintiff from some pm1icular type of l1a1m, the scope of the duty being detennined by 
the nature of the relationship between them, and those cases in which the defendant is being 
sued for failing to control a third party who subsequently causes harm to the plaintiff Tins 
latter duty may be based either upon a special relationship of control between the defendant 
and the third party or it may arise out of the third party's use of either real or personal 
property belonging to the defendant or over which the defendant exercises control. 
In the first category, the affitmative duty in question may be properly described as a 
duty to protect. The crucial relationship upon which all such duty questions will centre is 
therefore that which exists between the defendant and the plaintiff. The duty to rescue may 
be regarded as one specific fonn of this broader duty to protect. In the second category, the 
duty is clearly one to control and the crucial duty-forming relationship is therefore that 
existing between the defendant and the third party. It is subnlitted that distinguishing at this 
stage between different types of affinnative duties should prove to be of much benefit later 
on when it comes to identifying a set of unifying and structured principles governing the 
various recognised instances of third party liability. 
Addressing then the question of the substantive juridical significance of designating a 
claim as one concerning an omission, the first point that would have to be made is that, 
superficially, the law on omissions appears very simple and straightforward. There is really 
only one rule and that is that the law of tort does not recognise a duty of care for omissions. 
As is well known, the effect of such a blanket denial of the existence of a duty of care is to 
render claims of the type in question non-justiciable. This should, in theory, send out a 
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message to all potential plaintiffs whose allegation of negligence is based upon an omission 
that there is no point in bringing a claim before the courts because it is simply not going to 
succeed. The reason that this is not what happens in practice is that this general rule against 
liability for omissions is subject to a plethora of exceptions which have been established on 
a very gradual and ad hoc basis. This is encapsulated by the vague generalisations 
employed to signify when an exception will be recognised. The most common is that of the 
infamous, undefined "special relationship". Plaintiffs rely on this lack of coherency to bring 
their omissions claims, in the hope that they will be able to fit theirs into one of the 
established categories of exception, or indeed, even to create a new one. 
The stage has now been reached where the exceptions appear to be all but 
submerging the rule. This has prompted many academics to call into question the utility of 
retaining it. Indeed, in recent years, the rule has been the subject of some particularly fierce 
criticism. 1 To address this criticism it is necessary to analyse the arguments that are 
traditionally put fmward in suppm1 of the non-liability rule. In making his case for the 
fmmulation of a duty to wam, Logie provides a neat sunm1ary of these arguments. 2 The 
first to which he makes reference concems the role played by the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
dichotomy in maintaining fundamental distinctions between law and morality. 3 The 
strength of this argument will clearly be detetmined by the degree of importance to be 
attached to the segregation of law and morality in the first place. To Smith and Bums, it 
constitutes the "hallmark ofEnglishjurisprudence",4 for they subscribe to the school of 
thought that advocates the complete separation of the two. This view is founded upon a 
very strict interpretation of the basic principle that it is not the function of the law to 
enforce moral values. The obvious criticism to be levelled here is that such an interpretation 
is too narrow and unnecessarily rigid. Insofar as the law is an instmment of social ordering, 
the importance of recognising its independence of morality cannot be disputed. For if it is 
to operate properly in this respect, its content has to be detennined by application of sound 
legal principles which have themselves been fonnulated in accordance with its overall aims 
and objectives. That these legal ptinciples may well conflict with moral norms is clearly 
exemplified by the operation in tmtlaw of the objective notion of fault. However, all that 
1 See, eg., B. Markesinis, "Negligence, Nuisance and Affirmative Duties of Action", (1989) I 05 LQR I 04. 
2 J. Logie, "Affinmtive Action in the Law of Tort: The Case of the Duty to Warn", ( 1989) 48 CLJ 115. 
3 !bid, p. 118. 
4 J. C. Smith and P. Bums, "Donoglwe v Stevenson- The Not So Golden Anniversary", (1983) 46 MLR 147, 
p. 163. 
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this really means is that law must not be dictated by morality. It does not mean that the two 
should necessarily be incompatible. One need not look too far for evidence demonstrating 
that often they will coincide. This argument about the mle against liability for omissions 
playing a vital role in preserving the distinction between law and morality can, therefore, 
only apply with any force in cases where the sole reason for imposing an affirmative duty is 
to compel good samaritanism. Where there is an independent legal basis for the duty, it is 
of little significance. 
The second argument detailed by Logie concerns the extent to which affirmative 
duties restrict the individual's right to liberty. It is said that, by contrast with obligations not 
to inflict harm, insistence on positive action to benefit others is morally objectionable in 
that it petmits an unjustifiably high level of interference with freedom of action. However, 
whether this is tlue in any given case is essentially an empirical matter. What counts as 
'justifiable' interference may plausibly be seen in utilitarian terms. From this perspective, a 
duty of positive action is not unduly restrictive where the overall effect is to maximise 
liberty. Moreover, as Smith and Burns have pointed out, a positive duty which flows fi·om a 
specific voluntary conmutment, or from a particular role or function voluntarily assumed, is 
not, by definition, an unjustifiable limitation on agency. 5 For present purposes, the 
significance to be taken from this is that the argument about freedom of action clearly does 
allow for the recognition of a number of legitimate exceptions to the general no-duty-for-
omissions mle. 
A further, related argument is that the imposition of a duty of positive action may 
require significant expenditure in tern1s of time, money and effort. While, again, this may 
be said to be justified in the case of a cm1m1ission by the voluntary nature of the 
defendant's decision to act in the first place, i.e. there is implied in this decision a vohmtary 
assumption of all associated burdens and responsibilities, the same cmmot be said of an 
omission. Put in economic tem1s, with commissions, such expenditure may be properly 
regarded as part and parcel of the defendant's activity and, moreover, as necessary for the 
assessment of the hue cost of the activity. Economic efficiency requires that activities bear 
their own costs. Since obligations of affinnative action will often absorb the costs of other 
hann-producing activities, they are said to create a situation of economic inefficiency. This 
very argument was discussed by Lord Hoffman in Stovin v. Wise. 6 It is significant, 
5 /bid, p. 157, (emphasis added). 
6 [1996] 3 All ER 801, p. 819. 
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however, that although he appeared to attach much credence to it, he recognised that it 
would not apply to those situations in which the affirmative duty is based upon a particular 
undertaking on the part of the defendant with concomitant reliance. 7 
The third argument dealt with by Logie centres upon causation. Firstly, it is 
questioned whether a failure to act can be said to have 'caused' anything at all. Secondly, 
the problem of the identification of the defendant may be invoked. Generally the defendant 
is identified via a direct causal link between his or her negligent behaviour and the 
plaintiffs injury. How is this to be done in the absence of such a link? Indeed, the 
defendant might just be one of a large group of people who were in a position to take 
positive steps to assist the plaintiff but failed to do so. However, while such arguments may 
look good on paper, the practical reality is that they would not even arise for consideration 
in the vast majority of omissions cases reaching the courts. The reason why the particular 
defendant has been targeted by the litigation will be self-evident, for it will most probably 
fmm the basis of the plaintiff's duty arguments. Moreover, the courts have come to accept 
as sufficient, proof of causation of an indirect nature. Again, therefore, such arguments can 
only be used, in a fairly abstract way, to justify the absence in our tort system of a general 
duty to rescue. Othetwise, they are of little substance and by no means cast any doubt upon 
the large number of exceptions to the rule that are currently in existence. 
There is one other important reason, not expressly covered by Logie, behind the 
general reluctance of our tort system to impose liability for omissions. It is the popular 
notion that omissions are simply less culpable than commissions. Clearly this argument 
presupposes that culpability is an essential element of civil responsibility. If it can be 
assumed that the doctrine of corrective justice is to be regarded as fomling the primary 
structure of the English law of tort, this is not problematic, although it would perhaps be 
more accurate to speak in tem1s of moral blameworthiness rather than culpability. For 
present purposes, it is fortunate that the matter has already been considered in great detail 
by Honore. 8 
Put in very simple terms, Honore's basic premise is that the degree of 
blameworthiness to be attached to an omission will be detennined by the character of the 
nom1 that it violates. Ordinmily, it is worse to violate a nmm tlu·ough a positive act than it 
7 Ibid. 
8 T. Honore, "Are Omissions Less Culpable?", in P. Cane and J. Stapleton (ed.s), The Law of Obligations: 
Essays for ?a trick Atiyah. ( 1991 ), p. 33. 
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is to do so through negative conduct. However, Honore maintains that it is possible to 
designate certain nonns, which he refers to as 'norms imposing distinct duties', as being so 
important that their violation by whatever means will attract reproach. On this 'distinct-
duties' theory, an omission violating such a nom1 will be just as blameworthy as a 
conmnssion in the same instance. This begs the question of how a norm imposing a distinct 
duty is to be identified in the first place. According to Honore, one distinction to be made 
between a distinct duty and a mere background duty imposed by an ordinary norm is that 
the fom1er is owed to specific persons as dictated by the pmticular circumstances of the 
individual agent involved, whereas the latter is owed by each to all. Examples provided of 
distinct duties are those owed by parents to children,9 those owed by citizens to their state 
and those owed by persons who create dangers to those endangered. The broad conclusion 
to be drawn from this is that distinct duties are high-ranking social or moral duties in 
relation to which strong arguments may be advanced in suppm1 of their translation into 
legal duties. The list of such arguments drawn up by Honore in thls respect is fairly typical 
of that contained in the majority of academic accounts on the subject. 10 
(1). The agent has positively created a risk ofharm. 
(2). The agent occupies an office or position of responsibility. 
(3). The agent is well placed to meet a need, such position creating a 
situation of dependency. 
(4). The agent is the recipient of a benefit. 
(5). The agent has given an unde11aking. 
Honore' s discussion of the relationship between omissions and the notion of 
blameworthiness serves to reaffi1m the conclusions drawn from the analyses of each of the 
other arguments in suppm1 of the omissions rule: that the basic rule against liability for 
omissions is entirely valid and justifiable, but that against this rule a large number of 
exceptions must be recognised. It is clear then that the main problem that we are left with 
conceming the law on on1issions is that there is no obvious underlying theme connecting 
the established exceptions. 
9 As far as omissions are concemed, exception may be taken to this pa11icular example. See C. Mclvor, 
"Expelling the Myth of the Parental Duty to Rescue", (2000) 12 CFLQ 229. 
10 See, e.g., J. Logie, op. cit .. p. 121; J. C. Smith and P. Bums, op. cit., p.l57; D. Howarth, Textbook on Tort, 
(Butterworths, 1995), p. 173; M. A. Jones, Textbook on Torts, (OUP, 2002), p. 53. 
10 
Highly critical of this whole area of the law, Markesinis has advocated that the basic 
rule be dispensed with altogether and that the ordinary principles of negligence be 
employed to exclude from the liability regime the majority of omissions-based claims. 11 
This could usually be done at the duty stage, most notably by stringent application of a 
specially formulated and tightly construed concept of proximity. Although essentially a 
sound proposition, such a move would perhaps appear too radical for the English judiciary, 
given its longstanding and steadfast attachment to the non-liability principle. The 
altemative would be to entirely rework the exceptions, clearly setting out what the grounds 
for each of the acceptable exceptions are and ruthlessly rejecting all those scenarios not 
fitting within those parameters. This would involve methodically going through all the 
existing case law in which a duty of affirmative action has been recognised and trying to 
extract the precise grounds on which each one has been based, with the ultimate aim of 
establishing general categories of exception to the non-liability for omissions rule. 
Obviously, this would be a huge task. Each case in which it was sought to hold the 
defendant liable for ham1 which he or she did not directly cause, whether it be because the 
harm had been inflicted either by a third party, by an object or as a result of a natural 
occurrence, would be relevant. Fm1unately, for present purposes, the remit of such a search 
can be narrowed down significantly, for it would be limited solely to the former. In effect 
then, this is largely what will be attempted in the remainder of this thesis, for although not 
all third party liability actions will necessarily involve omissions, 12 it is undoubtedly the 
case that by far the vast majority, and certainly the most contentious, will. 
11 Op. cif. 
12 As Lunney and Oliphant point out, if the defendant were to provide the third pmiy with the means to injure 
the claimant, for example, then it is possible that such misfeasance could constitute the sole focus of a 
negligence action: Tort Law: Text and Materials (OUP, 2000), p. 402. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Third Party Liability of Property Owners 
The exalted status of the proprietary right is a defining feature of English private law. 
Indeed, so heightened is the protection given to this type of interest that our legal system 
could even be accused of valuing the notion of property more highly than that of personal 
physical integrity. 1 In view of this heightened protection, the fact that, co1Telatively, the 
ownership or control of prope11y also imports a number of responsibilities, to ensure that 
the property does not, in itself, represent a danger to others, is uncontroversial. Thus, for 
example, occupiers of land are bound by the occupiers' liability legislation to ensure that 
their premises are reasonably safe for persons permitted to use them, with an attenuated 
fmm of this duty even extending to trespassers. 2 
What is controversial, however, is the idea that the legal responsibilities of property 
owners3 can extend to the actions of independent third pa11ies in using the property, so as to 
give 1ise to liability in tort for ham1 caused by these third parties. Common law duties of 
this nature have, nevertheless, been long recognised in nuisance. More recently, attempts 
have also been made to establish wider third party prop1ietary duties in negligence, albeit 
that these have been largely unsuccessful. Unfortunately, the law in both respects is in a 
rather confused state, due to the failure of the com1s in dealing with these types of claims to 
put forward consistent lines of reasoning. Indeed, prevalent throughout all of the cases in 
this domain is a distinct lack of understanding about the nonnative foundation of these 
particular fon11S of third party liability. Crucially, ratios have been misinterpreted and 
misapplied, and the true nature of the interrelationships between the relevant cases has been 
obscured. However, a thorough analysis of the case law reveals that a coherent body of 
founding principles justifying limited instances of third pm1y property liability both in 
nuisance and in negligence can be identified. 
1 See, e.g., P. Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law(Hat1 Publishing, 1997), p. 131 and P. Cane," 'What a 
Nuisance!'", (1997) 113 LQR 515 at 519. 
2 Occupiers' Liability Act 1984. 
3 This term is used in the broad sense to refer to any party with a legal interest in land. 
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I. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY IN NUISANCE 
There are three basic grounds upon which the liability in nuisance of a property owner who 
is not directly and personally responsible for the creation of a nuisance may be based: 
(1) authorisation of the nuisance; 
(2) adoption of the nuisance; and 
(3) continuation of the nuisance. 
Viewed abstractly, each of these grounds appears relatively straightforward. A property 
owner is said to authorise a nuisance if he permits to take place on his property an activity 
which he ought to realise is likely to constitute a nuisance. Thus, in Tetley v Chitty,4 a local 
authority which granted a lease of its land to a third party, knowing that the land was to be 
used as a go-karting track, was held liable for authorising the noise nuisance which ensued. 
Similarly, a propet1y owner 'adopts' a nuisance quite simply if he makes use of it. And 
lastly, he will be said to continue it if, with actual or constructive knowledge of its 
existence, he fails reasonably to abate it. In true legal fashion, however, each ground has 
proven to be rather difficult to apply in practice. 
From the descriptions just provided, it is clear that in the case of either authorisation 
or adoption, it is at least notionally possible to point to some kind of active involvement on 
the pat1 of the defendant in the infliction of the hatm complained of, and hence to some 
degree of moral fault, which arguably serves to make a finding of liability against him more 
justifiable in tenns of ordinary notions of fairness. The concept of continuation, however, 
cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of individual responsibility for actions, for liability 
in such instances is, at its most basic level, predicated purely upon status. Thus, while it 
may ultimately be detennined by notions of fault, it is not founded on fault. Clearly the 
most contentious of the three grounds, continuation is also the basis of liability with 
potentially the widest scope, for it can be argued against a property owner who has quite 
simply done nothing at all. By contrast, the criteria of liability for the other two grounds are 
more defined. Continuation is, therefore, the ground most likely to be used to argue third 
party property liability and indeed, over time, to extend its remit. 
4 [1986]1 All ER 663. 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts have tended to apply the concept of 
continuation rather restrictively. Indeed, it seems that continuation is alone subject to a 
special rule concerning the nature of the defendant's interest in the land concerned, 
although this rule is by no means obvious from the case law, the courts having for some 
reason failed to clearly articulate it. The rule is that only those in legal possession of the 
land can be liable for continuing a nuisance. 5 In the case of land subject to a lease, 
therefore, regardless of whether the third party causing the nuisance is a tenant, a trespasser 
or a mere licensee, the landlord will have no duty to abate and could only be held liable on 
the basis of authorisation or adoption. What this effectively means is that the concept of 
continuation can only be used for the benefit of claimants subject to a nuisance caused by a 
trespasser or a licensee, for the purpose of giving them a choice of parties to sue- either the 
creator or the occupier. By contrast, where the creator is the occupier, he alone can be sued 
for a failure to abate. 
It is ventured that the rationale behind this distinction may have something to do with 
the fact that, in practice, unlike the tenant creator, it will generally be difficult to track 
down the trespasser or the licensee in order to sue them personally. Thus, the victim would 
be left without any viable course of action at all were he unable to sue the occupier instead. 
Thus, it may be that this particular rule relating to continuation is motivated to some extent 
by basic considerations of justice and fairness towards the claimant. Presumably, the issue 
of ability to abate is also relevant. 
In practical terms, it is a simple rule yet clearly an important one. It is to be expected, 
therefore, that the courts would have no difficulty in applying it consistently. Not so. In 
Chartered Trust Plc v Davies,6 the landlord of a shopping mall was held liable for 
continuing a nuisance created by one of its tenants, without any discussion of the fact that 
occupation is supposed to be a prerequisite to liability on this basis. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, however, when this case was later drawn to the attention of the Court of 
Appeal in the important case of Hussain v Lancaster City Council, 7 it affim1ed the 
propriety of the rule but refused to condenm this patiicular instance of blatant 
circumvention, instead explaining it away, rather unconvincingly, on the basis that it was a 
5 The principal authority for this rule would appear to be Smith v Scott [ 1973] I QB 314, as applied in 
Hussain v Lancaster City Council [2000] QB I. 
6 [1997]2 EGLR 83 
7 [2000] QB I at 18-20. 
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case that involved special facts. It is submitted that the only ground of third party property 
liability which could feasibly have been argued in this case was that of authorisation. 
Furthermore, while it is clear that all three grounds are separate and distinct, there 
can be identified on the pmt of both the judiciary and some legal academics a pronounced 
tendency to elide the distinction between them. Such elision is most evident in relation to 
the concepts of adoption and continuation. More specifically, the notion of adoption is 
often refened to as though it were the same thing as continuation. 8 It is submitted that one 
of the main sources of this error is a misreading of Sedleigh-Denfield v 0 'Callaghan, 9 a 
case which will be discussed in detail presently. Suffice to say here that it is regarded as the 
leading authority on continuation and, as such, is always cited in this context. However, 
while the principal basis of liability in this case was, undoubtedly, the defendants' failure to 
abate, there was also evidence of adoption as the defendants had made use of the source of 
the nuisance for some considerable time before it actually caused any harm to the victim. It 
is, therefore, strictly correct to refer to Sedleigh-Denfield in terms of both. Presumably, 
'continuation and adoption' has simply become a familiar and convenient phrase 
commonly associated with this case, to such an extent that it is used, unwittingly, even 
when the case is being discussed solely in terms of continuation. This in turn has led to the 
use of the phrase in other contexts in which only the concept of continuation is appropriate 
and has thus given rise to the misconception that adoption is just another word for 
continuation. 
Such confusion has arguably been further compounded by the decision of the Court 
of Appeal in Page Motors Ltd v Epsom and Ewell Borough Counci/. 10 This case involved a 
claim in nuisance against a local authority in respect of a nuisance created on its land by a 
number of gypsies who had for a number of years been camping there illegally. Though it 
had the legal power to do so, the defendant authority had deliberately refrained from 
ejecting the offending parties since to have done so would have been simply to have 
transferred the problem elsewhere within the area. Clearly, from the point of view of its 
civic responsibilities, this would not have achieved anything and, indeed, it actually suited 
the authority to have the gypsies remain on the land in question at that time as it gave them 
8 See Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire County Council [2000] QB 51; M. Lunney and K. Oliphant, Tort Law, 
Text and Materials (2000). p. 545; and R. Bagshaw, "Private Nuisance By Third Pm1ies", (2000) 8 Tort LR 
165. 
9 
[ 1940] AC 880. 
10 (1981) 80 LGR 337. 
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a chance to work out how to contain the borough's recognised gypsy problem properly and 
to make the necessary alternative arrangements. 
On the facts, this was clearly a classic case of continuation. The authority, as legal 
occupier, had a duty to abate the undisputed nuisance existing on its property, and this it 
had failed absolutely to do. That should have been the end of the matter. However, Ackner 
LJ's legal sensibilities were clearly offended by the authority's rather self-serving attitude, 
and this seemingly impelled him to reinforce the finding of liability against it. Relying 
specifically on its admitted motivation for not removing the gypsies, he reasoned that in 
obtaining a temporal advantage from their continued presence on this particular site, the 
council was in fact making use of the nuisance complained of so that it could also be 
regarded as having adopted it. Tllis is clearly erroneous. To adopt a nuisance, a defendant 
must actively take advantage of the actual nuisance or of the source of the nuisance in order 
to obtain a concrete benefit from it. Here, however, any benefit obtained was not related at 
all, in any direct sense, to the activities of the gypsies constituting the nuisance. Rather it 
was merely ancillary to its failure to abate. The council exploited the general situation 
rather than the actual nuisance. To deliberately decide, in the interests of personal gain, to 
ignore one's legal obligations is hardly laudable, but it does not amount to active and 
specific use of pm1icular sources of harm to others. 
Quite simply, Ackner LJ tried to stretch the notion of adoption too far. What is most 
worrying about this is that he appears to have succeeded, for this aspect of the decision has 
never been challenged. The result is that an essentially straightforward concept has become 
mmecessarily complicated. Constmed so broadly, its scope is now vulnerable to further 
inappropriate manipulations. 
Finally, it is necessary to mention one other operational difficulty which appears to 
afflict all three grounds of liability but which has arisen for discussion particularly in 
relation to continuation. It is the issue of whether the nuisance complained of must actually 
take place on the property owner's land. Rather unhelpfully, the case law on this point is 
blatantly contradictory. 
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(i) The nuisance cases 
The concept of third party liability in nuisance is long established. For example, in 
Attorney-General v Corke, 11 a property owner was successfully sued by his neighbours in 
respect of the conduct of a group of travellers occupying his land. Although technically 
categorised as a Rylands v Fletcher decision, Corke is often discussed in a nuisance context 
as most of the judgment handed down was actually concerned with the applicability of 
nuisance principles. It was a common fact that the conduct in question was of a serious and 
substantial nature and that it was, in itself, capable of constituting a nuisance. For Bennett J, 
the principal difficulty as regards making the defendant liable for this nuisance was rather 
that this conduct had not been carried out on the defendant's land. Obviously, therefore, the 
judge had assumed this to be a necessary precondition of liability in nuisance. Rather 
surprisingly, however, he did not actually discuss the basis for the defendant's liability in 
this instance. He made no mention at all of the notions of authorisation, adoption or 
continuation and so it is not clear upon which of these grounds he was actually considering 
the claim in nuisance. It is submitted that this was a ftmdamental enor which, as regards 
nuisance, deprived his judgment of all legal substance. 
There are tenable grounds for arguing both authorisation and continuation in this 
case. In his rather short judgment, Bennett J made marked reference to the high degree of 
foreseeability that the presence of the travellers on the defendant's land would result in the 
harn1 complained of in this case. This, taken in conjunction with the fact that the defendant 
had given the offending parties permission to be there, had provided them with some 
limited facilities and was moreover making a commercial profit out of them, arguably 
provided a strong case for authorisation. On the other hand, the general tenor of the 
judgment would seem to suggest that Betmett J was rather more concerned with the issue of 
whether there was a duty on the pm1 of the defendant to abate the nuisance and indeed 
subsequent courts considering the decision have tended to treat it as an instance of 
continuation. 12 Either way, for Bennett J, liability was precluded by the fact that the acts 
complained of had not taken place on the defendant's land. However, having demonstrated 
himself to be particularly unfavourably disposed towards members of the travelling 
11 [1933] Ch 89 
12 See, e.g., Smith v Scott [ 1973] I QB 314 at 321, 322 and Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council [2000] 
QB 51 at 58. 
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community generally, he was clearly sympathetic towards the concerns of the claimants 
and did wish to provide them with a remedy. So he, rather ingeniously, overcame this 
spatial obstacle by grounding liability instead on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. A triumph 
of judicial innovation this may have been, but he forfeited any legitimacy the decision may 
have had by once again failing to elaborate. He did not even explain what the rule was, let 
alone how it actually applied in this particular instance. 
Given that the defendant had brought the travellers onto his land for profit, it could 
plausibly be argued that there was accumulation for the purposes of Rylands v Fletcher, and 
given his allusion to the high degree of foreseeability that the travellers would cause 
offence to those in neighbouring properties, it is even possible to see how Bennett J was 
able to construe them as "things likely to do mischief if they escape". But it has to be 
questioned whether the element of escape can be meaningfully satisfied in this type of 
scenario. The duty of the defendant under Rylands v Fletcher is to prevent an escape, which 
in itself presupposes a power and an ability to control the thing in question. It is highly 
debatable whether the defendant in this case had any authority over the gypsies so as to 
control any of their movements at all. 13 That is the difficulty with applying the rule in 
respect of independent persons as they are necessarily free agents. 
Although the decision has not been openly criticised by another court, it has been 
rather coolly received. Certainly the Rylands v Fletcher interpretation of it has not been 
used to found any further actions and indeed subsequent courts have conveniently side-
stepped the issue of the propriety of the decision in this respect by following the lead of 
Pennycuick VC in Smith v Scott14 and construing it as a case of continuation. But, of 
course, this then blings the spatial issue back into play, for if it is indeed a condition of 
continuance liability that the nuisance take place on the defendant's land, then obviously 
the decision in Corke cannot stand on this basis either. This would lead inevitably to the 
conclusion that the case had simply been wrongly decided. 
It is perhaps of some significance in this respect that A-G v Corke was not even cited 
in the leading case on third party property liability, Sedleigh-Denfield v 0 'Callaghan. 15 
There, the local council, in what transpired to be an act of trespass, constructed a culvert in 
the line of a ditch on the defendants' property. Unfortunately, it installed in the wrong place 
13 It is recognised, however, that as the Rylands v Fletcher rule was, in that era, more clearly seen as a strict 
liability concept, this may simply not have been considered as a relevant issue at the time. 
14 Supra,no.l2. 
15 [1940] AC 880. 
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a gtid designed to catch pieces of debris, with the result that the pipe was liable to become 
blocked. Although several years passed without incident, eventually, after a heavy storm, 
the culvert did become blocked and water from the ditch flooded the claimant's 
neighbouring property causing considerable damage. The crux of the claim against the 
defendants was that they should have been aware of the tisk of harm posed by the 
improperly protected culvett and that, as occupiers of the property, they had a responsibility 
to remove this risk. In other words, the damage caused by the flooding was to be regarded 
as a nuisance stemming from an existing state of affairs on the defendant's property which 
the defendant had a duty to abate. The principal basis of liability was therefore continuation 
of the nuisance. 
Prior to Sedleigh-Denfield, the legal position adopted by the courts had quite clearly 
been that an occupier would not be liable for a nuisance created by a trespasser unless he 
had allowed it to continue by his act or default. Crucially, mere refusal or neglect was said 
not to amount to a default for this purpose. 16 In holding the defendant liable in this case, the 
House of Lords depatied dramatically from this position. It is clear from their speeches, 
however, that the Law Lords were still keen to preserve some link between liability and 
personal responsibility, or at least some loose idea of fault, 17 and they achieved this in part 
by making knowledge of the existence of the nuisance a key precondition of liability. Thus, 
in Sedleigh-Denfield itself, if it had not been for the fact that the defendants' employees had 
been known to have periodically cleaned out the ditch after the culvert had been inserted, 
the defendants may well have been able to avoid liability by simply disclaiming all 
knowledge of the existence ofthe nuisance. 
A further concession made by the House in the interests of moral responsibility was 
its inclusion of the issue of ability to abate as a factor relevant to liability. 18 Having already 
established that the actual duty to abate would mise on a rather strict basis, what the Law 
Lords were trying to do here was ensure that the defendant would not be unduly burdened. 
Thus in determining whether this duty had been fulfilled, the defendant's conduct would be 
assessed according to a standard of reasonableness. While tllis test clearly bears a striking 
resemblance to ordinary negligence, a crucial distinction between the two is that the 
concept of fault being applied in this patiicular nuisance context is subjective rather than 
16 Job Edwards Ltd v Birmingham Navigations Proprietors [ 1924] I KB 341. 
17 See, in particular, dicta of Lord Atkin at p. 897. 
18 Ibid. 
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objective. This means that both the physical and material resources of the defendant will be 
taken into account, and clearly this should operate to his or her advantage in most cases. 
Liability for continuation is therefore far from strict. 
Clearly, the reason why the idea of holding a property owner liable for a nuisance 
created by a third party is unpalatable is that it would seem much more appropriate to sue 
the third pmiy instead as it is obviously more responsible for the ham1. It is submitted, 
however, that the reason why the decision to impose liability on the property owner in 
Sedleigh-Denfield was so easily reached was that it was not patiicularly objectionable in 
this sense to begin with, for the role played by the third party here, although clearly 
instrumental, was rather remote from the actual harm and was just one of a combination of 
factors leading to the nuisance. In patiicular, the heavy rainfall played a crucial role. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Bright, 19 there is a difference between making a property 
owner liable for the conduct of a third party which affects the physical state of the land and 
consequently gives rise to ham1 to others, and making the defendant liable for the simple 
bad behaviour of a third party present on the land. Clearly it is much easier to justify the 
liability of the defendant in relation to the condition of the land. However, the courts have 
made it very clear that they regard such distinctions as being of absolutely no relevance to 
the law on continuation. In Lea key v National Trust, 20 the Court of Appeal, affirming what 
had already been decided by the Privy Council a number of years earlier, 21 stated 
emphatically that the principles established by Sedleigh-Denjield would apply to all cases 
of continuation, regardless of whether the nuisance was caused by nature or by human 
agency. And indeed, in Page Motors Ltd v Epsom and Ewell Borough Council, 22 a case 
with no other complicating factors, the Comt of Appeal had no hesitation in holding the 
defendant council liable for the anti-social conduct of gypsies camped illegally on its 
property. 
It is submitted that the judiciary has adopted the correct approach in this respect. 
Property owners should be made to act responsibly as regards every aspect of their property 
and its use, in terms of how it is likely to affect their neighbours. As regards third party 
nuisances taking place on their property, it is the property owners who are in the best 
position to prevent or abate them, for, at least in theory, they should have the legal power to 
19 S. Bright, "Liability for the Bad Behaviour of Others", (200 1) 21 OJLS 311 at 315. 
20 [ 1980] 1 QB 485. 
21 Goldman v Hargrave [ 1967] 1 AC 645. 
22 (1981) 80 LGR 337. 
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remove such persons?3 This duty to abate must simply be regarded as one of the burdens of 
ownership/occupation. 
Susan Bright does not agree. Obviously concerned to keep this branch of the law 
firmly grounded in the notion of individual moral responsibility for one's actions, she has 
argued that the only situation in which a property owner should be liable in nuisance for the 
conduct of someone else is where he has expressly or impliedly authorised the behaviour in 
question. 24 To suppm1 her argument, she reanalyses some of the existing cases with a view 
to demonstrating how easily they could be reinterpreted as instances of authorisation rather 
than continuation. In Page Motors, for example, she maintains that the provision of services 
to the gypsies by the defendants, such as a water supply and waste disposal skips, could be 
said to amount to implicit authorisation. It is submitted that this is to construe the notion of 
authorisation in tem1s that are too wide and too vague. If it is to serve any useful purpose, it 
must be specific to the actual source of the nuisance. 
In relation to another case, Bright relies on the precise wording of the following 
dicta, in particular, the use ofthe verb 'to allow': 
"It may be that the cotTect analysis, where it is alleged that the owner/occupier 
of the land is liable for the activities of his licensees, is that he is liable, if at all, for a 
nuisance which he has created by allowing the troublemakers to occupy his land and to use 
it as a base for causing unlawful disturbance to his neighbours". 25 
Here, she would appear to be reading too much into the judge's pm1icular choice of 
vocabulary. Given that the defendants had not consented to the presence of the 
troublemakers on their land in the first place,26 simply failing to remove them once they 
found out they were there could clearly not, in itself, be said to amount to authorisation. It 
is just too weak an argument. It is, moreover, contradicted by authority. The decision in 
Smith v Scott27 would indicate that it is only in exceptional circumstances that the courts 
will uphold a claim of authorisation in cases involving third pm1ies, the test being virtual 
certainty that the nuisance will occur and not just high likelihood. The case itself involved 
23 The fact that they will generally be able to insure themselves against such risks cannot be ignored either. 
24 Op. cit., p. 320. 
25 Lippiatt v South Gloucertershire Council [2000] QB 51 at 61 per Evans LJ (her emphasis). 
26 Contrast A-G v Corke, in which the defendant had given the offending third parties express permission to be 
on his land. 
27 [1973]1 QB 314. 
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an action against a local authority landlord in respect of the conduct of a problem family 
that it had housed next to the claimants. Representatives of the council openly admitted in 
court that they had known that the family in question had a reputation for engaging in 
extremely anti-social behaviour and that it had actually been anticipated that they would 
cause a nuisance at this address. It was nevertheless held that this did not justify a finding 
that the council had authorised the nuisance. 
Moreover, it may be questioned whether there is actually anything to be achieved by 
reinterpreting these cases as instances of authorisation. By stretching the notion of 
authorisation to the extent that it more or less minors the standard interpretation of 
continuation, Bright is arguably ensuring that the outcomes will always remain the same 
regardless of which route is taken. This will go no way towards achieving her stated aim of 
reducing the number of instances of prope1iy owner liability for the acts of third parties. 
If, however, liability for the bad behaviour of trespassers and licensees is to be 
admitted, it will need to be very tightly controlled. The property owner's legal 
responsibilities must remain strictly linked to the use of the land. It is submitted that, 
considered in this context, the answer to the question posed earlier as to whether the 
existence of the nuisance on the defendant's property is to be regarded as a prerequisite to 
liability has clearly to be yes. To permit otherwise would simply result in the tort of 
nuisance becoming dangerously denaturised. Ample proof of this is provided by two very 
recent cases. 
The nuisance action in Hussain v Lancaster Citv CounciP 8 revolved around an 
orchestrated campaign of violence and harassment perpetrated against the owners of a small 
shop situated on a housing estate. They sought to hold the local council liable in nuisance29 
for the harm they suffered as a result of this campaign on the basis that most of the culprits 
were either tenants of the council living on the estate or else persons living with tenants. 
Such relationships, they argued, placed the council under a duty to abate the nuisance, with 
particular emphasis being placed in this respect on the council's power, as landlord, to evict 
the troublemakers. 
28 [2000] QB I. For a (not altogether convincing) criticism of the Hussain decision, and in particular the rule 
limiting liability for continuing a nuisance to occupiers, see J. Morgan, "Nuisance and the Unruly Tenant", 
(2001) 60 CLJ 382. 
29 They also brought an action in negligence against the council but this was dismissed, rather perfunctorily it 
may be said, on the ground that it would not be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care in the 
circumstances. Indeed, the judgments on this issue were so mundane and routine as to be of little or no 
academic interest. 
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Before moving on to discuss the decision of the Court of Appeal, it is necessary to 
address briefly the significance of the defendant's status as a public authority. It is 
submitted that most of the academic commentaries on this case have accorded undue 
weight to it and that this has resulted in unnecessary obfuscation of matters that are, in 
essence, entirely straightforward. Though this was in no way implied by the Comt of 
Appeal in the case, it appears to have been assumed by some academics that special 
principles concerning the liability of public bodies in respect of the use of their statutory 
powers, such as those derived from X v Bedfordshire County Council, 30 would have to be 
applied in this case in order to detetmine whether the nuisance claim was evenjusticiable in 
the first place. 31 But in Hussain, the defendant council was not being sued in respect of its 
exercise of a public law function. It was being sued rather in its essentially private law 
capacity as a landlord and as such was merely subject to the same rules in nuisance as any 
private landlord, at least as regards the existence of its basic obligations. It is recognised, 
however, that policy concerns may have a role to play in relation to the fulfilment of these 
obligations in terms of the standard of reasonableness to be applied. Indeed, comments to 
this effect were made by Ackner LJ in Page Motors. 
Moreover, resort to public-law inspired control devices to avoid the liability of the 
council in this case were entirely unnecessary anyway, for the claim was always bound to 
fail on the basis of ordinary nuisance principles. The first factor in this respect, which was 
indeed detenninative in itself, was that the council was being sued as a landlord for 
continuing the nuisance. However, as was stated earlier, it is an established rule of nuisance 
law that landlords cannot be sued on this basis since the duty to abate only arises on the part 
of occupiers. As there were no grounds for arguing that the council had authorised or 
adopted the nuisance, there simply was no legal basis at all for holding it liable for a 
nuisance not of its own creation. 
Secondly, none of the third party conduct constituting the nuisance actually took 
place on the tenanted property. In the Comt of Appeal, this was the main point of 
contention and Hirst LJ clearly stated that it was indeed a necessary condition of liability in 
this instance that the nuisance consist of an unreasonable user of the defendant's land. Such 
a decisive judgment on this issue would have gone a long way towards clarifying this 
30 [1995] 3 All ER 353. 
31 See, for example, J. O'Sullivan, "Nuisance, Local Authorities and Neighbours from Hell", (2000) 59 CLJ 
11. 
23 
particular aspect of the law, had not a differently composed Court of Appeal insisted on 
derogating from this position a mere couple of weeks later. 
In Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council, 32 it was, once again, the activities of a 
group of travellers that were at the centre of a nuisance action. The travellers in question 
had established an encampment on an area of land owned by the local council. The 
claimants were tenant farmers of neighbouring land who complained that, among other 
things, the travellers trespassed onto their land, left rubbish and excrement on it, stole 
timber and fences, damaged crops and a stone wall and allowed their dogs to chase the 
claimants' sheep. They duly sued the council, as landowner, for failing to abate this 
nuisance behaviour. 
The case came before the Court of Appeal as a striking out action, the defendant 
arguing that, in view of Hussain, the claim had no reasonable prospect of success since the 
acts amounting to the nuisance had not actually been carried out on the defendant's land. 
This was true and should have been the end of the matter. TI1e Court of Appeal, however, 
disagreed. Though recognising that they were bound by Hussain, all three judges 
considered the claimants in this case to be highly meritorious and desired to find some way 
of providing them with a remedy. They did this by taking out of context dicta of Lord Goff 
in Hunter v Can my Whmf 3 and transforming them into a veritable statement of principle 
which met their own purposes. They were thus able to artificially distinguish Hussain. 
The comment in question by Lord Goffwas to the effect that, in nuisance cases, 
some form of emanation from the defendant's land is generally required. 34 He was, 
however, refetTing specifically to cases in which the defendant is being sued for creating a 
nuisance. Given that such cases are generally dealt with in an entirely different manner to 
third party cases, it does not follow that the comment would necessarily apply to the latter. 
Moreover, it was not intended as, and indeed has not otherwise been treated as, a statement 
of authority. In fact, it has long been a matter of debate in creation cases whether the 
nuisance must actually come from the defendant's land because, although it has never been 
fonnally articulated as a condition of liability, in practice most nuisance actions are 
between neighbours and this has given rise to the suggestion that it is actually an unspoken 
rule. The balance of authority, however, would seem to indicate othetwise. There have been 
32 [2000] QB 51. 
33 [1997]2 All ER 426. 
34 !bid at p. 700. 
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many successful actions against non-proprietary defendants. 35 What Lord Gaff appeared to 
be doing in Hunter was effecting some kind of compromise between these two positions 
which could, in a vague and non-committal way, be used to explain the bulk of existing 
case law in a consistent manner. So he adopted the term 'emanation' which was clearly 
broad enough to fit this purpose, for it could be used to refer to any kind of loose 
cormection between the nuisance and the defendant's property. 
In Lippiatt, Evans LJ seized upon this notion of emanation, treated it as a bona fide 
and all-embracing principle and applied it to the facts at hand to conclude that what had 
emanated in this case was the travellers themselves.36 Similarly, Mummery LJ described 
the travellers as having used the defendant's land as a "launching pad" or as a "base" from 
which to commit the acts of nuisance on the claimants' property. 37 By way of distinction, in 
Hussain, the conduct of the perpetrators "was not in any sense linked to, nor did it emanate 
from, the homes where they lived". 38 
What is most worrying about this particular development is that it has been 
wholeheartedly endorsed by academic commentators.39 It is submitted though that their 
endorsement is not so much for the decision itself, but relates rather to the fact that it 
represents a departure from Hussain which they had roundly condenmed. Bagshaw, for 
instance, accuses the Court of Appeal in Hussain of having made two serious errors of 
analysis. He disagrees with the mle that the nuisance must take place on the defendant's 
land and supports this view with a sizeable list of cases in which defendants were held 
liable for nuisances not on their own land. However, for the very same reason just 
discussed in relation to the judgment of Evans LJ in Lippiatt, it is submitted that the 
argument is seriously flawed. The cases he refers to are all creation cases and, as already 
stated, there is a clear distinction to be drawn between these and third party liability cases 
in this respect. As confinned by the House of Lords in Hunter, nuisance is solely a tort 
against land. Its function is to protect the tights of property owners, or more specifically, 
their rights to use and enjoy their property. It is therefore really only necessary that 
claimants prove their entitlement to this protection by asse1ting their proprietary interests. 
35 See list of cases drawn up by Bagshaw, op. cit. , p. 167. The textbooks are also in agreement on this point: 
B. S. Markesinis & S. F. Deakin, Tort Law. (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 438; D. Howatih, Textbook on 
Tort, p. 516; M. A. Jones, Textbook on Torts, (81h ed.), p. 360. 
36 [2000] QB 51 at p. 60. 
37 !bid, at p. 64. 
38 !bid, at p. 61 per Evans LJ. 
39 See, e.g., Bagshaw, op. cit. and O'Sullivan, op. cit., p. 16. 
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The defendant is identified as the appropriate party to sue by his actions, by the fact that he 
has positively created the nuisance. By contrast, in the third party nuisance cases, it is 
purely the property owner's status that fom1s the basis of his liability. Clearly, if the creator 
is an independent third party, the only thing linking the defendant to the nuisance can be the 
land. His legal responsibilities mise out of the land, not out of his control of the third 
parties. Any duties to control them are rather only ancillary to these duties in respect of the 
property itself. It is therefore cmcial that this spatial factor be considered a necessary 
condition of liability. In the absence of this connection, there is no real reason for making 
the defendant any more responsible than anybody else for the nuisance. Moreover, the 
notion of emanation is much too loose a concept and would provide too tenuous a link, for 
it could be easily manipulated and distorted. 
Obviously, the property owner has played some kind of role in the affair in 
facilitating the presence of the third parties in that area, thus enabling them to target the 
particular claimants in question. However, as regards the actual commission of the 
nuisance, in tem1s of cause and effect, this facilitative role could only be described as 
circumstantial rather than instrumental and clearly this would not be enough, in itself, to 
justify the imposition of legal obligations. Of course it would be desirable to compel 
property owners to act considerately in deciding who can make use of their land, so as to 
ensure that such persons would not engage in activities off the land which would be likely 
to annoy those in the surrotmding area, but it is not appropriate to try and do this through 
the law of nuisance, for it has simply not been designed for this purpose. 
The second error of analysis, according to Bagshaw,40 was that instead of focusing 
their attentions on the tenants' land, the Court of Appeal should have been asking whether 
there was a state of affairs on the defendant council's land which amow1ted to a nuisance. 
The reason this error was an important one was that many of the alleged incidents took 
place on open spaces on the estate that were owned by the council and also on the highway. 
Since the council was technically the occupier of these areas, the second ground given by 
the court for dismissing the claim, the mle that landlords cannot be liable for continuing a 
nuisance, would no longer apply and there would be nothing then to bar its liability. It is 
submitted, however, that this is not a feasible argument. It would, in theory, make the 
council liable for nuisances caused by anyone and everyone in these areas. In particular, 
40 Op. cit., p. 167. 
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there would be nothing to link the council to the perpetrators of the harm in this instance as 
council tenants, which is crucial here precisely because the claimants' principal argument 
against the council was that its duty to abate consisted largely in evicting these tenants from 
their council homes. 
The reason why the decision in Hussain would appear unsatisfactory, particularly to 
the layperson, is that the victims in this case were genuinely meritorious. They had endured 
an appalling litany of abuse and intimidation spanning over a number of years, which the 
police had been unable to contain. Bright conunents that, by comparison with the claimants 
in Page Motors, who had actually succeeded, the victims in Hussain were obviously much 
more in need of legal protection. 41 However, this is because she obviously conceives of the 
law of nuisance as having among its functions to curb anti-social behaviour. A brief 
reference to Hunter v Canmy Whmf, in tenns of its categorical reaffim1ation of the link 
between nuisance and land, is enough to demonstrate just how fallacious this view is. 
As pointed out by Thorpe LJ in his very short judgment in Hussain, 42 the simple truth 
of the matter is that, by its nature, the claim in question fell more appropriately within the 
domain of criminal law. The fact that, up until that point, it had failed to provide the victims 
with an adequate remedy was unfortunate, but it did not justify the denaturisation of the law 
of nuisance. 
11. THIRD PARTY PROPERTY LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE 
The action in negligence against a property owner in respect ofhann committed by a third 
party may be described as a kind of default action. That is to say, it will generally only be 
pleaded as an alternative to nuisance, in circumstances in which, for some reason, an action 
in nuisance will not lie. This will usually be because the connection between the third party 
ham1-doer and the defendant's land will be too transient to constitute a nuisance. Typically, 
there will have been no pre-existing relationship between the defendant and the third party, 
and the harm complained of will result from just a single act on the pmt of the latter that 
41 Op. cit., p. 312. 
42 [2000] QB I at p. 28. 
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just somehow happens to incorporate the defendant's property.43 Indeed, most of the cases 
in this particular area follow a similar fact pattern in that they involve actions by property 
owners in respect of damage to their prope1ties caused as a result of third party intruders 
gaining unlawful access to the defendant's neighbouring property. 
There is another reason why a nuisance argument may not be viable in these cases, 
one that relies on the authority of the Hussain decision. It is that the act of the third party 
causing the harm may not actually take place on the defendant's land. Furthermore, it could 
also be that the type ofhann suffered by the claimant is not recoverable in nuisance, 
following the dicta of Lord Hoffman in Hunter v Canmy Wharf 44 For he has suggested that 
where personal injuries are concerned, the only appropriate cause of action is negligence 
and not nuisance. 45 On this point, however, it is worth noting that all the third party 
negligence actions against landowners thus far have been in respect of either property 
damage or economic loss. 
On the relationship between nuisance and negligence in this domain, the predominant 
view appears to be that there is really very little difference between the two. 46 Indeed, 
Lwmey and Oliphant had commented that, at least as far as those cases involving property 
damage are concerned, "any liability in nuisance mirrors that in negligence".47 This, 
however, is to greatly overstate the degree of overlap between them. It has already been 
pointed out that the reason an analogy is drawn between these two tmts in this respect is 
that, by contrast to ordinary creation cases, liability for third patty nuisances is determined 
principally by reference to the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. But again as 
already stated, this fault test differs from the breach element of negligence in that it is 
subjective. Moreover, there are two other conditions of liability to be met in negligence that 
do not directly conespond to any element of nuisance liability. These are, of course, the 
existence of the common law duty of care and the requirement of a causal link between the 
negligence and the harm that is both factually direct and legally not too remote. And 
indeed, it is these latter elements of duty and causation that have proven to be the most 
problematic in the negligence cases in this field. 
43 Although it is possible for an isolated incident to constitute a nuisance, this will only be in exceptional 
circumstances where it can be said to stem from an existing state of affairs on the defendant's property. 
44 [ 1997] 2 All ER 426. 
45 !bid, at p. 458. 
46 See, e.g., Goldman v Hargrave [ 1967] I AC 645, pp. 656, 657 and Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 
[ 1987] I AC 241 at p. 274 per Lord Goff, though it should be noted here that he is refeiTing specifically to 
harm caused by fire. 
47 Tort Law: Text and Materials, p. 542. 
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Taking first of all the duty issue, it is true that the concept is not unknown in 
nuisance, in that the responsibility of the property owner in cases of continuation is said to 
consist of a duty to abate. However, the very foundation of this duty marks it out as entirely 
distinct from the duty of care that arises in negligence. While the nuisance duty is a quasi-
automatic one, stemming directly from the status of the defendant as occupier and subject 
only to the additional proviso that there be knowledge of the existence of the nuisance, the 
existence of the negligence duty is subject to a variety of preconditions and is essentially 
dependant upon factual circumstance. As such, the negligence duty is variable in nature and 
consequently much more difficult to establish than the nuisance duty. 
Moreover, to complicate matters in negligence even further, it seems that the courts 
do not have any clear or consistent ideas as to what these preconditions to the common law 
duty of care actually are, or indeed, what they should be. The problem is that the coUiis 
have not yet specifically addressed the issue of the nature and foundation of this type of 
third party duty. Instead, they have simply assumed that the relevant authority is the well-
known third party liability case of Home Office v Dorset Yacht48 and have consequently 
tried to construe the duty involved as being one to control the actions of the third party. 
This approach, however, is entirely inappropriate, given that the third party perpetrators in 
the relevant case law were all complete strangers to the defendants.49 It ignores the fact that 
there are different types of affirmative duties at play in third party liability cases. It also 
explains, in pati, why the cases in this particular category of third party liability, which are 
indeed among the most high-profile of all the third party liability cases generally, 50 are so 
acutely misunderstood. Part of the focus of the following discussion will therefore be to 
identify the true nature and foundation of the duty involved here. 
Moving on to causation, there can be further identified from the case law a veritable 
judicial obsession with the notion of remoteness. For when faced with the issue of the third 
party liability of propetiy owners, the general tendency of the courts is to leap right in at the 
legal causation stage, and to analyse the whole case in terms of remoteness, to the exclusion 
of all other elements of negligence. Arguably, most of these cases should instead have been 
48 [ 1970] AC I 004. 
49 E.g. P. Per! (Exporters) v Camden London Borough Council [ 1984] I QB 342 (thieves); Ward v Cannock 
Chase District Council [ 1985] 3 All ER 53 7 (vandals); King v Live1poo! City Council [ 1986] 3 All ER 544 
(vandals); Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [ 1987] I AC 241 (vandals). 
50 In academic circles, discussions of the general issue of third party liability in negligence tend to centre 
around these property cases. See, e.g., D. Howmih, "My Brother's Keeper? Liability for the Acts of Third 
Parties", (1994) 14 LS 88 and G. H. L. Fridman, "Non-Vicarious Liability for the Acts of Others", (1997) 5 
Tort LR I 02. 
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principally dealt with on the basis of duty. Of yet greater concern, however, is that the 
com1s do not seem to recognise the difference between duty and remoteness issues in these 
cases. Often they purpm1 to be talking in tenns of duty, but actually concern themselves 
entirely with remoteness arguments. And to make matters worse, the remoteness rules that 
they apply are not even the conect ones in the circumstances. It is submitted that, once 
again, this is the result of a misapplication of Dorset Yacht ptinciples. 
(i) The negligence cases 
In P. Per! (Exporters) Ltd v Camden London Borough Council, 51 thieves broke into the 
defendants' unsecured premises, knocked a hole through an interior dividing wall in order 
to gain access to the claimants' adjoining business premises and from there stole a quantity 
of merchandise. In suing the defendants in negligence, the claimants put forward a number 
of reasons as to why a duty of care arose on the part of the defendants to secure their 
premises in order to protect their neighbours from property damage. First of all, the 
claimants actually leased their premises from the defendants and consequently the 
defendants were aware that they had valuable goods stored there. Secondly, the defendants 
knew that unauthorised persons regularly entered their property, that vagrants had actually 
been camping out there at the relevant time and indeed that frequent burglaries occuned 
there. Thirdly, numerous complaints had previously been made to the defendants about 
their total lack of security, but they had failed absolutely to do anything about it. 
Clearly, the case put forward by the claimants was essentially based upon the 
extremely high degree of foreseeability that hmm of the type complained of would be 
caused to the claimants. Taken in conjunction with the fact that, against this risk, the 
conduct of the defendants in failing even to have a lock fitted on their front door had been 
utterly umeasonable, it cannot be doubted that the claim was, at the very least, an entirely 
plausible one. Indeed, it succeeded at first instance. Before the Court of Appeal, however, it 
was rejected on the ground that it did not come within any of the recognised exceptions to 
the common law rule against holding one person liable for the acts of another. It is 
submitted that the main reason why the Court of Appeal dismissed the action was that it did 
not actually know how to properly assess it, and indeed ended up going about it in entirely 
51 [1984] I QB342. 
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the wrong way. For it is arguable that if it had proceeded on the conect basis then it might 
actually have approved the action. 
The principal difficulty for the Comt of Appeal in P. Per! was the complete lack of 
direct precedent for the issues at stake. Unfortunately, Wall er, Oliver and Goff LJJ did not 
actually appreciate this fact, for they neglected to consider in any detail at the outset what 
the exact issues were and instead just jumped straight in to an assessment of what they 
presmned them to be. Most impmtantly, they failed to give any consideration at all to the 
question of the precise nature of the affinnative duty fanning the crux of the claim and 
simply took the very broad and generalised view already adverted to that as the notion of 
"third party liability" was involved, then Dorset Yacht obviously applied and the relevant 
duty was one of control. 52 This consequently represented the first nail in the coffin for the 
claimants, for obviously no relationship of control could be said to exist in this case as the 
defendants and the third parties were total strangers. Indeed, the identity of the third parties 
was never even discovered. That a duty of this type could therefore not arise was, of course, 
then quickly pointed out by the Court. 53 
Clearly, however, at no point in the victims' statement of claim had it been suggested 
that the defendants had any responsibility to directly influence the behaviour of the 
particular individuals who broke into their premises, as indeed Goff LJ expressly 
acknowledged. 54 The duty actually alleged was rather one of protection owed to these 
particular claimants in respect of a particular type of hmm caused in a particular manner. 
The focus of the court's attention should therefore have been on the justifications for this 
particular type of duty in the circumstances. What was the nature of the relationship 
between the defendants and the claimants? Could any specific reasons be advanced as to 
why these particular defendants should be obliged to act to the benefit of these patticular 
claimants? 
As has already been stated, the claimants' case in this respect was based upon the 
very high degree of foreseeability that ham1 of the type complained of would be caused to 
them as the proximate neighbours of the defendants. What the Court of Appeal should 
52 See, in particular, dicta of Wailer LJ at p. 349 and ofOliver LJ at p. 355. lt is noted that the judges did 
recognise that there were some other exceptional circumstances in which a third party duty could arise in the 
absence of any special relationship between the defendant and the third party tortfeasor, the prime example 
being a Stansbie v Troman ([ 1948] 2 KB 48) type of scena1io. These, however, were included almost as 
afterthoughts and quickly dismissed as inapplicable in the present case- see, e.g., p. 357 per Oliver LJ and p. 
359 per Goff LJ. 
53 At p. 349 per Wailer LJ and at p. 355 per Oliver LJ. 
54 [1984]1 QB342atp.359. 
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therefore have been asking was whether the notion of likelihood of harm could actually be 
used to found a duty of care. Moreover, close consideration should also have been given to 
the exact nature of the role played by the defendant in the commission of the tort. Rather 
than just labelling it as a mere omission, the Court should have inquired into the causal 
relationship between the defendants' failings as regards security and the actions of the third 
parties in causing the damage. For it is submitted that the defendants' failings were pivotal 
in the sense that they actively facilitated the third party conduct. Their role was indeed 
instrumental in this sense. What the Comt was dealing with then was not a pure omission, 
but rather positive contributory conduct of the type falling into the hybrid category between 
commissions and omissions. As discussed in the previous chapter, 55 it is much easier to 
justify the imposition of a duty for this type of conduct than it is for a mere omission. 
Arguably then, what the Court of Appeal should have been considering in this case was 
whether the high likelihood of harm taken in conjunction with the fact that the defendants 
had actively facilitated the commission of the tort sufficed to provide the necessary 
justification in this respect. It is submitted that, on the facts, this did indeed provide a very 
strong foundation for a duty of care. 
In P. Per!, Wailer and Oliver LJJ did realise that the foreseeability factor was central 
to the claim, but failed to identify the element of negligence to which it was most relevant, 
for they dealt with it more or less exclusively in te1ms of remoteness. 56 This was because 
the claimants' arguments about the likelihood of the ham1 happened to correspond exactly 
with the remoteness aspect of Lord Reid's speech in Dorset Yacht, particularly the part at 
which he states: 
" ..... where human action fonns one of the links between the original 
wrongdoing of the defendant and the loss suffered by the plaintiff, that action must at least 
have been something very likely to happen if it is not to be regarded as a novus actus 
inten,eniens breaking the chain of causation. "57 
Concentrating on this remoteness issue, rather than on duty, perhaps because they 
realised that the Dorset Yacht fo1mulation of duty did not work very well in this case, 
55 Supra, p. 5. 
56 Goff LJ dealt solely with the duty issue and, accordingly, his judgment was rather short. 
57 [1970) AC 1004 at p. 1030. 
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Wailer and Oliver LJJ focused on what exactly Lord Reid meant by the above statement in 
terms of the specific degree of likelihood required. And while they were unable to reach 
any definite conclusions about this in the end, they were confident that the degree of 
foreseeability in this case that the thieves would use the defendants' propetiy to gain access 
to the claimants' storeroom58 would not, in any event, be high enough to satisfy this test, 
whatever it turned out to be. 
The same preoccupation with remoteness issues can also be seen in the next case to 
invoke the third party liability of a property owner, Ward v Cannock Chase District 
Council. 59 It is, however, to be distinguished from P. Per! in three different respects: firstly, 
it is only a first instance decision; secondly, it has received much less academic attention; 
thirdly, and most importantly, it involves an action that was actually successful. 
The claimant in Ward was the owner of a terraced house which became damaged 
when the adjoining property collapsed due to the complete failure of its owner, the 
defendant local council, to maintain it. The claimant's house was subsequently deemed 
unfit for habitation, with the result that the claimant and his family had to be rehoused. The 
council accepted its responsibilities to cany out the necessary repairs to the property, but 
then failed to do anything about it. Evenh1ally a court order requiring the work to be done 
had to be issued against them. Initially, they agreed to comply, but then, the very next day, 
vandals broke into the claimant's property and actually removed parts of the building, 
causing further substantial damage. The council then argued that as the situation had 
changed since the mandatory order had been made, their obligations had also altered. In 
particular, they denied having any responsibility in respect of the additional damage caused 
by the vandals. They then refused to carry out any repairs at all. During this stand-off, the 
state of the property was allowed to deteriorate to the point that it became so unsafe it had 
to be demolished. The issue for the court to decide was therefore whether the council could 
be made liable for the additional costs involved in rebuilding the property, as opposed to 
just carrying out the originally required moderate repairs. 
Deciding the case, Scott J concentrated on the appropriate foreseeability test to be 
applied for the purposes of legal causation, in accordance with Lord Reid's speech from 
Dorset Yacht. By contrast toP. Per!, however, it is submitted that in this case, this was 
actually the correct approach for the comi to have taken. This is because the defendants had 
58 They rated such conduct only as a foreseeable possibility. Seep. 357 per Oliver LJ. 
59 [1985] 3 All ER 537. 
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already inflicted an identifiable harm on the claimants even before the intervention of the 
third parties and, more importantly, in court accepted responsibility for this. The conduct of 
the third parties facilitated by the original act of negligence on the pati of the defendants 
then caused additional harm to the claimants. The issue for the court, therefore, was not 
whether the defendants were actually liable at all, as it was in P. Per!, since here the 
defendants were clearly liable for the original harm at the very least, as they had already 
conceded. Rather it was whether the defendant could be made liable for the additional 
harm, and this is more clearly construed as a causation issue. 60 
Having gone through all the relevant authorities on the remoteness issue and 
considered all the different formulations of Lord Reid's 'likelihood' test, Scott J concluded 
that in the end they all amounted to the same thing- reasonable foreseeability- and that 
such a requirement was readily fulfilled in this case. Though he may have glossed over 
somewhat the dicta in support of a high likelihood test, the finding that in this case the 
harm was not too remote seems coiTect. Of crucial importance in this respect was the 
evidence before the court about the nature of the locality in which the properties in question 
were located. For the area, known as 'the Mossley', had a particularly bad reputation for 
crime, especially theft and vandalism, and this led Scott J to conclude that it was "virtually 
certain"61 that the claimant's property would succumb to the hatm in question. 
A further factor militating strongly in favour of liability was the high degree of fault 
clearly evident on the part of the defendants, for in addition to the fact that its failures to act 
were wholly unjustified, there was some suggestion that it had victimised the claimant. 
Indeed, Scott J, on at least two occasions, made pointed reference to the council's 
"disgraceful treatment" of the claimant and his family. 62 He also commented specifically on 
the fact that the court order issued against the defendants had been framed in very strong 
terms, thus emphasising further the level of judicial disapproval of its conduct. 
Overall, Ward would appear to have been correctly decided. That the next decision in 
this series, however, is to be characterised by the same judicial confusion between duty and 
remoteness that manifested itself in P. Per!, would suggest perhaps that the court's 
adoption of the cmTect approach to liability in Ward had more to do with chance than actual 
discernment of the issues at stake. 
6
° For another case involving similar issues, see Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [ 1981] QB 625. 
61 [1985] 3 All ER 537 at p. 553. 
62 !bid, at pp. 542, 543. 
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In King v Liverpool City Council, 63 it was once again the activities of vandals that lay 
at the centre of a negligence action against a property owner. In this case, the targeted 
property was an empty and unsecured council flat. Unidentified third parties broke into the 
flat and tampered with the water system on three separate occasions and each time caused 
water to flood the claimant's flat situated directly below. After the first break-in had been 
reported, the council had arranged for a plumber to come in to do some repair work, but he 
was unable to turn off the rising main supply of drinking water as this would have affected 
the other flat. Although it was standard practice for the council to atTange for vacant 
properties to be boarded up, for some reason this was not done in this case. There was 
evidence that boarding up work had been catTied out after the third break-in, but this was 
strongly disputed in court and, in any event, it was evident that even if any such work had 
been initiated, it had not been effectively done. 
The thrust of the claimant's allegation against the council was that the evident 
vulnerability of the empty flat to acts of vandalism gave rise to a duty of care on the part of 
the council, as owner of the propet1y, to ensure that it was adequately protected against 
such dangers and that tllis duty had not been fulfilled because the steps it had taken to this 
effect had fallen far below the standard of reasonableness required. 64 The Court of Appeal 
disagreed. Indeed, it is clear from the negative tone of the main judgment, given by Purchas 
LJ, that the Court was of the opinion from the very beginning that the claim never had any 
chance of succeeding. Unfm1unately, that was where its cet1ainty ended, for it is also 
evident from Purchas LJ's judgment that the Com1 was entirely tmclear as to the exact 
reasons why it was destined to fail. Most significantly, he vacillated between duty and 
remoteness issues without making any distinction between them, indeed seenlingly without 
even realising that there even was any distinction to be made between them. One moment 
63 [1986] 3 All ER 544. 
64 At first instance, the claimant also sought to argue nuisance, on grounds of continuation, but this was 
swiftly rejected by the trial judge as untenable on the facts. it is submitted, however, that his reasoning in this 
respect is subject to question. He held that in calling the plumber, the council had taken reasonable, albeit 
ineffective, steps to abate the nuisance and thus had fulfilled its duty in this respect. But this is only 
convincing if the source of the nuisance could be said to have been the actual escape of the water. Realising 
this, the claimant tried to argue that it was rather the condition of the premises that constituted the nuisance 
and that, in this respect, the action taken by the council had not been reasonable. Clearly, there is much force 
in this argument, for if the flat had been properly secured the vandals would not have been able to break in 
and cause the flooding in the first place. At the very least, the nuisance should have been regarded as a 
combination of both the lax security and the escape of the water. Indeed in both Sedleigh-Denfield and Lea key 
v National Trust, a similarly broad approach was taken to the question of what constituted the nuisance in 
those cases. The trial judge, however, simply rejected this argument outright as being "of no significance". 
Arguably, this was very ill considered on his part. 
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he was discussing the notion of a duty to control, the next he was citing remoteness 
arguments from Dorset Yacht and P. Per!. In fact, his whole judgment contained very little 
analysis of how any of the points raised actually applied to the claim in King itself. Even 
more confusingly, he then appeared to suggest in his concluding remarks that the main 
reason the claim failed was either lack of fault or absence of factual causation, for he 
treated as determinative the (rather dubious) finding of the trial judge that there were no 
effective steps the defendants could have taken in the circumstances to defeat the activities 
of the vandals. 65 Of course, he did not present this as a breach or factual causation issue, 
instead stating that it could relate either to the question of the ambit of the duty (breach?) or 
to legal causation. Then he went on to conclude that the claim failed for Jack of duty! 
Ultimately, it would appear that the principal motivation for the decision was a basic 
floodgates fear. For it was pointed out in court that vandalism was a particularly big 
problem at that time in the area concemed. And indeed, the defendant's status as a local 
authority undoubtedly fmther influenced the comt in this respect. But if vandalism was 
such an obvious risk in the circumstances, should this not instead have been considered as a 
factor militating in favour of compelling the council to take precautionary measures? It is 
significant that the Court of Appeal entirely glossed over this point. 
The next case in this series is arguably also the most important one. It has certainly 
received the most academic attention. Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Lt~6 involved a 
derelict cinema that had fallen prey to repeated acts of vandalism. Its owners were unaware 
of this and consequently made no attempt improve security on the premises. On one 
occasion, a fire was started in it which spread to adjoining properties and caused serious 
damage. The owners of these properties duly sued the owners of the cinema in negligence, 
alleging a breach of duty to prevent the entry of the intruders who had started the fire in the 
first place. The claim succeeded at first instance, but was then dismissed on appeal by both 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
That the claim ultimately failed comes as no great surprise at this point, in view of 
the attitude demonstrated by the courts towards this type of liability in the cases already 
discussed. Of more interest in the present context is the way in which the House of Lords 
arrived at its decision to reject the claim, for it is submitted that, for the first time, the 
correct approach to liability was consciously adopted by at least one member of the court. 
65 At p. 552. 
66 [1987] I AC 241. 
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Unfortunately, the Law Lord in question, Lord Mackay, did not make his speech explicit 
enough in this respect and, as a result, the whole case has been wrongly interpreted on a 
number of fronts. 
The standard view of Smith is that it stands as firm authority for the rule that there 
can be no duty at common law to control the actions of another. This view stems from a 
reading of the case which treats the speech of Lord Gaff as the leading judgment. Taking a 
very straightforward and orthodox approach, Lord Gaff avoided having to go into the 
substantive details of the case by basing his analysis solely in tenns of the law on omissions 
and concluding that as the claim did not fit within any of the established exceptions to the 
general rule against liability for omissions, it was bound to fail as having no legal 
foundation. 
Writing separately, both Markesinis and Howarth, however, have suggested that an 
entirely different reading of the case can be taken, one which instead treats the speech of 
Lord Mackay as setting out the ratio decidendi, and that this actually casts a whole new 
perspective on this area of negligence law, perhaps even opening up a novel category of 
liability. 67 The thrust of their argument is that while Lord Gaff abstractly denied the 
existence of a duty of care and this created, in effect, a blanket exclusion of liability 
extending to all cases in which property owners who fail to prevent third parties from 
gaining access to their property are blamed for ham1 that is subsequently caused to 
neighbouring properties, Lord Mackay, by contrast, based his decision to dismiss the claim 
on the facts of the case, thus theoretically leaving this avenue of third party liability open 
for future exploitation. They maintain that the reason Lord Mackay's speech is to be 
regarded as the leading judgment is that his is the one that received the support of the 
majority.68 In asset1ing this, they argue that both Lord Griffiths and Lord Brandon fi'amed 
their decisions in terms similar to those stated by Lord Mackay, with Lord Griffiths actually 
expressing himself to be in total agreement with Lord Mackay. While Lord Keith's position 
would seem impossible to categorise here since he, incomprehensibly, expressed himself to 
be in total agreement with both Lord Mackay and Lord Gaff, he does not actually affect the 
balance in this respect, for even if he were to be discounted, or indeed placed on the side of 
Lord Gaff, Lord Mackay would still hold the majority. 
67 B. Markesinis, "Negligence, Nuisance and Affirmative Duties of Action", ( 1989) I 05 LQR I 04, D. 
Howarth, "My Brother's Keeper'? Liability for the Acts of Third Pmiies", ( 1994) 14 LS 88. 
68 Indeed, Howarth even goes so far as to describe the speech of Lord Goff as akin to a dissenting judgment, 
"Negligence After Murphy: Time to Rethink", ( 1991) CLJ 58 at 77. 
37 
It is submitted that this reading of Smith is essentially correct. However, it is further 
submitted that Markesinis and Howa1th erred in interpreting Lord Mackay's substantive 
analysis of the claim as being based primarily on issues of fault and causation. For a close 
reading of his Lordship's speech reveals that he actually formulates the ratio of the case in 
terms of duty and that his comments on breach and remoteness issues are merely to be 
regarded as obiter dicta. Admittedly, Lord Mackay did not help to clarify the matter by 
failing to explain, at the different stages of his speech, which element of negligence he was 
actually referring to. 
The first crucial point is that Lord Mackay treated the notion of the foreseeability of 
the conduct of the vandals as being determinative of the duty issue, for he stated: 
" ..... unless Littlewoods were bound reasonably to anticipate and guard against 
the danger, they had no duty of care, relevant to this case, requiring them to inspect their 
premises. Unless, therefore, Littlewoods, on taking control of these premises without any 
knowledge of the subsequent history of the property after they assumed control, ought 
reasonably to have anticipated that they would be set on fire and thus or otheiWise create a 
substantialtisk of damage to neighbouring properties if they did not take precautions, the 
claims must fail. "69 
He thus implied that if the defendants had ever been infmmed about the previous acts of 
vandalism, then a duty to secure the premises would have been imposed on them. 70 By 
making actual or constructive knowledge of the very high risk of harm a key factor, he thus 
enables a strong parallel to be drawn between this fom1 of negligence liability and third 
party nuisance liability under the Sedleigh-Denfield principle. 
For Lord Mackay, the entire claim was consequently dealt with on this basis. 71 
However, he felt the need to go on and add his own 'observations' 72 about some of the 
other matters raised by the claim, notably breach and remoteness issues, expressly because 
of their "general importance". 73 
69 [ 1987] I AC 241, at pp. 257-258. 
70 On this analysis then, he presumably would have recognised a duty of care in P. Per!. 
71 Supra, no. 69 at p. 259. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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He addressed first of all the by now notorious question of how to interpret Lord 
Reid's 'likelihood' speech from Dorset Yacht, and concluded that the test for remoteness 
set out was that the ham1 caused by the intervention of the third pmty had to be reasonably 
foreseeable as probable rather than just possible. 74 He then tumed to breach, but basically 
just said in this respect that the ordinary test of the reasonable man would apply. One 
interesting point he did make here though was that there was a distinction to be drawn at 
this stage of the liability assessment between cases of fire involving third parties (i.e. a 
Smith or Goldman v Hargrave type of scenario) and cases of theft involving third parties (a 
P. Per! or King type of scenario). What he appeared to be suggesting here was that a higher 
standard of care would generally apply in relation to the former, the reasons for this being 
that fires are more inherently hazardous than acts of theft and that fires continue to 
represent sources of danger on the defendant's property until they are put out, whereas the 
use of the defendant's land by thieves would be transient, simply to gain access to the 
neighbouring properties. Lord Mackay also considered that victims would be able to take 
independent action to protect themselves against theft in a way that would not be possible 
with fire. As he was talking only at a general level, however, he did not attempt to consider 
how any of this would apply to Smith itself. 
For present purposes, it is Lord Mackay's approach to the duty issue that is of most 
significance, for it is submitted that it comes close to establishing a logical and workable 
test for duty in this type of third party liability case. It may be recalled that Lord Mackay 
proceeded on the basis that a duty would be imposed if there were a high degree of 
foreseeability that the third party conduct causing the ham1 would take place. This makes 
sense since it is clear that the reason why these particular defendants have been targeted is 
that they have been in a position to prevent a highly obvious risk. It is recognised that there 
is a general judicial hostility towards such all-embracing foreseeability tests, 75 with even 
the usually progressive Markesinis commenting that such a duty test would be dangerously 
expansive.76 It is submitted, however, that such vehement distrust of the concept of 
foreseeability is unfounded. It stems from the misconception that foreseeability 
automatically equates with liability, a position that would clearly be dangerously expansive, 
when in fact it is only being used to detennine whether the claim can pass through the first 
74 /bid, at p. 26 I. 
75 Hence the demise of the Anns test. 
76 Op. cit., p. I 05. 
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stage of the liability inquiry and go on to be substantively litigated. To concede a duty is 
not to concede automatic liability. In any event, it is not proposed to make the high degree 
of foreseeability requirement the sole basis for the duty in these cases, for it is recognised 
that with such an exceptional form of liability further justification is needed. Some other 
link between the pmticular defendant and the hann complained of needs to be made, 
something to con-elate with the role canied out in ordinary personal negligence cases by the 
act of misfeasance on the pmt of the defendant. 
It could be argued that the necessary link in this respect is provided by the fact of the 
defendant's control of the property in question, but it is thought that this is not reason 
enough to impose what may in some cases turn out to be rather onerous responsibilities. 
There needs to be a sense that the individual defendant personally deserves to be so 
obligated. This can only mean focusing on the defendant's conduct. If all the cases just 
discussed are looked at from this perspective, it can be seen that in each one there was some 
kind of initial failing on the pmt of the defendant which enabled the third party intervention 
to take place, without which the third party intervention could probably not have taken 
place at all. Arguably, this fact of positive, direct and instmmental facilitation of the 
commission of the tort, taken in conjunction with the high degree of likelihood of the third 
party conduct taking place, would suffice to justify the duty to take reasonable care in all of 
the cases apart from Smith, where the degree of likelihood was not high enough. Indeed, 
this was the very idea canvassed earlier in relation to the P. Per! case, and having examined 
the rest of the case law, it does seem to constitute, at the very least, a feasible approach to 
duty. If applied strictly, and alongside the standard Caparo tripartite test for duty, or at least 
alongside the 'proximity' and 'fair, just and reasonable' stages of this test, for the 
foreseeability requirement is probably incorporated into the principles just discussed, then 
there is no reason why liability could not be tightly controlled and, consequently, there 
should be no real floodgates fear. A further point to be made is that if this approach were to 
be adopted then there would be no need to apply Lord Reid's likelihood test at the 
remoteness stage, since this will already have been dealt with in these cases under the 
mbric of duty. Indeed, it is submitted that it will only ever be appropriate to apply his 
remoteness test in cases involving duties to control, as per Dorset Yacht itself. 
A cmcial consequence of basing a duty on a positive facilitation of the commission 
of the tott, plus a high degree of likelihood of the third party intervention, is that there 
would be nothing to link it specifically to property owners, or indeed to property damage, 
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so that it would have the potential to constitute a principle of general applicability. It is 
submitted, however, that this would not necessarily be a problem. In fact, it may even turn 
out to be a good thing, for such a general principle could be used to explain, in a consistent 
manner, many other related instances of third party liability that, at present, appear rather 
disparate. 
Take, for instance, the well-known case of Haynes v Harwood, 77 which involved a 
claimant injured by some runaway horses. The defendant owner of the horses had left them 
unattended in a busy street, near to where some children were playing, and the horses 
bolted when one of the children threw a stone at them. The claimant was injured while 
trying to stop the horses. The defendant was held liable, essentially on the ground that he 
should have anticipated that children in such close proximity would become engaged in 
some sort of mischievous enterprise. In other words because it was highly foreseeable that 
the harm would occur. It is interesting that in Srnith, Lord Goff categorises Haynes as a 
special case of third party liability based on the defendant's creation of a source of 
danger. 78 He obviously conceives of this category as being strictly limited, however, to 
dangers that are capable of being instantaneously 'sparked off, such as those represented 
by horses or fireworks or the like. It is contended, however, that what should count should 
not be the actual source or nature ofthe danger, but rather the likelihood of its occurrence. 
Another relevant case in this respect would be Stansbie v Troman, 79 in which a 
decorator who left the claimant's house unlocked was held liable for the actions of a thief 
who subsequently entered and stole property. Lord Goff treated this decision as being based 
upon an assumption of responsibility on the pat1 of the decorator towards the claimant, 
arising from the contract between them. 80 .Lord Mackay, on the other hand, regarded the 
decorator's liability as being based rather on the idea of the foreseeability of the unlawful 
intrusion. 81 It is submitted that his is by far the most convincing, and indeed common sense, 
explanation of the case, not least because the contract between the parties relied on by Lord 
Goffrelated only to the defendant's conduct in decorating the house and there was no 
representation, either express or implied, on the part of the defendant as to the security of 
the property. 
77 [1935] I KB 146. 
78 [1987] I AC 241,273. 
79 [1948] 2 KB 48. 
80 [1987] I AC241 atp.272. 
81 !bid, at p. 265. 
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The idea of a positive facilitation of the commission of the tm1 accompanied by a 
high degree of foreseeability of the third pm1y intervention may also be applied to another 
mini-seties of cases: those involving hann caused by stolen motor vehicles (pm1icularly 
buses!). 82 The three cases making up this series were briefly chronicled by Fleming, 83 but 
apart fi"om this they have received little academic attention. Of course, the fact that only 
one of the decisions was actually repm1ed will not have helped to raise their profile. 
The first case is from 1982. In Hayman v London Transport Executive, 84 an 
unattended bus which had been stolen fi"om an area in which children frequently meddled 
with unattended buses collided with the claimant's car. The Court of Appeal held the 
Transport Executive liable, more or less on the basis that it had taken wholly inadequate 
precautions against what was, in the circumstances, an obvious risk of harm. Then in 1986, 
in Den ton v United Counties Omnibus Co, 85 a similar claim arose in respect of damage 
caused by another stolen bus. This time, however, the Com1 of Appeal refused to impose 
liability. Relegating Hayman to the status of a case based on its own special facts, it took a 
very orthodox approach to the duty issue, applied P. Per! and held that the claim was duly 
defeated by the general rule against imposing duties to control the acts of another. Finally, 
in Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd, 86 it was an unattended minibus that was 
stolen and this time the consequences were much more serious, the claimant's wife being 
knocked down and killed as a result of the thiefs reckless driving. On the authority of 
Denton and Smith v Littlewoods, the Court of Appeal once again denied that any duty of 
care was owed by the defendant bus company. 
Arguably, in both Denton and Topp, the high degree of foreseeability that the buses 
would be stolen and that harm would consequently be caused to other road users actually 
provides a very strong foundation for the existence of a duty, given that the defendants in 
each case had contributed to the creation of the 1isk by leaving the vehicles unattended in 
82 Worthy of mention also in this context is Lord Denning's brief attempt to introduce into English law a 
special category of vicarious liability in relation to cars. Commonly referred to as 'the family car doctrine', it 
involved holding car owners liable for the negligence of their immediate family members in using the car: 
Launchbw)' v M organs [ 1971] 2 QB 245. This doctline was, however, quickly rejected by the House of 
Lords, which stated clearly that the liability of a car owner for the use of his car by another could only be 
established by evidence of 'casual delegation', that is, by evidence that the car was being used with the 
owner's permission and at least partly in his interests: Morgans v Lazmchbw)' [ 1973] AC 127. For the 
Australian position, see Soblusky vEgan ( 1960) I 03 CLR 215, but note also the recent decision of the High 
Court of AustJ·alia in Scoff v Davis (2000) 74 ALJR 1410, as noted by P. Handford, (200 I) 9 Tort LR 97. 
83 J. G. Fleming, "Injury caused by Stolen Motor Vehicles", (1994) 110 LQR 187. 
84 Unreported, CA, March 4, 1982. 
85 Unreported, CA, May I, 1986. 
86 (1993] I WLR 977. 
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the first place. Particularly in Topp. in which the defendants admitted that it was their 
company policy for drivers to leave buses unlocked with the keys in the ignition at 
changeover points, so that they could be collected by the next driver. On the occasion in 
question, the company had moreover been infonned that the changeover driver for the bus 
at the centre of the incident had not turned up and that meant that the bus was stranded, but 
they simply did nothing about it. In the end, the bus was left sitting for about nine hours 
before eventually being stolen. 
There is one last, isolated case that can be explained on the basis of the duty 
principles being advocated. It differs, however, from the others just discussed in that it is an 
example of when not to apply these principles, for in this case they were simply not 
supported by the facts. In Paterson Zochonis v MeJfarken Packaging Ltd. 87 the defendants 
were printers who unwittingly supplied the packaging for tubes of counterfeit face cream 
They were sued by the holders of the copyright for the cream on the grounds that their 
suspicions should have been aroused that the packaging was to be used for a wrongful 
purpose by a nun1ber of specified small details and that, consequently, they should have 
checked that the persons who had placed the order had had the necessary authority to do so. 
Clearly, in view of the entirely innocent role played by the defendants, these allegations 
were very tenuous. Not surprisingly, the Com1 of Appeal rejected the claim and, as such, it 
may be commented that, if nothing else, the Paterson decision at least demonstrates that it 
is possible to keep the foreseeability duty principle within definable limits. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Overall, while the use of the law of nuisance to engage the third pmty liability of property 
owners has been too expansive, the use of the law of negligence in this respect has, 
arguably, been too restrictive. 
In nuisance, the most wonying development has been the replacement of the 
requirement, in cases of continuation, that the third party conduct constituting the nuisance 
actually take place on the defendant's land with the rather vague idea that the conduct 
needs now only to be construed as somehow 'emanating' from the defendant's land. For it 
87 [ 1986] 3 All ER 522. 
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has been pointed out that the defendant's liability in these cases is based solely upon his 
status as a property owner and that means that the only real link between the defendant and 
liability is the land. To remove this link is therefore to remove the legal foundation from the 
duty to abate. 
In negligence, a misplaced floodgates fear appears to be all that guides the judicial 
approach to this branch of third party liability, for the case law has certainly demonstrated 
that it consists of very little in the way of principle. A new and radical approach to the duty 
issue has been suggested, one that predicates liability upon the defendant's positive 
facilitation of the commission of the tort against the background of a highly obvious risk. 
Not limited specifically to property owners, this new duty principle would, in effect, 
amount to a general principle of third pmty liability capable both of reconciling many 
existing isolated instances of such liability, and of setting out a consistent approach to 
future cases. It would explain, for example, why the oft-quoted scenarios of handing a 
loaded gun to a child or giving a set of car keys to a drunk would give rise to affirmative 
duties, situations in which it is accepted without question that third party liability should 
arise, but in relation to which the reasons why such liability should arise have never 
actually been articulated in any principled manner. 
It has also been pointed out that one fmther consequence of applying the new duty 
principles being advocated is that there would no longer be any need to apply Lord Reid's 
famous likelihood test at the remoteness stage, since this will already have been 
incorporated into the duty analysis. It may then be questioned whether there would be any 
role left for the legal causation element of negligence to play. It is submitted that there 
would. For one, the ordinary Wagon Mound test of reasonable foreseeability of the type of 
ham1 would still have to be satisfied. In this respect, it is to be noted that the likelihood test 
being applied at the duty stage will only relate to the idea of the third party conduct taking 
place, and not to the type of harm eventuating. Moreover, there may also be novus actus 
arguments coming in at this stage which concern either the claimant's conduct or that of 
another outside party apatt from the third party perpetrator.88 
One final point to be made is that it is envisaged that the ordinary test of the 
reasonable man would continue to apply at the breach stage. 
88 Obviously to construe the latter's conduct as a novus actus would be to defeat the duty analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Parental Liability 
The liability of parents in respect of their children is a rather anomalous category of third 
party liability. The particular nature of the parent/child relationship would appear to make 
parents prime candidates for the attribution of this type of liability. Characterised as it is by 
notions of responsibility, authority and control, the role they play would seem to provide a 
strong foundation for the imposition of two distinct duties of affirmative action involving 
their children: ( 1) to protect them from harm caused by third parties; and (2) to control 
them in order to prevent harm to third parties. That such duties do exist as a matter of law is 
a perception shared by many legal academics. 1 An analysis of the relevant case law, 
however, reveals a different picture. The whole idea of parental liability is quite exceptional 
in English tmtlaw, with such judicial reticence being seemingly explicable on the basis of 
policy considerations. There is a general belief that the domain of family life is one area of 
social interaction where the negative consequences of strict legal regulation are likely to 
outweigh the associated benefits. This is because the family unit is regarded as one of the 
foundational institutions underpinning society, with family hmmony accordingly being 
treated as sacrosanct. Concerned to promote this ideal, the comts have reasoned that by 
refusing to intmde into family affairs in the absence of compelling reasons to do so, they 
will effectively be encouraging and protecting the existence of stable family relationships. 
Taken to its logical extreme, it follows that negligence actions against parents that are 
founded simply on the fact of parenthood could not possibly be judicially sanctioned. 
Clearly, this reasoning can be criticised as overly simplistic. Nevertheless, for the moment 
at least, it simply has to be recognised that it fom1s the basis of the current English 
approach to parental liability. 
To analyse in detail the law on the third party liability of parents in respect of their 
children, it is necessary to approach separately the two different types of such liability. For, 
as mentioned above, the duty to protect the child from third parties and the duty to protect 
third parties from the child are two entirely distinct and independent duties. It is of cmcial 
1 See, e.g., D. Howarth, Textbook on Torts ( 1995), p. 173; J. G. Fleming, The Law of' Torts (1998), p. 171; M. 
A. Jones, Textbook on Tort (2002), p. 59. 
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imp011ance at the outset to realise that the law does not treat these obligations as 
inextricably linked, in that the recognition of one will not necessarily indicate the existence 
of the other. 
I. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS TO THEIR OWN CHILDREN FOR HARM 
COMMITTED BY OTHERS2 
The paucity of authority on the issue of the duty of parents to protect their children is a 
point of significance in itself. In the space of nearly three hundred years, there have been 
just two reported English decisions in which a parent has been sued in respect of injuries 
sustained by his or her own child. 3 The first is the seventeenth century case of Ash v Ash4 in 
which a mother was successfully sued by her daughter for the torts of assault, battery and 
false imprisonment. It is, however, of little relevance to the present discussion for it merely 
provides authority for the undisputed proposition that parents may be liable to their children 
for intentional torts perpetrated directly by them on the child. In such cases, a specific duty 
is owed and the liability of the parent is the same as that of any stranger, the relationship of 
parenthood being merely incidental. 5 Whether parents are under a positive duty to protect 
their children at all times from foreseeable dangers relates rather to the general issue of 
liability for negligence, based on a failure to prevent injury being sustained by the child. 
F01tunately, this issue is directly addressed by the second reported decision. 
In Surtees v Kingston-upon-Thames Borough Council, 6 the adult plaintiff brought an 
action in negligence against her former foster parents 7 and against the local authority that 
had placed her with them, for serious injuries sustained to her foot when she was just two-
2 For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see C. Mclvor, "Expelling the myth of the parental duty to 
rescue", (2000) 12 CFLQ 229. 
3 InS v Ward & Another [ 1995] I FLR 862, the plaintiff brought an action in negligence against her mother 
for failing to protect her from the abuse she suffered as a child at the hands of her father. The matter was 
never substantively litigated, however, for the only issue to actually come before the court was that of 
statutory limitation. There is also the Scottish case of Young V Rankin [1934] se 499, in which an infant 
plaintiff brought an action against his father for injuries sustained due to his negligent driving. 
4 ( 1696) Comb 357. 
5 See the dictum of Lucas J to this effect in the Australian case, Cameron v Commissioner for Railways (1974) 
Qd R480. 
6 [1991] 2 FLR 559. 
7 The comt accepted that the duty owed by a foster parent is the same as that owed by an ordinary parent. 
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years-old. 8 It had been clearly established that the injuries had been sustained through 
immersion in water hot enough to cause third degree bums, but the facts as to the actual 
circumstances sun·ounding the injury were unclear. The plaintiff alleged that while left 
unattended she must have placed her foot in a basin containing hot water, whereas the 
foster parents argued that she had somehow activated the hot tap herself after placing her 
foot in the wash basin. 
However, the significance of the decision, for present purposes, relates to the 
unanimous finding that the parental duty of care is not an automatic duty and that its 
existence must be detennined on a case by case basis, the appropriate test being reasonable 
foreseeability of injury of the type sustained. In finding that the foster mother was subject 
to a duty of care, the Court of Appeal considered it to be of crucial importance that she had 
been in a position to exercise de facto control over the plaintiff which suggests that the 
question of control may, in itself, be a detem1inative factor. The natural conclusion is that 
the parental duty of protection arises solely in certain circumstances and is not recognised 
as a general duty. 
Indeed, it seems that even where such a duty is held to exist, it may be so easily 
fulfilled as to make it almost incapable of giving rise to liability for "negligent parenting". 
In Surtees, the majority avoided holding the foster mother liable on the basis that the injury 
was too remote to be attributed to any fault on her part. In their refusal to characterise as 
negligent "the care which ordinary, loving and careful mothers are able to give to 
individual children, given the rough and tumble of home life",9 the judges were evidently 
motivated by a desire to avoid the imposition of an 'impossibly high' standard of care on 
parents and to preserve family harmony. 
(i) A commonwealth perspective 
In the absence of any other English authority on the subject, it is instructive to consider at 
this point how the question has been dealt with by other commonwealth courts, for, having 
been confronted with the issue in a greater number of cases, they have had the opportunity 
8 In the case of children, the ordinary limitation period of three years applicable to tort claims does not start to 
run until the age of majority has been attained- Limitation Act 1980, s.28. 
9 [ 1991] 2 FLR 559 at 583, 584 per Browne-Wilkinson V -C. 
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to give it more detailed examination. It is worthy of note that in the cases about to be 
discussed, the action in negligence against a parent was actually instigated by a third patiy, 
usually an insurance company, in the form of contribution proceedings. The general pattern 
is that a child victim sues a third party for injuries sustained and this first defendant, in 
seeking a contribution to any damages payable, alleges that the parents are also partly 
responsible because they negligently failed to protect the child. 10 This is an important point 
because it has been suggested that one of the main policy arguments against holding parents 
liable in negligence to their children is that, in practice, to allow such actions would 
actually operate to the financial detriment of the child. 11 For if such allegations were to 
mise in contribution proceedings, it is an undeniable truth that to uphold these claims 
against parents would be to effectively reduce the award of damages to which the child 
victim would othe1wise be entitled. 
The two leading commonwealth decisions on the parental duty of care are that of the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in McCallion v Dodd12 and the High Court of Australia in 
Hahn v Conley. 13 In McCallion v Dodd, the four-year-old plaintiff was struck by a car as he 
walked along the roadside with his parents, in the dark and against the flow of traffic. 
While the plaintiff was to the outside, being led by the hand by his mother, his father was 
on the inside carrying the baby. The plaintiff sued the defendant motorist whose insurance 
company claimed contribution from the boy's father, alleging negligence on his part. In 
considering the nature of the duty of care owed by the father to his son, the judges offered 
differing opinions. North P considered that the mere presence of the parent at the scene, 
coupled with the relationship of parenthood, placed him under a legal duty to ensure the 
child's safety, whereas Tumer and McCatihy J.T approved of the Australian view that the 
basis of the parent's duty of care is no different to that of a stranger and arises only where 
the parent has assumed responsibility for the child in a patticular situation. 14 McCarthy J, in 
particular, stated that there is no legal duty on a parent qua parent to protect and control a 
child, only unenforceable moral duties. 
In ordinary cases, the application of these rules would mean that the fact that the 
child was in the physical control of one parent at the time of the injury, as where a child is 
10 In England and Wales, this issue is govemed by section 1(1) ofthe Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. 
11 S. Yeo, "Am I My Child's Keeper? Parental Liability in Negligence", ( 1998) AJFL 12 (Lexis transcript). 
12 [1966] NZLR 710. 
13 (1971) 126 CLR 276. 
14 See Cameron v Commissioner for Railways (1964) Qd R 480 and D.J. Collett v Hutchins (1964) Qd R 495. 
48 
led by the hand, would suffice to exonerate the other parent. In McCallion, however, there 
were special circumstances to be considered because the mother was deaf and the father 
knew that she was not wearing her hearing aid at the time. In the view of the court, this 
meant that the father still retained some responsibility towards the child, which imposed 
upon him a duty of care, which he had failed to discharge. 
The judgment of McCm1hy J was approved by the majority of the High Court of 
Australia in Hahn v Conley, in which a three-year-old girl was knocked down by a car as 
she crossed a road to see her grandfather who was on the other side. The child brought an 
action in negligence against the motorist, whose insurance company duly claimed 
contribution from the grandfather alleging negligence on his part in failing, first of all, to 
prevent her from wandering on to the road and then in failing to come to her aid when she 
called out to him from the other side. 
While all the judges agreed that the existence of a duty of care depended solely on 
the particular factual situation, and not on the blood relationship, there was great 
divergence of opinion as to the significance of the particular facts of the case and the actual 
application of the concept of foreseeability. In the end, the decision reached by a three to 
two majority was that the grandfather was not under a duty to the child. Barwick and 
McTieman JJ held that, in the circumstances, no legal duty could be imposed in the absence 
of some positive action on the part of the grandfather, such as calling the child over to him 
and so leading her into danger. As it stood, all that he could be admonished for was a 
nonfeasance. Windeyer J disagreed to the extent that he did consider that a duty of care 
arose but he concurred in the overall decision not to impose liability because he held that 
the duty had not been breached. 
In their dissenting judgements, Menzies and Walsh JJ held that the grandfather was 
under a duty and that he had breached it for, as a familiar figure to the child, he should have 
foreseen that she would attempt to cross the road to reach him. 15 
It is clear from this case that if the relationship of parenthood cannot constitute the 
source of a duty then the only way in which it can be relevant is in so far as it may 
influence the nature and extent of the steps necessary to discharge any duty which arises. 
This means that it can only go to questions of breach and not duty. Typically, it would 
15 See also J. Wright, "Negligent Parenting. Can My Child Sue?" ( 1994) JCL I 04 at I 06 and I 07. 
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make little or no difference but, nevertheless, it remains the only way in which the liability 
of parents towards their children is capable of differing from that of strangers. 
Commenting on these decisions, J ane Wright suggests that, in comparison with the 
English courts, the connnonwealth approach to the circumstances giving 1ise to a parental 
duty is much narrower. For in Surtees, the Court of Appeal was at least prepared to accept 
that having de facto care of a child is enough to place a parent under an obligation of 
protection. 16 Nevertheless, for present purposes, the most important point is that even in 
English law parents are not held to be under a genera/legal duty to protect their children 
from foreseeable harm and that if, exceptionally, such a duty does arise, it will rarely lead 
to liability because fault will be so difficult to establish. Moreover, the much stricter 
approach adopted by the High Court of Australia in Hahn has been largely affirmed in 
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Com1 of South Australia and in other Australian 
jurisdictions. 17 
II. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR HARM COMMITTED BY THEIR CHILDREN 
UPON OTHERS 
The first point of reference in any inquiry on the law governing the liability of parents for 
the acts of their children has to be the following statement made by Willes J in the 
nineteenth century case Moon v Towers: 
"I am not aware of any such relationship as between a father and a son though 
the son be living with his father as a member of his family, as will make the actions of the 
son more binding upon the father than the actions of anybody else." 18 
This sets out the basic rule against general parental liability for a child's conduct in English 
law. No duty arises on the part of parents to prevent their children from causing harm to 
third patties simply out of the fact of their parenthood. Tllis is no more than is to be 
16 W1ight, op. cit., p. 107. 
17 Robertson v Swincer ( 1989) 52 SASR 356 and To wart v Adler ( 1989) 52 SASR 3 73 (S.A. ); Darcy v 
Nominal Defendant (1985) 2 MVR 447 (Queensland); Anderson v Smith (1990) I 01 FLR 34 (N.T.); Kerr v 
All en ( 1995) Aust. Torts Reports 81-323 (N.S.W.). All citations are taken from S. Yeo, op. cit. 
18 (1860) 141 ER 1306. 
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expected, in keeping with the judiciary's traditional aversion to any kind of liability for 
omissions. Indeed, all that it really confinns is that parents will not be automatically held 
liable for the wrongdoings of their children. Of more interest, for present purposes, are the 
exceptions to this basic rule. In this respect, reference must be made to the famous 
statement of Dixon J in the Australian case Smith v Leurs, 19 which is regarded as the 
seminal judicial pronouncement relating to parental liability. In it he affinns the absence of 
any general duty to control the actions of another, but goes on to say that there could be 
extraordinary circumstances in which 'special relations' give rise to such a duty, the 
relationship between parent and child in some instances falling into this category. 
" ... [I]t is incumbent upon a parent who maintains control over a young child to 
take reasonable care so to exercise that control as to avoid conduct on his pmt exposing the 
person or property of another to unreasonable danger. Parental control, where it exists, must 
be exercised with due care to prevent the child inflicting intentional damage on others or 
causing damage by conduct involving an unreasonable risk of injury to others. "20 
From this statement, it is clear that any duty of care owed by parents to third parties 
will be based on the exercise of parental control. Unforhmately, however, Dixon J does not 
elaborate any further upon the meaning or content of this notion of control. It is clear that 
he does not consider parental control to exist in all relationships between a parent and child, 
so that what he is referring to is not something that arises automatically upon attainment of 
parenthood. He could be referring to the legal duty to control imposed upon parents as part 
of their statutorily recognised 'parental responsibility'. If so, then, in the current English 
context, duties of affirmative action in respect of a child would only be imposed upon 
persons exercising such responsibility, as a matter of law, under s. 3( I) of the Children Act 
1989. Alternatively, he could be referring simply to parents who, in a given situation, are 
able to exercise de facto control over their children. It would then have to be fiuther 
questioned what degree of de facto control would be required in any given scenario to 
found a duty of affirmative action. Or perhaps he means to limit such duties to persons who 
have both parental responsibility and de facto conh·ol at the relevant time. A further 
complicating factor is that Dixon J gives no indication of the particular form such a duty 
19 ( 1945) 70 CLR 256. 
20 !bid, at p. 262 (emphasis added). 
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would take, in terms of nature and extent. What would it involve? Mere supervision or 
something more? 
To fill in these gaps it is necessary to turn to the case law. The dearth of English 
authoritl 1 on the subject makes it necessary, as before, to take the analysis further afield 
and include the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth courts. It is significant that all the 
cases that deal directly with the issue of parental liability are based on a similar factual 
scenario, for this may lead to the conclusion that it is the only type of situation in which 
parental liability may arise. This is where a child has caused harm to the plaintiff through 
the misuse of a dangerous object and an action in negligence has been brought against the 
parents for allowing the child to have possession of the object and then exercising 
inadequate supervision. It appears that, in detennining whether a parent is under a duty of 
care in such circumstances and whether or not his or her conduct is to be construed as 
constituting a breach of duty, the courts are generally influenced by a number of common 
factors. These are, in particular: the circumstances in which the child obtained the object, 
the nature of the object and the age and general disposition of the child. It is possible to 
divide the cases into three separate categories, from which a series of patterns can be seen 
to emerge. The categories are: 
(i). Entrustment; 
(ii). Accessibility; 
(iii). Unknown possession. 
(i) Entrustment 
Entrustment refers to cases in which the defendant parent either gave the object to the child 
or was aware that the child had the object and allowed him or her to retain possession of it. 
It is in these cases that the liability of the parent is most likely to be established. This stands 
to reason since entrustment can quite easily be construed as amounting to a clear and 
21 The leading case of Cannarthenshire County Council v Lewis [ 1955] AC 549, is commonly cited as 
authotity for a general affinnative duty arising from the parent-child relationship. However, it is submitted 
that this interpretation of the case is open to question. The defendant in Carmarthenshire was an education 
authotity which was held liable in negligence when inadequate security provision allowed a young child to 
stray horn the playground of a nursery school onto a busy road, resulting in the death of a lorry driver. Any 
references to parental duty were sttictly obiter. and, at times, the Law Lords were at pains to distinguish the 
potential dangers of the particular setting from that of the home. 
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positive contribution to the risk of the hann occurring, which in turn makes a duty to 
control easier to establish. In assessing breach of duty, the most impm1ant consideration for 
the courts appears to be the nature of the object involved. Whether a finding of fault will be 
made therefore depends to a large extent on whether the object is to be classified as one that 
is dangerous per se or merely as being potentially dangerous if misused. The entrustment 
cases may, therefore, be further sub-divided according to this classification of the 
instmment causing the harm. 
An example of an object that the com1s consider to be dangerous per se is a gun. 
Where such an object is involved, the liability of the parent is often established on the mere 
fact of allowing the child to be in possession of the weapon, without anything more. In 
Newton v Edgerley, 22 a twelve-year-old boy bought a shotgun with his father's approval 
and, in direct disobedience to his father's orders not to use the gun outside their farm, he 
took it with him on an outing with some friends. Walking along, another boy tried to take 
the gun off him and, in the process, accidentally pulled the t1igger with the result that the 
plaintiff was shot in the leg. The father of the boy who owned the gun was held to have 
been negligent in that he should either have forbidden the use of the gun altogether or else, 
anticipating his son's disobedience, he should have given careful instruction to the boy as 
to the use of the weapon to ensure that he did not represent a danger to others. It is difficult 
to gauge what level of instruction would have been needed to satisfy the court that the boy 
had been rendered totally safe in the use of the gun. It is submitted that even if the father 
had given further safety instructions, the same result would have been reached. Such a 
conclusion is supported by a much earlier decision in which a master was held liable for 
injuries caused by his maidservant through her use of a gun.23 The com1 considered that 
either he should have rendered the weapon totally harmless before entrusting it to her or he 
should have prevented her from using it altogether. Waller considers that had it been the 
defendant's own child who had caused the hann, the same ptinciple would have applied. 24 
A fm1her decision in this respect is that of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 
Edwards v Smith. 25 In this case, a father who bought a spring gun for his children was held 
liable for the actions of his son in injuring the plaintiff through the use ofthe gun. Tllis was 
22 [1959] I WLR 1031. 
23 Dixon v Bell ( 1816) 5 M & S 198. 
24 P. L. Wailer, "Visiting the Sins of Children: The Liability of Parents for Injuries Caused by Their 
Children", ( 1963) 4 Melbourne University Law Review 17 at p.26. 
25 (1941) I DLR 736. 
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so despite the fact that the son had acted in direct disobedience to his father's orders not to 
use the gun unsupervised. More active control on the pmt of the father was required to 
discharge the duty, such as, presumably, the taking of positive steps to ensure that the boy 
was not able to use the gun unsupervised. O'Halloran J A stated that the father incurred 
such responsibility "as he pennitted a dangerous thing to come into the hands of an 
immature boy without control under circumstances in which he should have anticipated 
... that hann might be done to the ... third party".26 The duty to control was directly linked to 
the tender age and inunaturity of the child perpetrator. In this context, reference must be 
made to the speech of Goodman J in the Canadian case Ryan v Hicks on. 27 Referring 
specifically to cases of the type being described, he said that the parents are liable because 
they are to be regarded, in the circumstances, as having direct control of the object causing 
the ham1. Tlus makes them personally responsible to the victim. In support of this, the 
decision in North v Wood28 may be cited. The claimant's puppy was attacked and killed by 
a dog owned by the defendant's daughter. The dog was known to be savage and had 
previously attacked other dogs. The action in negligence against the father failed. His 
daughter was aged seventeen at the time and was considered by the courts to be old enough 
to exercise control over the dog herself. The implication is that if she had been younger the 
decision nught have been different. 
That the liability of parents in allowing their children to be in possession of 
dangerous objects is no different to the liability of a stranger in tlus respect is exemplified 
by the decision in Burfitt v Kill e. 29 In this case, a shopkeeper who sold a pistol and some 
cartridges to a twelve-year-old boy was held liable for injuries occasioned to a third party 
by the boy through the use of the weapon. His liability was based on the sole fact of having 
made the sale. The cowt held that, while in ordinary cases where dangerous articles are 
sold, the seller is under a duty to third parties likely to be injured by such weapons to warn 
buyers of the potential dangers involved in the use of the object, where the customer is a 
young clllld, the matter is taken one step further in that the seller must refrain from selling 
the mticle at all. Tllls establishes the age of the child as a decisive factor in the 
detemunation of liability. 
26 !bid, at p. 745. 
27 ( 1974) 55 DLR (3d) 196. 
28 [1914]1 KB 629. 
29 [1939]2 All ER 372. 
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Similarly, in the Australian case of Curmi v McLennan, 30 a father who allowed his 
son and some of his friends to stay unsupervised in a boathouse which was owned by him 
and in which he kept a loaded gun was held liable for the actions of both his son and 
another boy in using the gun to irDure a third party. His duty of care obviously arose out of 
his actions in providing the boys with a dangerous object. 
Where the object inflicting the damage is not dangerous in itself but rather has the 
potential to be dangerous if mishandled by its user, different considerations apply, with a 
lesser duty of care being imposed upon the parents. It would seem to consist of a simple 
obligation to warn and instruct, usually without the further need to supervise. Typical 
instruments falling into this category are airguns, pellet guns and catapults. In Beebee v 
Sales, 31 a fifteen-year-old boy using an airgun shot and blinded the plaintiff in one eye. The 
boy's father was held liable for the harm. It is significant, however, that there was no 
negligence alleged on his part in allowing his son to be in possession of the weapon. The 
particulars of the claim related rather to his actions in pemlitting his son to continue to use 
it after he had received a warning about the potential hazards, for a neighbour whose 
window had been broken by the boy through the use of the gun had already made a 
complaint to the father. Thus it would appear that, even if Mr Justice Lush was "far from 
saying that even if the father had not been warned beforehand, there would have been no 
negligence on his part"/2 tllis factor, if it was not decisive of liability, at least influenced to 
a large extent the decision of the court. Several subsequent decisions lend support to tllis 
proposition. 
In the famous Australian case, Srnith v Leurs, the parents of a boy younger than the 
defendant's son in Beebee were held not liable for the eye injury sustained by the victim as 
a result of an accident caused by their son's use of a catapult. Although the court held that 
the knowledge of the defendants that their son was in possession of such a weapon placed 
them under a duty to third parties to control his actions, this duty was discharged by the 
simple act of issuing warnings to the boy about the dangers of using the catapult and 
receiving assurances from him that he would only use it against the house wall. 
30 [ 1994] I VR 513. 
31 (1916)32TLR413. 
32 Ibid. 
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Similarly, in Donaldson v McNiven, 33 a boy who was again younger than the 
defendant's son in Beebee also blinded his victim using an airgun and his father was held 
not to have been negligent. His duty to take care for the safety of third parties by 
supervising and controlling his son was also fulfilled by the simple act of exacting a 
promise from the boy that he would only use the gun in the cellar. The statement of Lord 
Goddard CJ that "[h]e cannot be watching his son all day and everyday, nor is there any 
obligation on him to do so"34 illustrates clearly the reluctance of the comts to impose 
onerous duties on parents, 
It is instructive to draw a contrast here between the decision in Donaldson and the 
one previously discussed in Newton v Edgerley. In the latter case, an express prohibition 
issued by the father did not suffice to exonerate him from liability since the weapon 
involved was classified as inherently dangerous. The differences in the ages and character 
of the children involved in both cases provided a further ground upon which the House of 
Lords in Donaldson was able to distinguish Newton, in that in Donaldson the boy in 
question was older and more mature. This evidently made it more reasonable for the 
defendant father to rely on the promise given by him. 
Gorely v Codd35 similarly involved an injury caused by the improper use of an 
airgun, although this time by a mentally retarded sixteen and a half year old boy. The action 
against the father was based on his alleged negligence in allowing his mentally incompetent 
son to possess such a weapon and then failing to adequately supervise him or instruct him 
in the use of it. True to form, the comt took a very lenient approach to the question ofthe 
father's liability. It held that his conduct was not unreasonable because, although his son 
was academically retarded, in all other respects he was a nmmal boy. Indeed, Nield J 
appeared to be particularly persuaded by the good character of the youth, describing him at 
one point as a "decent young person" who was not prone to violence. This seemed to make 
the judge more favourably disposed toward the defendant father, as though these attributes 
of the son were an accurate reflection of the father's good parenting skills. He thus held that 
sufficient instruction had been given and that, incredibly, supervision was not necessary. 36 
Thus the English cases indicate that, in the absence of special circumstances, the duty 
of care placed on parents by reason of allowing their children to be in possession of 
33 [1952] 2 All ER 691. 
34 !bid, at p. 692. 
35 [1967] I WLR 19. 
36 See also, Rogers v Wilkinson (1963) The Times. Jan 19 (airgun, father not liable). 
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potentially dangerous objects is very easily discharged. Commonwealth courts would 
appear to adopt a more stringent approach. 37 In Starr v Crone, 38 a British Colwnbia case, an 
eleven-year-old boy who had been given an airgun by his father wilfully shot and injured 
the plaintiff in the eye. After carefully reviewing the existing authority on the subject, 
Wilson J summed up the legal position as being that it is negligent to entrust a dangerous 
weapon to a young boy unless it is proved: (a) that he was properly and thoroughly trained 
in the use of the weapon, with particular regard to using it safely and carefully; and (b) that 
the boy was of an age, character and intelligence such that the father might safely assume 
that he would understand and obey the instructions. 
In ordinary cases, where the injury has been caused by a simple act of carelessness on 
the part of the child, the giving of detailed instructions is generally enough to satisfy the 
court of the reasonableness of a parent's conduct. The actual decision in Starr, however, 
demonstrates that additional principles apply where the child has demonstrated some form 
of malice. In such cases, parental liability is more likely to be established. Wilson J 
considered that such a gross misuse of the weapon gave rise to a strong initial presumption 
that the boy in question was not of a character and mentality to understand the instructions 
given. 39 In order to rebut the presumption, express evidence to the contrary was required 
and it was not forthcoming in this case. In particular, Wilson J stated that he would have 
liked the boy to have appeared as a witness in court so that he could have had the 
opportunity to assess him personally. 
The notion of being under a duty to give detailed instructions as to the use of a 
dangerous object, and to further ensure that the child is capable of following them, was also 
taken up by the Ontario High Comt in Ryan v Hicks on. 40 In this case, two fathers were held 
liable for the damage caused by their children in driving snowmobiles. In considering 
whether their children were sufficiently trained in the safe operation of such machines, the 
37 Eg. in LaP/ante v LaP/ante (1995) 125 DLR (4'h) 569, a father who allowed his inexperienced son to drive 
a car in treacherous icy conditions with some of his younger children in the back was held liable for the 
injuries suffered by the children when the car crashed. The defendant's liability was, however, based 
specifically on a breach of the duty of care he owed to the victims as his children to protect them, rather than 
on a breach of any duty to control the actions of his son. It is submitted that if the claimants had not been his 
children the ruling would have been different. 
38 (1950) 4 DLR 433. 
39 Indeed, in holding the defendant father liable, Wilson J distinguished the facts of the case from an earlier 
decision, Turner v Snider ( 1906) 16 Man R 79, in which a father who had entrusted a shotgun and some shells 
to his son was exonerated. He pointed to the fact that in Turner the act committed by the boy was one of mere 
negligence and not a wilful assault. 
40 (I 975) 55 DLR (3d) 196. 
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defendants should have taken into account "the ordinary character of boys twelve to 
fourteen years of age, their general aptitude for mischief, their desire for excitement, their 
lack of good and mature judgment and propensity for irresponsible acts in the use of 
motorised vehicles. "41 This case would also suggest that the Canadian courts place parents 
under a stricter duty of supervision than their English counterparts.42 
That the nature of the object being entrusted to a child similarly affects the liability of 
strangers is evidenced by Ricketts v Erith Borough Council. 43 Like Burfitt v Kille, it was 
concerned with the liability of a shopkeeper for selling to a child an object subsequently 
used to injure a third party. In this case, however, the object in question was a bow and 
arrow, which was not considered to be dangerous per se. The court, in consequence, held 
that the shopkeeper was not under any duty of care, either to the boy or any other person. 
This case also provides an example of the rather ridiculous lengths to which the courts are 
sometimes prepared to go in treating the perceived disposition of the child as being relevant 
to questions of breach and duty. In arriving at his decision, Tucker J made a point of saying 
that the young boy in question was "intelligent and bright-looking".44 This was evidently 
meant to imply that he would have given the defendant no cause for concern in selling him 
the bow and arrow. It is extremely doubtful whether the defendant would have been able to 
make such an assessment of the boy in the space of a single transaction, or that he would 
even have been inclined to, for that matter. As such, it is unrealistic to think that this 
influenced in any way his decision to sell the weapon to the boy. It must also be questioned 
how it is possible to discern that someone is 'bright-looking' and whether there is 
necessarily any direct correlation between the facial expressions of a child and his or her 
behaviour. Indeed, are not bright children often the most mischievous? 
(ii) Accessibility 
The above category deals with cases in which parents leave objects in places in which they 
are accessible to children. The children then get hold of the object for themselves and use it 
to cause harn1 to a third patiy. Since the behaviour of parents in this category is, by 
41 !bid, at p. 207. 
42 See also, In gram v Lowe ( 1975) 55 DLR (3d) 292. 
43 [1943] 2 All ER 629. 
44 !bid, at p. 631. 
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comparison with cases of entrustment, less reproachable in that their contribution to the 
creation of the risk of harm will have been much more indirect, it stands to reason that their 
liability is more difficult to establish. Indeed, the cases show that, in such circumstances, 
the duty of care placed on parents is less onerous again and, more unexpectedly, that it 
depends to an even greater extent on the nature of the child's character. 
In Hatfield v Pearson, 45 a thirteen-year-old boy, in direct defiance of his father's 
orders and unknown to him, took a 1ifle that was kept in the house and subsequently injured 
the plaintiff as a result of his misuse of it. The British Columbia Supreme Court held that 
the imputed mischievous nature of young boys made it foreseeable that the defendant's son 
might meddle with the gun and this imposed on the defendant a duty to physically remove 
it from the boy's reach, either by locking it away or hiding it. Tins decision was, however, 
overturned by the Com1 of Appeal, which held that such a duty only arises in special 
circumstances in which the child in question has previously demonstrated a propensity to 
intermeddle going beyond that of a generally obedient boy of average intelligence. 
Otherwise, the placing of a simple moral restraint on the child by giving an order not to 
touch the dangerous article and securing a promise to that effect is apparently all that a 
reasonable parent would be expected to do. 
Indeed, although it was set out by Lord Esher MR in Williams v Ead/(' that, as a 
general rule, in carrying out their duty of care to children, parents are "bound to take notice 
of the ordinary nature of young boys, their tendency to do mischievous actions and their 
propensity to meddle with anything that [comes] in their way",47 it would appear that the 
courts tend not to apply this principle. It is only really where a child has demonstrated a 
particular propensity to misbehave that a heightened duty of care is placed on parents. In 
Smith v Leurs, Dixon J considered that society would only expect a parent to take steps to 
prevent conduct that was reprehensible, for otherwise, the causing of hann by children was 
simply to be regarded as an "unavoidable or reasonable incident of vigorous boyhood".48 
Wall er would also suggest that, despite the constant refusal of the courts to equate 
children with animals, the fact that they are more inclined to impose liability on parents for 
harm caused by children shown to be of bad character indicates that the English and 
Australian comts are influenced, to some extent at least, by considerations similar to those 
45 (1957) 6 DLR (2d) 593. 
46 (1893) 19 TLR41. 
47 !bid, at p. 42. 
48 ( 1945) 70 CLR 256 at p. 263. 
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governing the doctrine of scienter. 49 He also points out that there is a clear application of 
the doctrine in several American cases, which he terms the 'vicious child cases'. 50 
That the bad character of the child operates to impose a greater duty on parents to 
supervise and control is justified on the basis that such parental knowledge, actual or 
imputed, makes the risk of injury more foreseeable. Should this mean, however, that 
parents of children who are of generally good character be relieved of all need to take any 
real steps to control them? As the cases illustrate, harm is just as likely to be caused by 
obedient children as by mischievous ones. Harm is often caused by children just being 
children and, hence, irresponsible. Unintentional torts are t011s no less than those that are 
caused intentionally or recklessly and can often be easily prevented through the exercise of 
adequate supervision and control. 
(iii) Unknown possession 
This final category deals with cases in which the parents are unaware that the child is in 
possession of the object causing the harm. Here it would seem that if parents are placed 
under any duty of care at all, it is no more than a very slight duty of supervision. Walmsley 
v Humenick51 illustrates the point. In this British Columbia case, the parents of a five-year-
old boy who had shot an arrow from a bow and struck another child in the eye were held to 
be exempt from liability on the basis that they did not know that their son had such an 
object. While the mother, who had seen her son whittling the sticks which were later used 
as arrows, was deemed under a duty to supervise her children as a result, this involved little 
more than glancing at them tlu·ough the window from time to time. Indeed, it would seem 
that but for the fact of her witnessing this activity, there would have been no duty of care at 
all. In any event, there was none placed on the father. This can only be explained on the 
basis that all that the father could have been reproached for was a pure omission. 
It would also appear that, in these cases, the nature of the child's character is even 
more significant and that parents are subject to a much lower standard of care. In Streifel v 
49 Starke J in Smith v Leurs stated that "[y]oung boys, despite their mischievous tendencies, cannot be classed 
as wild animals", ibid, at p. 260. 
50 Op. cit., at p. 29. 
51 ( 1954) 2 DLR 232. 
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Strotz, 52 the British Columbia Supreme Com1 held that the parents of two youths aged 
fourteen and fifteen were not liable for damage caused by their sons arising out of their 
theft of a car since the boys had not previously demonstrated a propensity to steal cars. 
Whittaker J went on to say that even if the parents had known of such a tendency, the onus 
was then on the claimant to show that there was some reasonable step the parents could 
have taken to prevent the theft, which they negligently failed to take. He also pointed to the 
fact that it had not been proved that the parents in question had been 'more than ordinarily 
lax ' 53 in training or supervising their children. The obvious implication is that ordinary 
carelessness is an acceptable standard of parental care. To establish a breach of duty, 
therefore, it would seem that claimants are required to show that the conduct complained of 
was extraordinarily unreasonable rather than just unreasonable. Thus parents, like 
professionals and public bodies, are set apart as a special category of defendant. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
The courts routinely employ a number of artificial control devices in order to limit as far as 
possible the liability of parents for the acts of their children. First of all, a rather stringent 
test of foreseeability of harm is utilised, for liability has been largely confined to cases in 
which parents were aware of their child's participation in a hazardous activity. By 
exonerating parents who are oblivious to their children's activities, without making any real 
inquiry as to whether they should have been more aware in the circumstances, the courts 
are effectively excluding the ordinary tmtious concept of reasonable foreseeability and 
replacing it with a requirement that amounts almost to inevitability. 
To like effect is the implied rule that parents of children of bad character are more 
likely to be held liable than those whose offspring are said to be generally obedient. 
Arguably this view of the relevancy of the general disposition of a child hmm-doer is 
seriously misguided. 
Such observations suggest that the com1s are only willing to impose a duty of care on 
persons who are in a position to exercise de facto control, construed not just in the sense of 
being physically able to take appropriate action at the relevant time but also in the sense of 
52 (1958) I I DLR 667. 
53 !bid, at p. 668. 
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being actually aware of the need to intervene in the first place. Unfmiunately, the analysis 
reveals little else about any additional criteria relating to parental status that the comts 
consider to be a prerequisite to liability. It is submitted that this is because there are no 
defined criteria, the courts proceeding rather on an ad hoc basis and, in the majority of 
cases, applying whatever principles they deem necessary to preclude liability. 
Finally, the cases show that even where the courts do recognise a duty, the relevant 
standard of care is set so low and is so easily discharged as to make it nigh on impossible, 
in the absence of special circumstances, for a claimant to succeed in an action based on 
parental negligence. Thus although the idea of imposing liability for the acts of others may 
be much more easily justified in the context of the parent-child relationship than in relation 
to many of the other recognised categories of such liability, parental liability is, 
paradoxically, probably the most difficult form of third party liability to establish in 
practice. This is due to the important role played by policy in tllis domain. 
In the context of other sinlilar relationships of authority and control over an 
inesponsible other which would not be subject to such policy considerations, however, it 
has to be assumed that third party liability could arise and that it would be much more 
easily established in practice. Thus the potential liability of temporary carers of cmldren, 
for example, in respect ofhann both to their charges and by their charges, is probably much 
greater than that of the actual parents in question. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Third Party Liability in Respect of the Intoxicated 
Of the various new categories of third party liability, it is arguably that which arises in 
respect of the intoxicated that causes the most concern. While its development in 
English tort law is yet at an embryonic stage, such 'alcohol liability' has already taken 
strong root in a number of commonwealth jurisdictions and is currently experiencing a 
period of rapid growth. Unfortunately, in the scramble to jump on this particular 
liability bandwagon in these jurisdictions, it appears that the basic principles of tort law 
have been all but trampled underfoot. For this extension of the boundaries of tortious 
liability has been effected with primarily socio-political aims in sight, but with little or 
no consideration of its wider legal ramifications. 
Third parties could be held personally liable in respect of the intoxicated in two 
distinct ways: for harm by another to the intoxicated or for the tortious conduct of the 
intoxicated. The intoxicated person may therefore feature as either the victim of harm or 
as the perpetrator. In the first case, the defendant's duty of care will be one of protection 
owed to the intoxicated; in the second case, it will be one of control owed to others. It is 
important that these two scenarios are not dismissed as merely exemplifying different 
facets ofthe one duty, for that would constitute a dangerous oversimplification of the 
legal issues at stake; dangerous in the sense that the legal implications of each form of 
liability would not be fully explored. As will be seen presently, the Canadian experience 
of alcohol liability provides ample proof of this danger. Rather, the duties of a third 
party to protect the intoxicated from others and to protect others from the intoxicated 
must be recognised as two entirely separate legal duties, each governed by its own 
particular set of legal mles. 
I. THE COMMONWEALTH POSITION 
Among commonwealth jurisdictions, the notion of alcohol liability is most developed in 
Canadian tort law. Its origins trace back to the 1974 decision of the Supreme Court of 
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Canada in Jordan House Ltd v Menow, 1 which saw a tavern owner held liable for the 
injuries sustained by a drunken patron, subsequent to his ejection from the 
establishment. The claimant in question was an habitual drunkard and a known 
troublemaker who had previously been banned from the defendant's hotel for anti-social 
behaviour. On the night in question, he was thrown out for being drunk and annoying 
other guests and, while making his way home, he was hit by a negligent motorist. In 
seeking to hold the company that owned the hotel (hereafter 'the hotel') jointly 
responsible for his injuries, the claimant's argument was that the hotel had breached its 
common law duty to protect him in his intoxicated state. 
That the hotel owed the claimant a duty of care was not doubted by the Supreme 
Court. Its primary concern was rather with the nature and scope of this duty. On this 
issue, two distinct views emerged. For Laskin J, everything more or less turned on the 
hotel's special knowledge of the claimant's particular susceptibility to alcohol and the 
effect it had on him.2 This gave rise to a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that he 
got home safely. The bar staff, in Laskin J's view, should either have arranged safe 
transport for him, called the police or even put him up for the night in the hotel. Given 
the magnitude of his expectations, it would seem clear that Laskin J regarded the duty 
of care involved as being of an exceptional nature, for he surely could not have thought 
it reasonable to oblige hoteliers to regularly provide their overly intoxicated patrons 
with the benefit of accommodation services normally reserved for paying guests. 
Indeed, he stressed that he was not imposing "a duty on every tavern owner to act as a 
watch dog for all patrons who enter his place of business and drink to excess".3 
Richie J, on the other hand, imposed a much stricter test of liability. In his view, 
the defendant's duty was not merely to protect the claimant once he became intoxicated, 
but rather to prevent intoxication in the first place. For him, therefore, the duty of care 
arose at a much earlier point. Whereas, under Laskin J' s fornmlation, the duty of care 
arose when the claimant became too drunk to look after himself, for Richie J, it 
presumably came into play when the hotel employees provided the claimant with his 
first drink. From the point of view of the claimant, the practical significance of framing 
the duty in such terms is that it makes it much easier to satisfy the fault element of 
negligence. If the defendant has not taken reasonable care to prevent intoxication, that 
in itself operates to breach the duty and nothing that is done afterwards to help the 
1 (1973) 38 DLR (3d) 105. For a comment on the decision, see: H. Silberberg, "The Intoxicated Patron: A 
Re-Appraisal of the Duty of Care", (1974) 20 McGill LJ 491. 
2 Ibid., atp.113. 
3 Ibid. 
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patron will suffice to undo that breach. Even providing a personal escort to take the 
claimant home would not make any difference, unless of course it had the effect of 
preventing the harm from occurring in the first place. However, such divergence of 
opinion within the court was, in the end, of little consequence in this case, for the 
defendant's conduct was such that it constituted a breach ofboth versions of the duty of 
care. Along with the negligent motorist, the hotel was held liable for two-thirds of the 
claimant's losses. 
Arguably, the correct way to interpret the decision in Jordan House would be to 
simply regard it as limited to the very special facts of the case. Of course, that is not 
how it has been interpreted. Not only did subsequent courts unfortunately latch on to the 
test propounded by Richie J, they, rather more worryingly, fashioned it to serve specific 
socio-political purposes, and thereby significantly widened its sphere of applicability. 
The potential of the Jordan House decision to be used as a sword in the fight against 
drink driving was quickly recognised. Thereafter, it was a slippery slope. 
In Canada Trust Co v Porter, 4 the Ontario Court of Appeal accepted Jordan 
House as establishing a new general principle of liability based on the provision of 
alcohol and used it to authorise a claim in negligence against a tavern owner brought by 
the victims of a road accident caused by one of the tavern's intoxicated patrons. In a 
flash, without any discussion of the matter, the duty of commercial alcohol providers to 
protect their intoxicated patrons had been transforn1ed into an all-encompassing duty, 
notably entailing an additional obligation to control the actions of such patrons in order 
to protect third parties. In a further twist, this duty of care was made to extend to all 
patrons, irrespective of whether they had had any personal dealings with the defendant. 
The claimant in Canada Trust was effectively a stranger to the bar staff and had, 
moreover, been served from behind a partition, so that the staff were not in a position to 
keep track of how much he, or any other patron, was drinking or to monitor his conduct. 
According to the Court, it was the defendant's responsibility to establish serving and 
staffing practices to ensure that no one on the premises was served past the point of 
intoxication. 
Allowing a duty of care to arise from the mere fact of serving alcohol, in the 
absence of any personal relationship between the claimant and the defendant, introduces 
a whole range of problems. For clearly, to remove the most effective control mechanism 
from the equation really is to invite an influx of vexatious claims. It also raises practical 
difficulties of implementation, for there are various degrees of intoxication which 
4 Unreported, Ont CA, 28 April 1980. 
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depend to a large extent on the constitution and temperament of the particular individual 
concerned. How is a bartender to determine the time at which it becomes appropriate to 
intervene and stop serving? 
This point is aptly illustrated by the next major case in the Canadian alcohol 
liability saga. The facts of Schmidt v Shwpe5 are as follows. Already intoxicated, the 
first defendant enters the second defendant's establishment whereupon he consumes 
three beers, then gets into his car and promptly drives off the road, seriously injuring his 
passenger. Together the two defendants are held liable for seventy percent of the 
victim's losses; the first defendant for obvious reasons, and the second defendant for 
breaching its duty not to serve an intoxicated patron. In the light of the first defendant's 
blood alcohol level, the Court considered that the bar staff should have noticed his 
drunkenness. Given that the first defendant was not known to the bar staff, had not been 
showing any visible signs of intoxication when he arrived and had consumed only a 
small proportion of his overall alcohol intake for the evening there, the judgment 
against the second defendant would appear unduly harsh. 
Moreover, even though the victim had been drinking with the first defendant prior 
to accepting a lift from him, the Court refused to accept the defence argument that he 
had consented to the risk of injury. By deliberately construing the defence ofvolenti non 
fit injuria in a very narrow sense, the Court was able to dismiss it as inapplicable in the 
circumstances. It simply pointed out that the victim had not been aware that the first 
defendant had been drinking before they met, so that he could not be taken to have 
understood the true nature and extent of the risk he was taking. That the Court, 
nevertheless, expected such awareness ofthe bar staff is a clear illustration of its pro-
victim stance. 
With such a staggering build-up, it will have come as no surprise to anyone when, 
in 1986, the principles governing provider liability, erstwhile limited to those supplying 
alcohol for commercial gain, were extended to include social hosts.6 However, Schmidt 
v. Sharpe probably represents the highpoint of alcohol provider liability in Canada. 
From subsequent case law there can be detected signs of a slight judicial retreat. 
The facts of Hague v. Billings7 follow a familiar pattem - victims of a road 
accident caused by a drunken driver bringing a claim in negligence against the alcohol 
provider. A notable feature of this case, though, is that it was not just one licensed 
establishment that had provided the driver with alcohol that was sued, but two. The first 
5 (1983) 27 CCLT 1. 
6 Baumeister v. Drake ( 1986) 38 CCL T 1. See also Wince v. Ball ( 1996) 136 DLR ( 4111) 104. 
7 (1989) 68 OR (2d) 321. 
66 
bar had served him with just one drink before staff realised that he was already drunk 
and refused further service. He then made his way to the second bar, where he was 
served four more drinks. It was after leaving this bar that he drove into the claimants' 
car. 
That the liability of the second bar was upheld comes as no great surprise at this 
point. Of greater interest, in the present context, is how the issue of the first bar's 
liability was dealt with. The Ontario High Court, and later the Ontario Court of Appeal, 8 
decided that this bar could not be liable for serving the driver past the point of 
intoxication simply on the basis of the single drink they had provided, for, at that stage, 
they had not had time to properly ascertain his state of inebriation. While it might not 
have been under a duty to prevent intoxication, however, the Court did consider that it 
was bound by a duty to prevent him from driving and that this duty arose at the point at 
which the staff realised that he was drunk. Moreover, it found that the efforts ofthe 
proprietor to persuade the driver to hand over his car keys to one of his friends were 
insufficient to fulfil this duty. Actual control needed to be taken of the situation and if 
the staff were not capable of doing this themselves, then they should have called in the 
police. On this analysis, therefore, the duty of care had been breached. Liability was, 
however, ultimately avoided on the basis of causation for it was found that even if the 
police had been summoned, the accident would still have occurred. 
The main point of significance to be drawn from Hague v. Billings is that the 
judicial approach to the duty issue adopted in that case was more akin to that set out by 
Laskin J in Jordan House than that ofRichie J. As such, it marks a clear departure from 
the previous trend. That it represents the shape of things to come would appear to be 
confirmed by the most recent significant decision in this field: Stewart v. Pettie. 9 
Accompanied by his wife, sister and brother-in-law, Pettie spent the evening at a dinner 
theatre where he consumed between ten and fourteen measures of rum. He was served 
each time by the same waitress who kept a running total of all alcohol ordered by the 
group. Upon leaving the theatre, a group decision was made to allow Pettie to drive 
them all home, even though both Pettie's wife and his sister were sober and were aware 
of how much he had had to drink. On that particular night, the roads were slippery and 
although Pettie drove in a cautious and safe manner, he lost control of the vehicle. 
Pettie's sister was seriously injured in the crash that followed and, along with her 
husband, she brought an action in negligence against, inter alia, Pettie and the dinner 
8 (1993) 15 CCLT (2d) 264. 
9 (1995) 23 CCLT (2d) 89. See also Wince v Ball (1996) 136 DLR (41h) 104. 
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theatre. On the issue of the theatre's liability, the trial judge's decision to dismiss the 
action was overturned by the Court of Appeal and then reinstated again by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
Given the particular importance of the Supreme Court's decision, as the highest-
ranking judicial pronouncement on the subject of alcohol provider liability, it is to be 
regretted that the judgment handed down is not easy to analyse. Although the Supreme 
Court clearly considered that overservice would not, in itself, suffice as a basis for the 
liability of an alcohol provider, which is a clear endorsement of the more lenient 
approach adopted in Hague v. Billings, it rather confusingly chose to explain its 
reasoning in terms of breach rather than duty. Basically, what the Supreme Court said 
was that, on the authority of Jordan House, there could be no doubt that commercial 
providers of alcohol owe a duty of care to their own patrons and to third parties who 
might reasonably be expected to come into contact with an intoxicated patron, most 
obviously, users of the highway. Cast in such broad terms, it is not surprising that the 
court recognised a duty in this case. More problematic, in its view, was the issue of the 
standard of care required of the defendant theatre in order to discharge this duty. It was 
under this rubric that the Supreme Comi went on to consider the kind of issues that 
previous courts, quite correctly, it is submitted, 10 had treated as relevant to the question 
ofthe existence of the duty in the first place. In particular, it was only at this point that 
the Supreme Court questioned whether the circumstances were such that the theatre was 
under an obligation to take positive steps to ensure that Pettie did not drive. It 
considered that positive steps would only have been required if there had been a 
foreseeable risk that Pettie would drive. The fact that he was accompanied by two sober 
adults negated the existence of the necessary risk factor. The theatre had met the 
standard of care required of it by simply 'remaining vigilant' in the circumstances, and 
so liability was avoided on the basis that the duty had not been breached. Alternatively, 
it was held that the action would also fail for lack of causation, for the inference drawn 
by the court was that even if the theatre had intervened, the claimants would still have 
allowed Pettie to drive. 
Apart from the fact that it makes difficult a neat summary of the current approach 
of the Canadian courts to alcohol provider liability, the confusion evidenced by the 
Supreme Court in Pettie as regards the nature of the distinction between the duty and 
breach elements of negligence is of little concern in the present context. A broad 
conclusion which can still be drawn is that those who provide alcohol in Canada to 
10 On this point, see dicta of Evans LJ in Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council [1997] 2 FLR 167. 
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persons who subsequently become intoxicated risk incurring liability in tort if such 
provision takes place in circumstances in which there is a foreseeable risk that the 
intoxicated person will engage in a potentially harmful course of action. The cases may 
further suggest that it is only the risks associated with roads and road vehicles that 
would be deemed foreseeable enough in this respect. If so, then tllis would certainly 
constitute one way in which the principles of alcohol provider liability are self-limiting. 
It is to be noted at this point, though, that it is not only by placing themselves in 
the position of providers that Canadian citizens run the risk ofbeing sued in respect of 
alcohol-related injuries. There is a designated area of Canadian tort law known as 
alcohol liability, which boasts a number of established categories. 11 Of these, provider 
liability is simply the one that has received the most attention. The others include: 
alcohol-related occupiers' liability; 12 liability for sponsoring dangerous activities 
involving the intoxicated, 13 and liability for transporting the intoxicated. 14 Significantly, 
if the importance of each category were to be judged in accordance with the amount of 
litigation generated by it, alcohol-related occupiers' liability would actually rank much 
higher than provider liability. This is because in Canadian tort law the principles 
governing occupiers' liability are very expansive, particularly by comparison with the 
UK. Such liability may arise not only in respect of the condition of the premises and 
activities taking place there, but also by reference to the conduct of entrants. There are a 
number of reasons why the provider liability cases have, nevertheless, attained the 
highest profile. Firstly, these cases have reached the highest courts and have been 
officially reported, whereas the others, for the most part, have warranted a mention only 
in regional or local press. Also, insurance companies are often quick to settle alcohol-
related occupiers' liability claims at the outset, for it has become a fairly established 
area of liability. The result is that these suits do not get publicised at all. 
The development of alcohol liability in Australia, although along similar lines, 
has progressed at a much slower pace, Australian judges having tended to proceed with 
much greater caution than their Canadian counterparts. As yet, it is only occupiers 15 and 
11 See further, R. Solomon and J. Payne, "Alcohol Liability in Canada and Australia: Sell, Serve and be 
Sued", (1996) 4 Tort LR 188. 
12 See, e.g., Niblock v Pac(fic National Exhibition (1981) 30 BCLR 20; Buehlv. Polar Star Enterprises !ne 
(1989) 72 OR (2d) 573; McGinty v Cook (1991) 79 DLR (41") 95. 
13 Cracker v Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd (1988) 44 CCLT 225. 
14 Dunn v Dominion Atlantic Railway Co ( 1920) 60 SCR 31 0; The Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Blain 
(1904) 34 SCR 74. 
15 Chord as v Bryant (Wellington) Pty Ltd ( 1988) 92 FLR 40 I; Wormald v Robertson ( 1992) Australian 
Tmts Reports 81-180; Gorman v Wilhams [1985] 2 NSWLR 662. 
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commercial alcohol providers 16 who may find themselves saddled with liability in 
respect of the intoxicated, with the courts using the notion of proximity and the 
requirement of a high degree of foreseeability as mechanisms of control. The Australian 
courts are also more likely than those in Canada to allow a volenti defence to be used 
against an intoxicated claimant. 17 Nevertheless, a significant body of jurisprudence on 
the subject now exists, and recent indications are that it is going to keep on expanding. 
II. THE POSITION IN ENGLISH LAW 
Writing in 1988 about the development of alcohol provider liability in the US, Jeremy 
Harder concluded that it was unlikely, "if not impossible", 18 that this kind of liability 
would ever find a place in English tort law. It is true that, as yet, this specific form of 
alcohol liability has not established itself here. However, diverse forms of alcohol 
liability are beginning to creep into our legal system, albeit in a rather haphazard 
fashion. 
Our starting point is Ban·ett v Ministry of Defence, 19 in which the widow of a 
naval aitman who died at an airbase after consuming an excessive quantity of alcohol 
sued the MoD for failing to prevent her husband's death. The deceased had been 
stationed at an isolated base in northern Norway at which seemingly unlimited 
quantities of low priced alcohol were freely available. On the fatal night in question, the 
deceased, who had been celebrating both his thirtieth birthday and news of a promotion, 
drank himself into a stupor. When he became unconscious, the duty senior rate 
organised for him to be taken by stretcher to his bunk, where he was placed in the 
recovery position. No medical attention was sought, although the duty ratings did check 
on him a number of times. The deceased, nevertheless, suffocated on his own vomit. In 
holding the MoD liable, Phelan J explained that although it was only in exceptional 
circumstances that a defendant could be fixed with a duty to take positive steps to 
protect an adult of full capacity from his own foibles, such exceptional circumstances 
16 Johns v Cosgrove & Chevron Queensland Ltd (unrepmied, Qld. Sup. Ct., 12 Dec 1997); Rosser v 
Vintage Nominees Pty Ltd Licensee (unreported, District Comi of Western Australia, 5 June 1998). 
References taken from T. Blyth, "Hotelier and Social Host Liability for Alcohol-Related Injuries- A 
Review of The Law in Australia", (1999) E Law- Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, vol 6, 
no 3. 
17 R. Solomon and J. Payne, op. cif .. p. 120. 
18 
"Tort and the Road to Temperance: A Different Kind of Offensive Against the Drinking Driver", 
(1988) 51 M.L.R. 735, 743. 
19 The Independent, 3 June 1993, CA [1995] 1 WLR 1217. 
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existed in this case. The fact that the deceased was known to be a heavy drinker 
combined with the free availability of alcohol and the very lax attitude of those in 
charge towards drunkenness made it readily foreseeable that the deceased would 
become intoxicated. Of particular importance also was the capacity of the defendant to 
exercise control over the prevailing envirmm1ent and to discourage drunkenness through 
the implementation of the existing codes of discipline. Instead, these were largely 
ignored. By the standards set out in the relevant Navy regulations and standing orders to 
cover the exact type of situation in question, the care provided to the deceased was 
wholly inadequate. Phelan J did recognise, however, that the deceased was at least 
partly to blame for his own fate, and made a finding of twenty-five per cent. 
contributory negligence. 
The MoD appealed against the decision, contending that the judge had been 
wrong to find that a duty of care existed in the circumstances, or that, alternatively, the 
finding of contributory negligence should have been fixed at, at least, fifty per cent. 
Beldam LJ, delivering the main judgment of the Court of Appeal, agreed with the 
defendant's arguments to the extent that the judge had erred in his reasoning on the 
issues of duty and breach. In his view, the imposition on the defendant of a duty to 
control the actions of the deceased in order to prevent him from injuring himself would 
represent an unwarranted contravention of the principle of individual responsibility. He 
stated: 
"I can see no reason why it should not be fair just and reasonable for the law to 
leave a responsible adult to assume responsibility for his own actions in 
consuming alcoholic drink. No one is better placed to judge the amount that he 
can safely consume or to exercise control in his own interest as well as in the 
interest of others. To dilute self-responsibility and to blame one adult for 
another's lack of self-control is neither just nor reasonable and in the 
development of the law of negligence an increment too far."20 
He then went on to distinguish the Canadian decisions, Jordan House and Cracker v 
Sundance, 21 stating that the duty of care in these cases was founded on factors 
20 Ibid., at p. 1224. 
21 (1988) 44 CCLT 225. 
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additional to the mere provision of alcohol and the failure to enforce provisions against 
dnmkenness. 22 
Crucially, however, although Beldam LJ concluded that the defendants was not 
under a duty to prevent the deceased from drinking so much that he fell unconscious, he 
held that, through its actions in putting the deceased into his bunk after he had 
collapsed, the defendant 'assumed responsibility' for the deceased and so placed itself 
under a continuing duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure his safety. Beldam LJ 
further held that although the trial judge had been wrong to equate the Navy's 
regulations and standing orders with the legal standard of care required of the defendant, 
a breach of the duty of care could, nevertheless, still be established because even by 
ordinary standards of reasonableness, the steps taken were wholly inadequate. 
Beldam LJ therefore ultimately concurred with the judge's finding that liability 
should be imposed on the defendant. However, he chose to give effect to his view that 
individuals should be made to take primary responsibility for their own actions by 
varying the apportionment of liability, increasing the deceased's level of contributory 
negligence from one quarter to two thirds. 
Interestingly, the issue of the liability of the MoD for harm suffered by 
intoxicated servicemen has arisen again for consideration just recently. The outcome 
does not bode well for the MoD. In Jebson v MoD, 23 the claimant was a soldier who had 
fallen from the back of an army lorry after climbing onto its tailgate in a fit of drunken 
high spirits. He was with a group of soldiers being transported back from a night out 
organised by the company commander. The thrust of his argument was that in arranging 
the outing with the knowledge that it would involve heavy drinking, and in supplying 
the transport, the defendants had placed themselves under a duty to provide adequate 
supervision of the men while in the lorry and that this they had failed to do. The driver, 
who was the only sober member of the party, was unable to see into the back ofthe 
lorry from his front cab. Overturning the decision of the trial judge, the Court of Appeal 
found in favour of the claimant. 
In a judgment that has clear echoes of Bel dam LJ in Barrett, Potter LJ stated that, 
although ordinarily an adult could not rely on his drunkenness so as to impose a duty on 
others to exercise special care, this was not an invariable rule. 24 It did not apply in this 
case because the defendants had impliedly undertaken an obligation of care towards the 
claimant. For Potter LJ, the fact that the defendants had provided the transport for the 
22 [1995] 1 WLR 1217 at p. 1225. 
23 [2000] 1 WLR 2055. 
24 !bid, at p. 2066. 
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soldiers, knowing that they were all likely to become inebriated, was crucial to this 
conclusion.25 He did, however, assess the claimant's contributory negligence at seventy-
five per cent. 
Jebson would thus appear to send out a clear message to the MoD that the courts 
do not intend to resile from the principle of third party liability in respect of the 
intoxicated set out in Ban·ett. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal did not avail itself of 
the opportunity presented by this case to elaborate on the reasons why the MoD has 
been made a particular target for this kind of liability. It can only be assumed that it has 
something to do with the nature of the relationship that exists between servicemen and 
their employers, with its emphasis on control, and perhaps with the strong alcohol-
related culture that seems to pervade military life. It is noteworthy that Potter LJ did try 
to pre-empt the making of a direct link between the finding of liability and the military 
status of the defendants, but his attempt was so feeble as to be without meaning. His 
example of "an appropriate analogy from civilian life"26 was that of a works outing 
arranged by an employer, along with transport and a driver, for "a group of young and 
boisterous employees". 27 Not content with limiting the ambit of the ratio by reference to 
the characteristics of potential claimants, however, he went on to introduce the type of 
vehicle involved as a further qualifying factor, specifying that it be a lorry with a 
similarly positioned tailgate and a driver who is unable to see into the back of it. It is 
submitted that this would seldom apply to a non-military vehicle. 
The next case of interest in this context is Griffiths v Brown, 28 which involved a 
claim in negligence against a taxi driver for injuries sustained by an inebriated 
passenger after he had alighted from the vehicle. The passenger in question had been 
dropped off by the taxi driver across the road from the specific destination he had 
requested. While crossing the road, he was hit by a car and seriously injured. He sued 
the taxi driver, alleging that the latter was under a duty of care not to set him down at 
any point at which it was foreseeable that, because of his intoxication, he would be at a 
greater risk of injury than a sober person. He argued that the taxi driver had breached 
this duty by obliging him to cross the road to get to his destination. 
The claim failed. Jones J opined that the defendant was under no duty of care to 
the claimant, other than to take reasonable care to carry him safely during his journey 
and to set him down at a place where he could safely alight. In this, his duty was no 
25 [2000] 1 WLR 2055 at p. 2066 
26 /bid, at p. 2065. 
27 Ibid. 
28 (1998) The Times, October 23. (Transcript obtained). 
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different to that which would be owed to a sober passenger. He distinguished the 
Canadian authorities in much the same way as Beldam LJ did in Barrett, stating that the 
particular circumstances that gave rise to the duties in those cases were not present in 
the case at hand. However, in a move that had the effect of seriously undermining the 
conclusiveness of this pronouncement about duty, .Tones J went on to consider the 
question of breach, making it clear that his purpose in doing so was to guard against the 
possibility that a duty did actually exist in the circumstances. In doing this, he also 
further elaborated on the kind of situation in which, in his view, it would be feasible for 
a duty of care to exist. For him, the degree of intoxication was detenninative, for he 
considered that such a duty could only exist where a passenger had reached such a state 
of intoxication as to be plainly incapable of taking care of his or her own safety. It 
followed that this was also the only circumstance in which the duty could be breached. 
In this case, the claimant had consumed somewhere in the region of twelve to thirteen 
pints of strong lager and was obviously very drunk. But the fact that he was able to walk 
without staggering and give instructions to the defendant as to his destination was taken 
as evidence that he still retained some degree of control over himself. This, in 
consequence, meant that a breach of duty could not be established. 
The natural conclusion is that had the claimant been in a worse state, a duty of 
care could have been both owed and breached by the taxi driver. 29 Interpreted in this 
way, the decision is entirely reconcilable with Barrett. The principle to emerge is that an 
undertaking to provide a service to, or in some way to come to the aid of, an individual 
who is so intoxicated as to be incapable of taking care for his or her own safety will be 
held to amount to an 'assumption of responsibility' for that person and so give rise to a 
duty of protection. That this notion of there being an 'assumption of responsibility' is 
judicially recognised as constituting a legitimate ground on which to base a duty to 
rescue the intoxicated is supported by other dicta of .Tones J in Griffiths. 
When discussing the kinds of situation in which a duty of care would arise on the 
part of the taxi driver, J ones J put forward the examples of a young child or a mentally 
handicapped person travelling alone in a taxi. He opined that, due to the inability of 
such passengers to take proper care for their own safety, they would be carried only by 
virtue of some special arrangement under which the taxi driver would assume some 
"added responsibility" toward them. He cited also the example of an individual 
intending to become intoxicated on a night out and ordering a taxi in advance to take 
him or her home safely. If these drinking intentions were made known to the driver then 
29 Such is the interpretation of the decision given by R. Lawson, (1998) 142 SJ 1064. 
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J ones J considered that a duty would arise "because of what had been agreed or 
arranged and the express or implied assumption of added responsibility by the driver". 
Arguably, this latter example could be seen as an extension into the 'civilian' world of 
the principle of liability set out in Jebson. 
Of course, identifying the concept of an 'assumption of responsibility' as forming 
the basis of the duty to protect the intoxicated is the easy part. The more difficult task 
lies in determining what actually constitutes such an assumption, for, other than the fact 
that it stems from an 'undertaking', which may be either express or implied, the 
judgments just considered provide little guidance. Clearly, where there is an express 
undertaking there can be no problem. The difficulty lies with knowing how to identify 
an implied undertaking to assume responsibility. It becomes necessary to take our 
analysis further afield. 
An obvious starting point would be the House of Lords decision in Hedley Byrne 
& Co Ltd v Helier & Partners Ltd, 30 which famously established a limited exception to 
the rule against recovery in tort for negligently inflicted economic loss. It sets out that a 
duty to take reasonable care not to cause pure economic loss will arise where a special 
relationship exists between the claimant and the defendant, such relationship being 
based upon two reciprocating factors: a voluntary assumption of responsibility on the 
part of the defendant and reasonable reliance on this assumption on the part of the 
claimant. Although the Hedley Byrne principle was originally confined to cases of 
economic loss arising from negligent misstatements, it was later extended to include 
instances of such loss caused through the provision of services31 and it is this latter 
category that would appear to be of most relevance to the issue at hand. However, it 
takes only a brief excursion into this area of the law to realise that this line of inquiry is 
unlikely to lead anywhere. For although the Hedley Byrne concept of 'assumption of 
responsibility' is now into its fourth decade of existence, there is still much debate 
surrounding such fundamental issues as its true meaning,32 purpose or, indeed, utility. It 
has been severely criticised in judicial quarters as being more of a label than a 
substantive test/3 for it gives no indication of the criteria that underpin it. Nor has it 
even been applied in a consistent manner by the courts. As Janet O'Sullivan points 
30 [1964] AC 465. 
31 Henderson v Men·ett Syndicates Ltd [1994] 3 All ER 506. 
32 The current predominant view seems to be that it refers to relationships that are 'equivalent to contract'. 
See D. Howarth, Textbook on Tort (1995), p. 276. 
33 See, e.g., dicta of Lord Griffiths in Smith v Eric Bush [1989] 2 All ER 514 at 536 and of Lords Roskill 
and Oliver in Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 at 628 and 637. See also K. Barker, "Unreliable 
Assumptions in the Modem Law ofNegligence", (1993) 109 LQR 461. 
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out,34 in some cases it has been used to label a genuine exercise of choice by the 
defendant in question to act on behalf of the particular claimant; 35 in others, to denote a 
situation in which the defendant ought to have decided to act on behalf of the claimant, 
whether or not he or she actually did.36 Used in this latter way, it is a legal fiction which 
constitutes little more than a watered down proximity test, for it may be based on 
nothing more than the fact that there is a close relationship between the claimant and the 
defendant, even in the absence of any personal dealings between them. 
Moreover, due to the fact that it applies exclusively to cases of economic loss, 
and that these cases straddle the boundary between tort and contract, the Hedley Byrne 
concept of assumption of responsibility has strong contractual affinities. In the context 
of the present discussion on alcohol liability, the principles of contract law have no 
application whatsoever. The need for a concomitant reliance on the part of the claimant 
also further distinguishes the Hedley Byrne notion from that used in relation to alcohol 
liability. For it cannot realistically be suggested that the reason why individuals actively 
seek to become intoxicated, knowing that the attainn1ent of such a state carries with it 
certain risks, is that they rely on others, especially strangers, to protect them from such 
risks. If they give any thought at all to the risks, they either see them as highly unlikely 
to materialise, or as simply outweighed by the benefits. Even if such reliance did exist, 
it could hardly be deemed reasonable. 
If the courts have not set out any guiding principles for detem1ining the existence 
of an assumption of responsibility, then the natural conclusion to be drawn is that they 
do not have in mind any specific principles, but simply approach the question in 
individual cases on an ad hoc basis. In the context of alcohol liability, the attribution of 
this kind of an assumption would seem to be made on the basis that the particular 
defendant could easily prevent the injury through low-cost measures and it is considered 
appropriate in the circumstances that he or she should render such protection. As such, 
it could be construed as the introduction into our legal system of a duty of easy rescue, 
such as that advocated by Weinrib two decades ago.37 Quite apart from the fact that it 
would be effecting a complete reversal of well-entrenched law without any overt 
discussion of the issue, the recognition of an affirmative duty of action on such tem1s 
would appear to be entirely unjustified in the context of harm suffered as a result of 
voluntary intoxication. None of the factors underlying the other established third party 
34 
"Negligence Liability of Auditors to Third Parties and the Role of Assumption of Responsibility", 
(1998) 14 PN 195, 198-199. 
35 See, e.g., Henderson v Men·ett Syndicates Ltd [ 1994] 3 All ER 506. 
36 An example of this may be found in White v. Jones [1993] 3 All ER 481. 
37 E. J. Weinrib, "The Case for a Duty to Rescue", (1980) 90 Yale LJ 247. 
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duties to protect that have been encountered so far are present here. In particular, there 
is no relationship of authority and control between the parties, such as that existing as 
between parents and children or referees and rugby players, and the victims involved in 
these intoxication cases cannot be regarded as inherently vulnerable, in the sense that 
they do not have to depend almost entirely on the defendant to safeguard them in certain 
situations. Indeed, the fact that any risks to which they may be exposed will be ones that 
they have created for themselves and indeed have positively embraced should, arguably, 
by itself prevent them from invoking the responsibility of anyone other than themselves 
in the event of the actual materialisation of the risks. 
The third and final decision for discussion in the present context is that of the 
Court of Appeal in Bran non v Airtours Plc. 38 Its significance in the present context lies 
primarily in what it reveals about the court's attitude to the issue of the intoxicated 
victim's contributory negligence. Illustrating the diverse contexts in which the 
principles of alcohol liability in English tort law have been applied, the defendant in this 
particular case was a tour operator, responsible for organising an evening of 
entertainment at which the claimant was injured. The festivities in question took place 
at a holiday resort in Tunisia, where the claimant was staying as part of a package deal 
organised by the defendants, and consisted of the usual mixture of food, music and 
copious quantities of alcohol. Long tables with benches had been arranged to seat the 
partygoers and at the end of these were placed electric fans. A general warning had been 
issued at the start of the evening by an Airtours representative about the dangers of 
walking on the tables because of the presence of the fans. However, as the night wore 
on, and inhibitions became loosened by alcohol, the claimant, like many others, began 
to walk across the tables anyway. Predictably, he ended up injuring himself on one of 
the fans. 
At trial, the judge held Airtours liable for the claimant's injuries on the grounds 
that it had knowingly introduced him into a dangerous setting and intentionally put him 
into a party mood by providing him, free of charge, with unlimited quantities of alcohol. 
Moreover, Airtours had known the fans to be a danger since another holidaymaker had 
previously been injured by one, yet its representatives had issued only one warning 
about this on the night in question and made no attempt to prevent the party-goers, 
including the claimant, from climbing onto the tables. Recognising, however, that the 
claimant was primarily to blame for his own injuries, in that he had walked into a 
readily visible fan, the court made a finding of seventy-five percent contributory 
38 ( 1999) The Times, February I. (Transcript obtained). 
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negligence. It is against this finding that the claimant successfully appealed. 39 Giving 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Auld LJ accepted the claimant's argument that the 
figure had been set too high and duly reduced the figure to fifty per cent. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
As yet, the development in English law of a set of principles of liability in respect of the 
intoxicated has taken place at a fairly restrained pace, particularly by comparison with 
other commonwealth jurisdictions. Such liability has not yet extended beyond the 
factual scenario of the intoxicated as the victim, as opposed to the perpetrator, of harm. 
As a result of its foundation upon the entirely nebulous concept of' an assumption of 
responsibility', however, concerns must already be voiced about the legitimacy of such 
a form of third party liability, and moreover, about the potential for it to expand even 
further. Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that future ill-considered and equally loose 
applications of this 'assumption ofresponsibility' notion could result in the extension of 
the law on liability for the acts of others beyond all defensible limits. As such, the 
response to the existence in English law of any form of alcohol liability on this basis has 
to be one oftotal hostility. 
39 Significantly, no cross-appeal was made by the defendants against the finding of negligence. 
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CHAPTER JFIVE 
Third Party Liability in Sport 
A further identifiable category of third party liability involving private law defendants 
concerns the world of organised competitive sport. One of the more recent additions to the 
field, it is most notable perhaps for its singularity. That is to say, the sporting arena does 
not form the most obvious backdrop to actions of this nature and seems to share little in 
common with the contextual settings of the other established categories. In particular, there 
is typically no vulnerability issue at stake. However, one need only consider the 
combination of fast-paced activity and competitive spirit, the high degree of physical 
contact and elevated risk of injury, along with the existence of an often large number of 
intermediaries who will be involved in a directional capacity, to see that the sporting arena 
can be fertile ground indeed for the formation of claims invoking the liability of third 
parties. 
I. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY ACTIONS AGAINST REFEREES 
In England, the issue of third party liability in sport first came before the courts in the case 
of Smoldon v Whitworth, 1 in which the referee of a colts rugby match was sued by one of 
the players in respect of the serious injuries he sustained when a scrum collapsed.2 The 
basis of the claim against the referee was that he had been negligent in failing to implement 
specific safety measures designed to prevent collapses. The safety rules were said to be 
contained in the Laws of the Game issued by the sport's governing body, the International 
Rugby Football Board. In recognition of the increased physical vulnerability to injury of 
players under nineteen, the Laws contained special provisions relating to colts games. The 
claimant relied, in particular, on Law 20 which set out that, for safety purposes, a routine 
known as the "phased sequence of engagement" was to be followed in all colts matches. 
1 (1996) The Times. 23 April. 
2 The claimant also sued one of the opposing players but the claim was dismissed at first instance and no 
appeal was made against that decision. 
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There was ample evidence to demonstrate that the defendant did not even understand the 
purpose of this particular provision, let alone enforce it, and the abnom1ally high number of 
collapsed scrums that had taken place during the game in question was particularly 
prejudicial to his case in this respect. It followed that if the claimant could just establish a 
duty to implement the rule then the breach element would more or less establish itself. 
At trial, Curtis J did not treat the claim as being in any way exceptional. He did not 
advert to the fact that it was predicated upon the concept of liability for the acts of another 
and simply dealt with the duty issue by way of a straightforward application of the Caparo 
three-stage test. In particular, he saw no reason why it would be unfair or unjust to impose a 
duty of care on the defendant and went on to find that liability in negligence could be easily 
established. 
The defendant appealed on the basis that the standard of care applied by the judge 
was not appropriate to the circumstances of the case and that the finding of fault was 
therefore insupportable. 3 That he did not contest the finding of duty is of crucial importance 
in the context of the present discussion. For not only does this imply an unquestioning 
acceptance of the admissibility of the principles of third party liability into this particular 
field, which in turn suggests a possible softening of the traditionally hostile judicial 
approach to this type of liability, it also constitutes a significant expansion of the grounds 
upon which such liability can be founded. In Smoldon, the duty was based seemingly 
entirely upon the defendant's position of authority and consequent power to actively control 
the conduct of the players, without any real concomitant reliance on the part of the potential 
victims. The duty of care owed by a referee can thus be described as the amalgamation of 
both a duty to control and a duty to protect. It is distinctive, however, in that the class of 
persons that the referee is bound to control corresponds exactly with the class that he is 
bound to protect. That is, the potential third party perpetrators and the potential victims are 
one and the same. 
That a special pre-tort relationship can consequently be established between the 
referee and both of the parties involved in the tmt action is what makes the imposition of a 
duty of care justifiable in this type of third party liability case, not least because it imports a 
significant restriction on the scope of the duty. It is submitted that the potential third party 
liability does not therefore extend beyond injuries as inflicted between players on the actual 
3 ( 1996) The Times. 18 December. (Transcript obtained). 
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playing field. Notably, it would not cover hann caused by players to spectators or officials, 
or vice versa. The existence of two concurrent special relationships, that is, one between the 
referee and the claimant and another between the referee and the third party harm-doer, is 
thus to be regarded as an essential prerequisite to the existence of the referee's affirmative 
duty of action. 
While the defendant in Smoldon did not rely on the exceptional nature of the liability 
issue at stake to contest the duty of care, he did introduce it as a remoteness argument. 
Relying on dicta of Lord Mackay in Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd,4 he asserted that 
where it is sought to hold one person liable for the acts of another, it must be shown that the 
kind of injury suffered by the claimant was a highly probable consequence of the 
defendant's breach of duty. In other words, in this type of case, the ordinary Wagon Mound 
test of reasonable foreseeability is replaced with a much more stringent 'high likelihood' 
requirement. It is submitted that, in the circumstances, tllis was an entirely valid point for, 
as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, while a 'high likelihood' test for remoteness may 
not be appropriate in the Smith-type scenario, it probably does apply in third party liability 
actions based upon a duty to control. 5 However, the Com1 of Appeal in Smoldon rejected 
this argument outright, holding that it was sufficient that the harm complained of could be 
shown to be a foreseeable result of the defendant's failure to prevent the scrum collapsing 
and that this was so even though, statistically speaking, it was a result that was very 
unlikely to eventuate.6 
The issue that most preoccupied the Court of Appeal, and indeed that upon which the 
finding of liability ultimately rested, was the applicable standard of care. As already stated, 
thls constituted the main basis of the defendant's appeal. Relying on Wooldridge v 
Sumner, 7 the defendant's argument was that nothing short of a reckless disregard of the 
claimant's safety would suffice to establish a breach of duty. The claimant, on the other 
hand, put forward the authority of Condon v Basi8 and contended that the defendant's duty 
was to exercise such a degree of care as was appropriate in the circumstances. Like the trial 
judge, the Court of Appeal agreed with the claimant on this issue also. Bingham LCJ stated 
that although sporting competitors in a vigorous and fast-moving contest may be entitled to 
4 [1987]AC241 at261. 
5 Supra, p. 40. 
6 (1996) The Times, 18 December, transcript, pp. 9, I 0. 
7 [1963] 2 QB 43. 
8 [ 1985] 2 All ER 453. 
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be all but oblivious ofthose around them, so that any conduct falling short of recklessness 
could be more or less excused, the same could not be said of referees. 9 Their position is 
different precisely because one of their main functions is to ensure the safety of players. 
The standard of care to be expected of them is, therefore, much higher. The only concession 
to be made on their part is that in a fast-moving game, the referee would not ordinarily be 
held liable for a mere eiTor of judgment. On this analysis, a breach of duty was easily 
established in the present case, for there was a very clear failure on the part of the defendant 
to enforce the relevant safety mles. 
In giving judgment against the defendant, Bingham LCJ made clear his concern lest 
the decision be seen as leading referees into a downward spiral of litigation. He thus took 
great care to emphasise the special nature of the circumstances involved and how this 
placed clear limitations on the ratio of the decision. 10 In this context, the fact that it had 
been a colts match was of cmcial importance since the safety mles in question only applied 
to this type of game. Moreover, the failure on the part of the defendant to enforce these 
mles had been particularly blatant. From this latter point, it could be deduced that if the 
fault of the defendant had been less serious or less clear, the court might have been less 
inclined to impose liability. 
Nevertheless, it was somewhat predictable that the decision in Smoldon should 
trigger a highly publicised backlash of opinion. 11 Indeed, the NUT even threatened to 
boycott after-school sports unless commitments were made to ensure that teachers involved 
in these activities would be adequately covered by insurance. With the benefit of hindsight, 
it would be easy now to dismiss such furore as simple oveiTeaction for, six years down the 
line, the anticipated baiTage of similar actions has not materialized. Legally speaking, 
therefore, apart from the obvious insurance implications for clubs and referees, it would 
seem that Smoldon has made little impact. However, it is submitted that it would be rash to 
dismiss it as entirely insignificant. It is possible that the potential of the decision to found 
fu1ther liability actions has just gone unnoticed, or that it has simply been forgotten about. 
If so, then it would just take one related, high-profile action to bring it back into the 
limelight again. And Smoldon could obviously be applied to any sport in which the 1isk of 
9 (1996) The Times, 18 December, transcript, p. 9. 
10 !bid, at pp. 9 and 18. 
11 See, eg., "Teachers May Refuse to Take Up Whistle", Daily Telegraph, 18 December 1996 and "Teachers 
Threaten to Boycott Spoti", The Guardian, 20 May 1996. See also, S. Greenfield and G. Osbom, "The 
referee's fear of a penalty", ( 1996) 12 PN 63. 
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injury is high. Obvious examples would be football, hockey, judo, karate or boxing, to 
name just a few. Any failure to enforce recognised safety provisions could be cited as 
negligence and the main hurdles would be establishing that the defendant's fault was 
sufficiently serious and that there was an adequate causal link between this fault and the 
harm complained of. 
In the meantime, however, the law on sports liability has developed in a different 
direction, for it is rather the sports administrative bodies responsible for rule-making that 
have been targeted in recent years. As defendants, they are more attractive because, by 
comparison with the position of the referee under Smoldon, their potential liability is much 
further reaching. It was in Australia that this type of action was first mounted. 
11. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY ACTIONS AGAINST SPORT GOVERNING BODIES 
In two separate incidents in Australia in the mid-1980s, two rugby players suffered similar 
catastrophic injuries in scrumming accidents. Determined to obtain compensation through 
the tort system, but unable to point to anyone as being immediately and directly responsible 
for the harm, 12 they adopted an innovative approach to establishing liability and targeted 
numerous third party defendants in a series of legal actions spanning over more than a 
decade. Focusing their attentions on the way in which the mgby matches in question had 
been generally conducted and, in particular, on how the formal rules of the game had been 
applied, the claimants brought negligence actions against, among others, the opposing 
clubs, the referees, the referees' association, the Australian Rugby Football Union, the New 
South Wales Rugby Union and the Sydney Rugby Union. 
The allegations against them related, in part, to a failure to properly enforce the rules 
of the game, although in the circumstances, this argument was not, in itself, strong enough 
to sustain the claim. The claimants recognised that, as far as the actual infliction of their 
injuries was concerned, the real problem had been that the rules themselves had been 
inadequate in that they did not make adequate provision for safety regarding scrummages. 13 
Thus, in a rather 'audacious move, the claimants further contended that these defendants had 
12 No allegations of negligence could be made against any of the opposing players, 
13 It is important to note, however, that at no point was it suggested by the claimants that the rules of the game 
were, in themselves, legally dispositive. 
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been negligent also in failing to have the rules modified so as to allow for scrummaging to 
take place safely. They were, thus, in effect, reproaching the defendants, on the one hand, 
for failing to apply certain rules and, on the other hand, for actually applying others. It was 
clear, however, that this latter argument was fatally flawed in that the parties pursued were 
not responsible for making the rules, this being rather the sole domain of the sport's 
gove1ning body, the International Rugby Football Board (IRFB). It would therefore have 
been open to these defendants to have simply met this allegation with the argwnent that 
they had no discretion on the matter and simply had to apply the rules as promulgated by 
this body. In anticipation of this, the claimants sought to join the IRFB as eo-defendant. 
While, in theory, this may have sounded like a simple enough solution, in practice, it turned 
out to be a particularly problematic task that was to launch them into a whole new saga of 
litigation and ultimately take them right the way up to the High Cowt of Australia. 
The first hurdle they encountered was that, as an unincorporated association, the 
IRFB was not a legal entity and so could not be sued as such. 14 To get around this, the 
claimants instead joined the actual Member Unions of which the IRFB was made up and 
the representatives of the Member Unions who had attended the relevant meetings, that is, 
those meetings taking place before the claimants' injuries were occasioned and at which the 
rules of the game could have been modified. It is of interest to note that the principal 
amendment to the rules that the claimants argued should have been made was the 
introduction of the 'crouch-touch-pause-engage' sequence, or 'phased sequence of 
engagement' procedure, as a compulsory requirement. It was the non-enforcement of this 
specific requirement which fmmed the basis of the referee's liability in Smoldon a few 
years later, it having been officially incorporated into the rules by the IRFB in 1988. 
Having overcome this initial hurdle, however, the claimants still had to convince the 
court, in accordance with the New South Wales Supreme Court Rules 1970, that they had a 
'good arguable case' against these IRFB defendants, otherwise leave to proceed against 
them could not be granted. At first instance, they were unsuccessfu1. 15 For Grove J, the 
sheer physical distance between the parties was more or less fatal to the existence of a duty 
of care, for it meant that the requirement of proximity could not be meaningfully satisfied. 
The individual IRFB defendants were, after all, from different parts of the world and 
14 See Luke Douglas Hyde v Australian Rugby Football Union Ltd as representative of the International 
Rugby Football Board. (NSW Supt Ct, I 0 Feb 1994, unreported). 
15 Hyde v AE Agar; Worsley v Australian Rugby Football Union (NSW Supt Ct, 22 July 1996, unreported). 
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connected to each other only by their attendance at various meetings held in Europe, while 
the claimants were just two unknown rugby players from Australia. To be taken in 
conjunction with this also was the voluntary nature of the rules concerned. The IRFB was a 
voluntary association and the claimants were adults who had made the choice to participate 
in the sport and who had thereby implied their acceptance of the rules laid down by this 
governing body. Moreover, given that there existed no precedent for this particular duty, a 
very strong and compelling case for its current recognition would have to have been made 
out, and this simply had not been done in this instance. 
The claimants appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal ofNew South Wales. 16 
Without expressing any definite opinion as to whether or not a duty of care was owed by 
the IRFB in the circumstances, Spigelman CJ, Mason P, and Stein JA were sufficiently 
persuaded by the claimants' arguments of the theoretical possibility of its existence to allow 
the matter to proceed to full trial. Cmcial to this decision was "evidence of assumption of 
control by the members of the IRFB and tenable allegations of reliance by the players of the 
sport", 17 the relationship of rule-maker and those bound by the rules creating the necessary 
relationship of proximity. The geographical distance between the parties was considered to 
be oflittle consequence. Thus, while the Supreme Com1 had required evidence of real and 
effective control by the defendants of the circun1stances and, by extension, of a de facto 
control of all the players on the field, to satisfy the proximity element of the Caparo three-
stage test for duty, the Court of Appeal was prepared to accept that a mere notional control 
of the general situation would suffice. Given that the high incidence of spinal cord injuries 
to rugby players had been well documented for many years, it was also arguable that the 
defendants should reasonably have foreseen that their failure to amend the mles to make 
better provision for safety would result in harm of this nature being sustained by the 
claimants. Furthermore, it could not be concluded at this stage that an argument that it 
would be unfair, unjust or unreasonable to impose a duty on the IRFB would necessarily 
defeat the claim. The defendants duly appealed. 18 
In the High Court of Australia, the principal focus of attention was on the issue of 
control and, in particular, on the circumstance in which the exercise of a power to control 
could be said to give rise to an 'assumption of responsibility', for this was treated by 
16 Hyde v Agar; Worsley v Australian Rugby Football Union Ltd ( 1998) 45 NSWLR 487. 
17 lbid. atp. 512. 
18 [2000) HCA 41 (3 August 2000). (Transctipt obtained). 
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Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ as being more or less 
determinative of the duty issue. They took issue with much that had been said on the matter 
in the Court of Appeal, aligning themselves much more closely with the reasoning of Grove 
J in the Supreme Court. In their opinions, there were a number of factors that clearly 
negated the existence of any real control on the part of the IRFB defendants. First of all, 
there was the lack of any prior personal contact between the parties: 
"To speak of persons who were sent once a year to London as representatives 
of national unions, as controlling a game of football played in a Sydney suburb, or a 
country town, by reason of their collective capacity to alter the international rules, is to 
speak of a remote form of control." 19 
Secondly, there was the fact that the various IRFB defendants did not have the power as 
individuals, and therefore in the capacity in which they were being sued, to change the laws 
of the game, for any proposed amendments had to be approved by a majority of at least 
three-quarters of those present at the relevant meeting. 2° Finally, the victims in question 
were adults who had participated in the sport of their own free will. 21 
The High Court judgments were permeated throughout by a marked fear lest the 
floodgates be opened up. Gleeson CJ stated that the extent of the potential liability of the 
defendants would be limited only by the number of persons who chose to play this sport 
anywhere in the world. 22 It is clear that this fear greatly influenced their ultimate decision 
and, in their eagerness to present their denial of liability as categorically as possible, they 
put forward as many justifications for it as they could muster. Unfortunately, some of those 
advanced are not capable of withstanding much scrutiny. Gleeson CJ, for instance, claimed 
that one reason militating against the existence of a legal duty was "[t]he high degree of 
subjectivity of an assessment as to what level of risk inherent in the sport as played 
according to a certain set of rules, is unnecessary". 23 However, that amounts to saying that 
difficult, though not impossible, tasks should not be attempted by the comts at all, as 
though the court's convenience is more impottant than the issue of the validity of the 
19 !bid, at para. 16 per G1eeson CJ. 
20 !bid, at para. 74. 
21 !bid, at para. 13. 
22 !bid, at para. 19. 
23 !bid, at para. 18. 
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claimant's right to compensation. The courts are confronted by such difficulties all the time 
and should be quite competent at dealing with them. It was also said that, in order to 
detennine the issue of reliance, factors such as the attitudes, capacities and propensities of 
individual players would have to be taken into account and that these were beyond the 
influence of the defendants. 24 However, this would not be a problem if reliance were simply 
construed as an objective concept. 
These criticisms aside, however, the grounds given by the High Court for its 
dismissal of the action do, overall, have sound basis in established legal principle. 25 As 
such, the decision has to be regarded as constructing a bar to future claims by injured 
sportspersons against the individual members of distant supranational rule-making bodies 
for making inadequate provision for safety in the rules ofthe game. It is submitted, 
however, that if it had not been for the status of the IRFB as an unincorporated association, 
then the position might have been entirely different. For, arguably, if it had not been 
necessary to single out the individual members of the body, the High Court would not have 
been so insistent that some kind of personal contact or personal dealings be established 
between the parties to the action as a prerequisite to legal proximity. If so, then it follows 
that the Hyde litigation may still provide the theoretical basis for other negligence actions 
against sports governing bodies that can be sued in their own right. The proximity 
requirement would probably take on a more abstract forn1 and be more easily satisfied in 
consequence. Further actions of this nature involving any sport in which the risk of injury is 
known to be high would then have to be anticipated. That such an action has already been 
successfully brought in the UK, in the context of professional boxing, lends much support 
to this proposition. Although not strictly a third party liability action, in that the negligence 
of the defendant regulatory body in this instance related to its failure to remedy the 
consequences of harm occasioned through the medium of a third party, rather than to 
failings relating specifically to the actual harm-causing conduct as such, the case in 
question is nevertheless instructive in this context in that the legal approach it demonstrates 
to the general issue of liability for inadequate safety provision would also extend to factual 
situations involving rules relating to conduct. 
24 Ibid. at para. 21. 
25 For a contrary view, seeS. Yeo, "The Infallibility of Rule-Making Bodies", (200 I) 9 Tort LR I 04. 
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Watson v British Boxing Board of ControP6 involved a negligence action by the 
former super-middleweight boxer Michael Watson against the British Boxing Board of 
Control (BBBC), a limited company, for the injuries he received during his famous world 
title fight against Chris Eubank in 1991. During the contest, Watson sustained a head injury 
resulting in a condition which, according to the weight of medical opinion, would have 
been largely remediable had appropriate medical treatment been promptly received. 
Unfortunately, the necessary resuscitation facilities were not available upon the premises in 
question, the doctor attending at the ringside did not have the knowledge of the required 
resuscitation procedure and the ambulance in attendance did not have the necessary 
resuscitation equipment. By the time Watson was taken to hospital and treated there, the 
condition had become irremediable and he suffered serious and permanent brain damage. 
In the High Comt, Kennedy J upheld Watson's claim, deciding that the BBBC was 
under a duty of care to its members and that this consisted of an obligation to alter its rules 
and regulations conceming safety to provide for resuscitation facilities, including the 
presence of a doctor with the relevant expertise, at the ringside of every one of its fights. 
Significantly, proximity was not even raised as an issue. In a very carefully considered and 
reasoned judgment, Kennedy J based his finding in this respect upon a combination of 
factors. While he did not use the precise terminology, his discussion is replete with 
allusions to the idea of an 'assumption of responsibility' with concomitant reliance as 
constituting the basis of this particular form of third patty liability in sport. Fortunately, in 
this instance, and by contrast to the alcohol liability cases, the factors underlying this 
application of assmnption of responsibility reasoning as the basis of liability were clearly 
spelt out. 
First and foremost, he referred to the absolute control exercised by the BBBC over 
professional boxing in the UK, to the extent that anyone wishing to play a role in this sport 
had to become one of its members and abide by its rules. 27 That the Board was a national 
governing body, rather than an international one like the IRFB, apparently also operated in 
favour of the claimant in this case, for it meant that the boundaries of its liability could be 
limited to a smaller and more readily definable class. There was thus not the same fear of 
indeterminate liability in this case as had been in evidence in Hyde. 
26 [2000] ECC 141 . 
27 !bid, at p. 147. 
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Next, there was the fact that the risk of injury of the type sustained by Watson was 
known to be very high in boxing28 and that the Board had publicly professed its concern for 
safety, both in its memorandum of association29 and in its rules and regulations,30 and 
indeed even in a press release. 31 This was clearly construed by Kennedy J as an express 
undettaking on the pmt of the defendant. Reinforcing this notion of there having been an 
assumption of responsibility was the defendant's actual ability to prevent harm, in that its 
safety stipulations were known to be readily obeyed by the various promoters and 
organisers of boxing matches, 32 for this placed the defendant in a position of authority. 
Lastly, Ke1medy J considered that, on the whole, boxers were likely to rely on the 
defendant to take sole responsibility for safety. He commented that "the pool from which 
professional boxers tend to be recruited is unlikely to be one with an innate or well-
infonned concern about safety", while the Board on the other hand was described as "a 
body with special knowledge which gives advice to a defined class of persons that it knows 
will rely upon that advice in a defined situation".33 That his remark about the background of 
boxers was entirely unsubstantiated, thus inviting the argument that it should be rejected as 
a sweeping generalisation, is to his discredit, not least because such emphasis on this degree 
of reliance was, arguably, unnecessary. For, in view of the cogency of his other reasons for 
recognising a duty, it is submitted that simple proof that boxers generally tended to rely on 
the Board as the rule-maker and as the greater authority on safety would have been 
perfectly acceptable in the circumstances. Such reliance could hardly have been deemed 
unreasonable. However, it is submitted that this indiscretion on the part of Kennedy J was 
not so great as to actually jeopardise the validity or conclusiveness of his finding that a duty 
of care did exist. 
By comparison with Smoldon, the duty of care in this case was clearly framed in 
more abstract tem1s. There was no physical contact between the defendant and the claimant 
and the defendant did not exercise any de facto control over the actual match in question. 
Rather, its responsibility was linked to its more general position of authority and its 
indirect, but nonetheless effective, capacity to control the circumstances. Thus while the 
liability of the referee under Smoldon is limited to what takes place on the sports field while 
28 !bid, at p. 149. 
29 !bid, at p. 147. 
30 !bid, at p. 148. 
31 !bid, at p. 150. 
32 !bid, at p. 153. 
33 Ibid. 
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he is there acting as an adjudicator, the liability of the rule-making body under Watson is 
potentially much wider and of a much more general nature. Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that the imposition of a duty of care on the defendant body in this instance was justifiable 
on the basis of its specific unde11aking to its members. And the duty is again limited by the 
existence of two, identical, special relationships of close proximity; one as between the 
defendant and the third party hann-doer and another as between the defendant and the 
victim. 
As regards breach, Kennedy J applied a simple cost-benefit analysis and concluded 
that the Board had acted unreasonably. Crucial to this finding was the fact that the 
effectiveness of the particular resuscitation procedure in question in treating head injuries 
of the type sustained by Watson had been widely recognised since at least 1980.34 
Moreover, the Board had failed to put forward any convincing reasons as to why it had not 
introduced this procedure as a standard response, and this led Ke1medy J to the conclusion 
that the matter had simply not been given any consideration at all. 35 He was also critical of 
the fact that the doctors who had been recruited to attend the matches had not been chosen 
on account of their particular skills or experience, but had been selected rather because they 
had been friends of existing doctors or had simply had an interest in the sport. Quite 
simply, the level of fault was high and there were no mitigating factors. 
On the issue of causation, Kennedy J applied McGhee v National Coal Board36 to 
overcome the difficulty that there was no conclusive medical evidence to show that Watson 
would have made a better recovery if he had received timely resuscitation and duly 
concluded that "on the balance of probabilities, the claimant's present state would have 
been materially better than it actually is".37 He also rejected the defence ofvolenti non fit 
injuria put forward by the Board on the ground that Watson had not been fully aware of the 
risks involved in the fight. He had not known about the Board's lax rule drafting and 
therefore could not be taken to have consented to the dangers that this raised. Thus, having 
found in favour of the claimant on every issue, Kennedy J had no hesitation in imposing 
liability on the Board. 
34 !bid, at p. 154. 
35 Ibid. 
36 [1973] I WLR I. 
37 [2000] ECC 141 at 161. 
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Moreover, an appeal launched by the Board against this decision has just recently 
been rejected by the Court of Appeal in similar unequivocal terms. 38 Unfortunately for the 
Board, it is likely that the particular timing of the appeal will have done much to reinforce, 
in the eyes of the appellate comt, the correctness of the first instance decision. For, in a 
strange coincidence, just several days prior to the hearing, another boxer suffered a similar 
injury in the ring to that sustained by Watson in 1991 and the incident was the subject of 
much media attention.39 This particular boxer, however, was fortunate enough to benefit 
from the tighter ringside safeguards that had been introduced in response to the Watson 
incident and, significantly, he is said to be making good progress in his recovery. 40 Watson 
could not have asked for any greater vindication of the basic arguments underlying his 
claim. 
Given that, as a direct result of the Watson case, the BBBC has now remedied its 
various failings concerning safety, it is unlikely that any further claims of this particular 
nature could be successfully brought against it in the future. Nevertheless, the decision is 
likely to have profound consequences for the sporting world generally. For not only is it apt 
to encourage similar actions against the governing bodies of other dangerous sports, it is 
also likely, given the extensive media coverage it has received, to bring the whole idea of 
suing in respect of sports injuries back to the forefront of public attention. It may thus 
inspire the fonnation of negligence actions on other grounds. Referees or other adjudicators 
would become obvious targets in this respect and, as such, it may be that Watson v BBBC 
will constitute just the high profile case alluded to earlier that could refocus attention on the 
potential of Smoldon v Whitworth to extend the boundaries of third party liability in sport.41 
That is not to suggest, however, that such claims would necessarily succeed, for both 
Watson and Smoldon would appear to set the fault requirement at a very high level. 
Potential claimants would thus need to be able to furnish very clear proof of unreasonable 
conduct and this may be difficult to do in practice.42 Moreover, it would seem that in 
relation to claims against rule-making bodies, the status of the body will also be of crucial 
importance, with international unincorporated associations being the most difficult to sue. 
38 [2001] QB 1134 
39 
"Sport Left Holding its Breath as lngles Pays the Ptice of His Courage", The Times, 18 December 2000; 
"MP Calls for Inquiry After Boxer Left in Coma", The Guardian, 19 December 2000; "Sport Must Pay Heed 
to Lessons from Watson Verdict", The Times, 20 December 2000. 
40 
"Ingle Making Good Progress", The Times, 28 December 2000. 
41 For early evidence of this, see Vmvles v Evans [2002] EWHC 2612. 
42 See also, J. George, "Watson v British Boxing Board of Control: Negligent Rule-Making in the Court of 
Appeal", (2002) 65 MLR I 06 at 116. 
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Rather, the primary legal significance of the cases just discussed is that they establish that 
the matter is at least justiciable. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there are at least two grounds upon which a common law duty to prevent 
harm in sport may be based: ( 1) the occupation of a position of immediate authority with a 
resultant power of immediate and effective control; and (2) the occupation of a position of 
general authority and indirect control in which there has been an express assumption of 
responsibility with concomitant reliance. In both cases, the duty will be further subject to 
the existence of two special relationships of close proximity. Given that the potential scope 
of liability based upon the second ground is clearly very wide, the additional requirement of 
an express undertaking on the part of the defendant to ensure the safety of the claimant 
carries out an essential limitative function. On either ground, however, the duty owed can 
be generally classified as one of protection arising out of a power of control over 
circumstances. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Third Party Liability Actions Involving Public Authority Defendants 
The negligence liability of public authorities is a complex and confused area of tort law. 
Given such a problematic starting point, it comes as no surprise then to discover that, in 
cases where the allegations invoking that liability take the form of third party liability 
arguments, the law is confotmded to the point of obscurity. 1 
In very basic terms, the reason why public authority defendants pose such 
difficulties for the law of negligence generally is that they are regarded as having special 
status, warranting the application of exceptional rules designed to restrict liability. For the 
most part, these rules relate to the duty of care issue. Unfortunately, the fundamental 
questions of just what exactly these rules are, and how and when they are to be applied, 
have not yet been fully resolved. The uncertainty that this has given rise to has then, in turn, 
engendered a litany of misapprehensions, misconceptions and misinterpretations. 
Addressing first of all the issue of why public authorities are accorded such special 
treatment in the law of negligence, the general tenor of the justifications traditionally 
advanced is that to impose such liability on them operates to the detriment of society and 
the common good. This stems from the fact that, unlike private persons, the sole purpose of 
these bodies is to serve the community. Indeed, they have been created specifically to carry 
out functions designed to benefit the community. And to this end, they are financed out of 
the public purse, or to put it another way, paid for by the taxpayer. The first objection then 
to making public authorities liable is that any compensation must come from their allocated 
public funds. This then reduces the amount of money available for the performance of the 
relevant public ftmctions which, if argued to its logical extreme, means that for the benefit 
of one aggrieved individual, the whole community has to suffer. Relatedly, there is also the 
floodgates concern that, in our increasingly litigious society, the perceived deep-pocket 
status of public authorities will make them vulnerable targets for wily claimants. 
The other main argun1ent in favour of shielding public authorities from the full 
rigour of negligence law is the 'defensive practice' argument. Its thrust is simple: the ever-
looming threat of liability may cause public servants to adopt excessively cautious 
1 Thus far, negligence is the only area oftmi law to have been used to found a third party liability action 
against a public authority in respect of its exercise of its public law functions. 
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approaches to their work, which would lead not only to an inefficient use of both time and 
resources, but also to the sacrifice of innovation. Moreover the task of actually defending 
claims will typically involve a further diversion of resources. 
These general public interest concerns about public authority liability, taken in 
conjunction with other more context-specific ones, which will be encountered presently,2 
tend to be referred to collectively under the umbrella term 'public policy considerations'. 
Although they are clearly of some force, such that they undoubtedly justify the limitation of 
public authority liability in some instances, there has been a tendency on the part of the 
courts to attribute to them far too much significance and to use them in a much too 
sweeping and indiscriminate manner to establish broad areas of complete public authority 
immunity from negligence liability. So blatant has been this tendency that, as well as being 
the subject of some particularly vociferous and widely expressed academic criticism,3 it has 
received stark reproof from the European Court of Human Rights. 4 While in recent times, 
the courts have shown some signs of at least acknowledging the need to redress the 
balance, 5 it is contended that much more is still required of them. Rather than skirting 
around the issue, which is all that they have done to date, they need to address it directly. 
Specific focus needs to be placed on the actual significance of each individual public policy 
consideration, in tetms of its capacity to override the claimant's corrective justice 
entitlement to compensation and, in particular, how this may vary from context to context. 
Aside from the public policy issues, there is another major complicating aspect of 
public authority liability, and it is this that most obviously justifies the application of a 
different set of rules from that which applies in ordinary negligence cases. The typical 
negligence allegation against a public body will be framed in very singular terms, in that it 
will relate to the exercise or non-exercise of statutory functions and thus straddle the 
boundary between private law and public law. The problem of how to deal with public law 
issues in a private law context is thus encountered. Of most concern are those instances in 
which the statute conferring the function on the public body in question also confers upon it 
an element of discretion as regards the actual exercise of the function. Where the particulars 
2 See infra, pp. I 09-110. 
3 See, e.g., S. H. Bailey & M. J. Bowman, "Public Authority Negligence Revisited", (2000) 59 CLJ 85, B. 
Markesinis, J.-8. Auby, D. Coester-Waltjen and S. Deakin, Tortious Liability of StatutOI)J Bodies: A 
Comparative and Economic Analysis of Five English Cases (Hart Publishing, 1999). 
4 In the well-known decision of Osman v UK [ 1999] I FLR 193. 
5 As evidenced most notably by the decision in Ban·ett v Enfield London Borough Council [ 1999] 3 All ER 
193 and as recognised by the ECtHR in Z v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 3. See also S v Gloucestershire County 
Council [2001] 2 WLR 909. 
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of a negligence claim involve the court in an assessment of a public body's use of its 
statutory discretion, issues of a constitutional nature come into play. T11e vety essence of an 
award of discretion is that it confers a cettain freedom of decision. If the use of this 
freedom is to be monitored, then this necessarily detracts from the very purpose of having 
the discretion in the first place. Such monitoring could be seen to amount to a usurpation of 
competence on the part of the court. Given that the discretion has been bestowed by 
Parliament, such judicial intetference with obvious parliamentary intention could be viewed 
as an infringement ofthe separation of powers principle. 
The much-maligned policy-operational distinction, in various guises, has been the 
principal tool used by the courts to address these constitutional competency issues. To date, 
this approach has been far from successful. It is argued, however, that this has been due 
mainly to a lack of clarity as to how the distinction is actually supposed to work, and to 
several key terminological problems. From the point of view of enabling the courts to 
identify those areas that are within their competency and those that are not, it is the essence 
of the policy-operation distinction that arguably provides the best guidance. To this end, an 
attempt will be made to provide the clarifications required in order to make the distinction 
workable. 
Lastly, there are various difficulties associated with the omissions issue in a public 
authority context. Many of the negligence actions against public authorities take the form of 
omissions actions and it is difficult to work out just what the significance of the omissions 
issue is in the various contexts. This has much to do also with the point made above about 
certain negligence claims against these bodies being framed in unique terms, for one of the 
most common allegations made against a public body is that it has been negligent in failing 
to exercise a discretionary function. Clearly, the fact that reference may be made to the 
statute as evidence that the public body targeted had either a public law power or duty to 
act is what fuels the claimant's argument that the defendant also had a duty of care to act at 
common law for the purposes of a negligence action. While it is obvious to any tort lawyer 
that to reason so simplistically is to entirely misunderstand the function of the duty of care 
concept in negligence, there are, nevetiheless, some conceptual difficulties with denying a 
duty in this scenario simply on the basis of it being a case of nonfeasance. Indeed, none of 
the traditional arguments in support of the non-liability for omissions rule actually apply in 
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respect of statutory bodies.6 In particular, there is no 'why-pick-on-me' argument- the 
body is targeted specifically because of its publicly advertised responsibilities in the 
domain in question. That is not to suggest that the omissions rule should not then have any 
significance in a public authority context- clearly imposing omissions liability on public 
bodies will be highly undesirable in certain circumstances for other reasons. It is a case of 
having to work out what these reasons are and what kind of variables they will be affected 
by. At a general level, however, it is submitted that there can be identified at the outset two 
factors of crucial importance affecting the relevance of the omissions argument. These are 
the nature of the negligence allegation at stake, particularly in terms of the modified 
policy/operational distinction mentioned above, and the nature of the particular public body 
involved, in terms of its main functions and responsibilities. In respect of certain functions, 
some public bodies will be more easily targeted by omissions claims than others. 
Only after addressing all ofthese issues in relation to the general negligence 
liability of public authorities is it possible to analyse coherently the sub-category of public 
authority liability that is the actual focus of this part of the thesis, namely third party 
liability. It is submitted, however, that even at this initial stage it is clear that the most 
important factor regarding the success or failure of third party liability claims in this 
context is going to be the categorisation of the main functions of the public authority 
defendant in question. Again it is a case of some functions being more conducive to the 
imposition of typical third party duties of control or protection than others. 
Before moving on to a full discussion of these issues, it is perhaps necessary to give 
some consideration to the question of their actual relevance, in view of the recent coming 
into force of the Human Rights Act 1998. In particular, does the application to all public 
bodies of the section 6 duty to act compatibly with Convention rights not render obsolete 
the negligence action against them? It is true that, in future, the action for breach of 
statutory duty under the HRA is likely to all but subsume the negligence action where this 
category of defendant is concerned. However, as perhaps indicated by recent ECtHR case 
law, it is suggested that the human rights action is likely to broadly follow on from recent 
developments in respect of the negligence action. After all, each of the recent, significant 
negligence decisions involving public authority defendants 7 was heavily influenced by the 
6 As Lord Hoffman recognised in Stovin v Wise [ 1996] 3 All ER 80 I at 821. 
7 See, in particular, Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [ 1999] 3 All ER 193 and Phelps v Hillingdon 
London Borough Council [2000] 4 All ER 504. 
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imminent arrival of the HRA, in the sense that the question of convention compatibility 
featured in each as a conscious consideration. Thus it may be suggested that for a breach of 
section 6 action, many of the considerations which currently feature at the duty and fault 
stages of the negligence inquiry will, in future, also arise in relation to the questions of 
whether there has been an actual interference with a convention right, and, in the event that 
there has been, whether the interference is one that can be justified. For these reasons, a 
clarification of the current negligence position is absolutely essential. Moreover, any 
outstanding claims in respect of harm inflicted prior to the coming into force of the 1998 
Act will, given its non-retroactivity, 8 still have to be brought in negligence. And given that 
some of these will inevitably involve victims who were still in their minority at the relevant 
time, and who would subsequently have the benefit of an extended limitation period9 within 
which to institute their claims, then the occasional negligence action can still be expected to 
crop up for a number of years to come. 
I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW 
The starting point for any analysis of the modem negligence liability of public authorities 
has to be the seminal House of Lords' decision in the five consolidated appeals collectively 
referred to as X (a minm) and Others v Bedfordshire County Council and Others. 10 Of the 
five appeals, two involved allegations of negligence against local authorities in respect of 
the performance of their child protection functions and three concemed allegations of 
negligence against education authorities in respect of their specific statutory duties towards 
children with special educational needs. In the actual judgments, they are thus referred to, 
respectively, as 'the abuse cases' and 'the education cases', and the decision is split 
accordingly. 
In the first abuse case, X v Bedfordshire County Council, five siblings suffering 
from severe parental neglect and abuse sued the local authority for basically failing to 
protect them from their parents by not taking them into care soon enough. The local 
authority had indeed been notified by various persons, including relatives, neighbours, the 
8 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 22(4). 
9 They have until the age of21 years: Limitation Act 1980, s. 28. 
10 [1995] 3 All ER 353. 
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police, the family's GP, a head teacher, the NSPCC, a social worker and a health visitor, 
that the children were at risk while living with their parents and that their living conditions 
were appalling, but it waited for almost five years before even placing them on the Child 
Protection Register. Inevitably, by the time they had finally been taken into care, 
irreparable physical and psychological damage had already been sustained. 
In the second abuse case, M v Newham London Borough Council, the allegation of 
negligence was actually to the opposite effect, namely that the defendant local authority had 
acted too quickly in removing a child from the parental home in an attempt to protect it 
from suspected sexual abuse. Tllis action followed an interview which had taken place 
between the child and a psychologist and a social worker in which the child had given the 
name of her abuser. The psychiatrist and social worker wrongly assumed that this was the 
mother's boyfriend who was living with them at the time and who had the same first name, 
even though there was no other evidence implicating him. The mistake was only discovered 
some time later, when the mother was granted access to the transcript of the interview and 
realised that the child had actually been referring to a cousin of the same name who had 
previously lived with them. Although the local authority admitted its mistake and took 
steps to rehabilitate mother and child, by this time they had already been separated for a 
year. Both brought negligence actions against the local authority, the psychiatrist and the 
social worker for ham1 in the fom1 of anxiety neurosis. 
In the first education case, E v Dorset County Council, the defendant local authority 
was sued, in its capacity as education authority, for first of all failing to identify that the 
claimant was suffering from a learning disorder requiring special educational provision and 
then, after later acknowledging his special needs, for deciding that the school he was 
attending at that time was appropriate to meet his needs. His claim was for damage in the 
form of pure economic loss, relating principally to the expense incurred by his parents in 
placing him at a special school. 
In the second education case, Christmas v Hampshire County Council, the 
claimant's vicarious liability action against the Local Education Authority was based upon 
the failure ofhis primary school headmaster to refer him for fonnal assessment of his 
learning difficulties and the failure of the teacher's advisory centre to which he was later 
sent to identify his specific learning difficulties. The resultant harm was said to consist of a 
severe limitation of his educational attainment and prospects of employment. 
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Finally, there is Keating v Bromley London Borough Council, in which the central 
allegation once again related to the failure of an LEA to make adequate provision for 
special educational needs. This time, however, part of the complaint was that the defendant 
LEA had, on two occasions, placed the claimant in special schools when he did not have 
any serious disability and should have been educated in an ordinary school, and that at 
other times, it failed to provide him with a place in any school at all. He claimed damages 
in respect of the impairment of his personal and intellectual development and for the 
limitation of his prospects of employment. 
In the House of Lords, the main judgment in respect of these claims was delivered 
by Lord Browne-Wilkinson. As tends to be the case with very important decisions, the 
judgment is not easy to analyse. Indeed, that even Peter Cane has confessed to having had 
some difficulty with it should give some indication of the level of difficulty involved. 11 
Without a doubt, this is due almost entirely to the complexity of the legal issues at stake. 
However, it is suggested that, at times, his Lordship is not as clear as he could be on certain 
points. And it is further suggested that this masks the fact that he is not entirely certain 
about the exact legal significance of some of the matters he elaborates on. This, however, 
should not be regarded as too strong a criticism for, overall, it is clear that he does have a 
very keen appreciation of the pertinent issues at stake, but that he has just not entirely 
worked his way through the very complicated task of deciding how they actually relate to 
each other. 
In addressing, at a general level, the crux of the issue common to all five claims, 
namely whether the perfonnance of a statutory dut;P can give rise to a common law duty 
of care so as to found an action in negligence, Lord Browne-Wilkinson begins by drawing a 
broad distinction between: (a) cases in which it is alleged that the authority owes a duty of 
care in the manner in which it exercises a statutory discretion; and (b) cases in which a duty 
of care is alleged to arise from the manner in which the statutory duty has been 
implemented in practice. 13 Therein lies the first major difficulty. Just what exactly is the 
essence of this distinction? Helpfully, he does go on to elaborate a little bit further, giving 
an example of each limb. Thus, a decision whether or not to exercise a statutory discretion 
11 
"Suing Public Authorities in T011", ( 1996) 112 LQR 13. 
12 It is clear that his Lordship intends to refer, at all times, to statutory functions in the form of duties rather 
than powers, because those are the only kinds of functions in issue in the cases at hand. Unfortunately, he is 
not very strict in his use of terminology in this respect, and occasionally refers to statutory powers instead, 
which can be rather confusing: see, e.g., [1995] 3 All ER 353, at pp. 369 and 370. 
13 [ 1995] 3 All ER 353, 368. 
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to close a school would fall under category (a), while matters relating to the actual running 
of the school would fall under category (b). But even taken in conjunction with the above 
description of the distinction, this illustration reveals very little about the determinative 
features of each category, arguably because the example provided of (b) is far too broad. 
There are so many matters relevant to the actual running of a school and, for instance, many 
of these will involve the exercise of statutorily conferred discretion. Does this not mean that 
these particular matters should then fall under (a)? If not, what is it about the decision 
whether or not to close a school, in te1ms of the exercise of statutory discretion, that makes 
it so different from all of the matters relating to the running of the school, including those 
of a discretionary nature? The most obvious deduction would be that it has something to so 
with the nature of the discretion involved. This would seem to be supported by the further 
elaboration that it is the difference between, on the one hand, taking care in exercising a 
statutory discretion whether or not to do an action and, on the other, having decided to do 
that act, taking care in the manner in which you do it. 14 On this basis, it would seem that the 
distinction is actually between decision-making and the mechanics of decision-
implementation. If this is correct, then it is submitted that the main source of confusion 
arising from his Lordship's original description of the distinction lies in his unqualified 
reference to the concept of statutory discretion in relation to the first limb. 
Alternatively, it could be thought that what he is actually referring to is the 
notorious policy/operational distinction, introduced into English law by Lord Wilberforce 
in Anns v Merton London Borough Counci/. 15 Indeed, this was how Peter Cane interpreted 
the distinction, in a case-note written just after the report of the X decision was published. 16 
It would appear, however, that such an interpretation is not suppmied by the rest of the 
speech. Lord Browne-Wilkinson makes separate reference to Lord Wilberforce's discussion 
of the policy/operational dichotomy in Anns and does not try to relate it directly to his own 
distinction. Moreover, it is clear that under Lord Wilberforce's test, the policy limb of the 
distinction is to be equated directly with the concept of discretion, 17 while Lord Browne-
14 Furthermore, the use of the term 'manner' in (a) would appear to be incongruent with the school closure 
example given. As an instance of strategic decision-making, this example would clearly go to the 'nature' of 
the discretion, rather than to the manner of its exercise. 
15 [1978] AC 728. 
16 Op. cit., p. 16. 
17 
"Most, indeed probably all, statutes relating to public authorities or public bodies, contain in them a large 
element of policy. The courts call this "discretion', meaning that the decision is one for the authority or body 
to make and not for the courts.": [ 1978] AC 728 at p. 754. 
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Wilkinson seems to treat them as two separate issues. 18 That said, the similarities between 
the two approaches are too striking to ignore. It may be that what Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
is actually doing here is putting forward his own version of the policy/operational test, 
which takes into account the main criticisms levied at the traditional version. Significantly 
in this respect, he makes explicit reference to the controversy swTOunding the traditional 
version, mentioning in particular the well-known dicta of Lord Keith in Row ling v Takaro 
Properties, 19 criticising the popular misconception that the dichotomy can serve in itself as 
a basis for detetmining issues of liability, when it is clear that it has a solely exclusionary 
function. Indeed, it is submitted that the main problem with Lord Wilberforce's 
formulation, and the main reason why the policy/operational test has not worked very 
successfully in the past, is the description of policy as discretion. This is much too loose 
and imprecise, and, consequently, it is also entirely misleading. Not all instances of 
discretion are to be equated with policy, as it is intended to be understood for the purposes 
of the dichotomy. Given its ordinary meaning, 'discretion' is actually a very broad term and 
elements of ordinary discretion can obviously also arise in respect of operational activities, 
as indeed both Lord Wilberforce and Lord Browne-Wilkinson expressly recognise. 20 
Clearly it is only certain types of statutory discretion that fall under the policy limb. 
Bearing in mind that the policy/operational test serves only an exclusionary role, in that it is 
designed solely to identify those particular areas of public authority activity that are 
unsuitable for judicial scrutiny, for reasons of constitutional competency, then it is 
obviously only those exercises of statutory discretion that involve a consideration of certain 
types of high-level policy matters that can carry the policy, as opposed to operational, label. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson himself gives examples of such non-justiciable policy matters, 
ranging from matters of social policy, to those involving the allocation of finite financial 
resources between the different calls being made upon authorities and the balance between 
pursuing desirable aims as against the risk to the public inherent in doing so. 21 
It is entirely possible that, recognising the utility of the basic policy/operational 
distinction, Lord Browne-Wilkinson was trying to emulate it, but discreetly so, so as to 
avoid the criticisms commonly associated with it. Certainly, he does recognise that the 
whole purpose of the distinction is to determine issues ofjusticiability, and even more 
18 As indeed Lunney and Oliphant also point out: Tort Law, Texts and Materials, p. 429. 
19 [1988] AC 473 at p. 501. 
20 See, respectively, [1978] AC 728 at p. 754 and [1995]3 All ER 353 at p. 369. 
21 [1995] 3 All ER 353 at p. 370. 
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importantly, he does not try to equate policy directly with discretion. Unfortunately, 
however, by failing to expressly qualify his own references to the tenn 'discretion' in this 
respect, it may be said that he simply succeeds in introducing another level of confusion to 
this area. 
Ultimately, however, it is submitted that, in initially drawing his own very broad 
distinction between (a) cases in which it is alleged that the authority owes a duty of care in 
the manner in which it exercises a statutory discretion and (b) those in which a duty of care 
is alleged to arise rather from the manner in which the statutory duty has been implemented 
in practice, his Lordship was simply trying to make the very general point that, as a guiding 
rule of thumb, duties of care are going to be much more difficult to establish in cases falling 
under the first limb than in cases falling under the second limb. For he then goes on to 
discuss the legal position in detail under the separate headings of discretion, justiciability 
and the policy/operational test, and does not attempt to relate any of this back to his initial 
distinction. This would then mean that the distinction, which has been the subject of much 
academic attention, is actually of very little significance and that it is the rest of his 
discussion which should actually be focused on. 
Dealing with discretion first of all, which his Lordship treats as being an 
automatically relevant factor, on the assumption, it seems, that the vast majority of statutory 
duties will contain some discretionary element, he makes the point that any local authority 
decisions falling within the ambit of the conferred statutory discretion cannot be actionable 
at common law. As already mentioned, the reasoning behind this is that the courts must not 
be seen to interfere with Parliamentary intention. This begs the question, however, of what 
actually counts as 'falling within the ambit of the discretion', and it would seem that the 
answer lies in the concept of unreasonableness. According to Lord Reid in Home Office v 
Dorset Yacht, 22 mere errors of judgment are protected, while decisions that are made so 
carelessly or unreasonably that there cannot be said to be any real exercise of the discretion 
at all, will fall outside the ambit ofthe discretionary inununity. Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
interprets this part of Lord Reid's speech as establishing a requirement that, in any 
negligence action in respect of the exercise of a statutory discretion, it must first be shown 
that the decision in question was outside the ambit of the discretion altogether, failing 
which the action cannot proceed any further. This has subsequently been interpreted as the 
22 [1970] AC 1004 at p. 1031. 
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application of a test of Wednesbwy unreasonableness.23 Although the basis for this 
additional duty hurdle in negligence actions against public authorities would appear to be 
Lord Reid's speech in Dorset Yacht, made some 25 years earlier, it is notable that X was the 
first case to formally recognise it as an actual legal requirement in such actions, for it did 
not even form part of the ratio of Dorset Yacht. Indeed, Cane comments that its imposition 
of a duty requirement of Wednesbury unreasonableness is one of just two ways in which X 
actually breaks fresh ground.24 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson then goes on to deal with non-justiciable policy matters. 
He firstly makes the point that in deciding whether or not the requirement of 
unreasonableness is satisfied, the court will have to assess the relevant factors taken into 
account by the defendant authority, and then goes on to say that if these relevant factors 
include policy matters, giving the examples quoted above of social policy and resource 
allocation, then the court must basically terminate its inquiry immediately. He mentions 
Lord Wilberforce's policy/operational dichotomy ostensibly as a potential method of 
identifying whether or not a particular decision is a non-justiciable policy decision. To this 
end, however, his discussion lacks content. He merely quotes Lord Wilberforce's 
description of the distinction alongside Lord Keith's well-known dicta, mentioned earlier, 
from Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd. This gives no guidance whatsoever as to what can 
actually constitute a non-justiciable policy matter. 
He then moves swiftly on to make the point that in those cases in which the 
allegation of negligence relates to how an act has been performed, as opposed to the actual 
taking of a discretionary decision to do some act, the ordinary Caparo tripartite test will 
apply. This is clearly a reference back to his own distinction, and coming in at this stage it 
does not make sense at all. What he appears to mean here is that after overcoming the two 
duty hurdles just discussed, namely the unreasonableness hurdle and the policy hurdle, the 
claimant will still have to satisfy the ordinary Caparo test for duty. Indeed, tllis is clear 
from the sub-heading he uses: "Ifjusticiable, the ordinwy principles of negligence 
23 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbwy Corporation [ 1948] 1 KB 223. See, e.g., M. 
Andenas & D. Fairgrieve, "Sufficiently Serious? Judicial Restraint in Tortious Liability of Public Authorities 
and the European Influence", in M. Andenas (ed.), English Public Law and the Common Law of Europe, (Key 
Haven Publications, 1998). 
24 The other being the introduction of a novel distinction between liability for breach of direct duties of care 
and vicarious liability: op. cit., at p.22. 
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apply". 25 Overall, the impression created is one of organised disorder. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson elaborates on all of the above issues, knowing that they are all ultimately 
relevant, but he is not entirely clear as to how exactly they all relate to each other. 
The final point he makes at this stage, however, is clearly relevant to all negligence 
actions against public authorities and it is that the statutory framework surrounding the acts 
complained of must always be taken into account in deciding whether a common law duty 
of care can exist in the circumstances. In his Lordship's own words: "a common law duty 
of care cannot be imposed on a statutory duty if the observance of such a common law duty 
of care would be inconsistent with, or have a tendency to discourage, the due performance 
by the local authority of its statutory duties". 26 Cane duly refers to this latter requirement as 
"the compatibility issue".27 
So, to summarise this first pmt of Lord Browne-Wilkinson's speech, where the 
statutory duty that is alleged to have been negligently perfonned involves some 
discretionary element, it must initially be shown that the defendant authority acted outside 
the ambit of the discretion by satisfying a test of Wednesbwy umeasonableness. If, 
however, in the course of tlus pmticular exercise, certain policy matters that the courts are 
not fit to comment on arise for consideration, then the claim is automatically rendered non-
justiciable. Having satisfied the Wednesbwy test, the next stage is the Caparo tripartite test. 
Put like this, it all seems so much simpler than a first reading of the full discussion would 
suggest. 
In practice, the policy issue will fall to be considered before anything else, for it is 
only after having elinrinated tlus concern that there can be any point in addressing the 
umeasonableness question. Thus, the policy-operational test is typically the first stumbling 
block to be encountered. Given the notoriety of this test, it does not serve as a good 
psychological starting point and tills can tend to taint the whole exercise. As already 
25 However, by relating his point specifically to cases falling under the second limb of his distinction, what he 
actually implies is that these are the only type of case that will ever be actionable at all, when the whole 
purpose of the preceding discussion was that any claim against a public authority will be actionable as long as 
the additional hurdles discussed are overcome. Presumably, his train of thought here was that it is only in 
relation to the type of allegation falling under the first limb that matters of policy are likely to arise, so that 
under the second limb it would usually be possible to go straight to the Caparo test, although even here he 
would seem to contradict himself somewhat as regards the existence of some element of discretion in relation 
to purely implementational matters. Does the requirement of unreasonableness not apply to these exercises of 
discretion also? It would seem that his Lordship just wanted to bring in his own distinction at some point in 
order to accord it some significance, perhaps to justify to himself having made it in the first place. 
26 [1995] 3 All ER 353 at p. 371. 
27 
"Suing Public Authorities in Tort", ( 1996) 112 LQR 13 at 15. 
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mentioned, however, most of the difficulties associated with the distinction stem from a 
flawed understanding of its nature and purpose. The tendency is to focus too much on 
labels, that is on trying to categorise a given decision or activity as either a policy issue or a 
operational issue, as though the attribution of one of these labels would be directly 
determinative of whether or not a duty of care would arise. Moreover, this is often done 
without even a clear understanding of what exactly constitutes a policy matter or an 
operational matter and much effort is then commonly wasted debating the difference 
between the two. Since the actual purpose of the test is to exclude those matters that are not 
suitable for judicial assessment, referred to for convenience purposes as non-justiciable 
policy issues, clearly it is only the identification of these particular matters that can be of 
any interest at all. Would it not be much simpler overall to abandon the policy/operational 
temrinology, and pose instead the question whether or not the claim involves a 
consideration of matters that the courts are not actually fit to pronounce upon, be it because 
they lack the necessary knowledge of the affairs at stake or because their interference 
would be regarded as constitutionally inappropriate? Indeed, such a suggestion has already 
been put forward by Paul Craig.28 He, however, ultimately concludes that it would probably 
not be possible to move away from the dichotomy altogether for, even if justiciability were 
to instead become the direct focus of enquiry, the policy/operational test is still likely to 
guide thinking in this respect. He is probably right about this. Thus, it would seem more 
prudent to retain it, but to also make sure that its role is clearly understood. It must be 
emphasised that it can serve only as a guide to the main issue at stake, which is that of 
justiciability. It can serve as a useful guide in this respect in that non-justiciable policy 
issues are only really likely to arise in respect of matters falling under the first limb of the 
distinction, that is matters relating to the exercise of discretionary decision-making 
functions. As long as it is understood that not all matters falling under this policy limb of 
the distinction will necessarily be non-justiciable, and that policy is not be equated with 
bare discretion, this approach should work perfectly well. 
As X itself shows, and indeed all of the other major decisions to date on the 
negligence liability of public authorities, the cout1s are very reluctant to dismiss claims on 
the basis ofnon-justiciability alone. Undoubtedly, this has had much to do with the fact that 
28 Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999). p. 862. 
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the vast majmity of such claims have come before the courts as strike-out actions29 and 
consequently without a full presentation of the facts. It is submitted, however, that as the 
other methods commonly used by the courts to try and avoid the liability of public 
authorities are increasingly called into doubt, due to numerous dubious applications, there 
may well be a revival of interest in the justiciability issue. As long as the more focused 
approach outlined above is taken, this should constitute a far more defensible basis for an 
outright denial of liability in applicable cases. 
After discussingjusticiability, Lord Browne-Wilkinson goes on to address the 
difference between the allegations before him that invoke the direct liability of the local 
authority defendants and those that invoke their vicarious liability for the acts of their 
employees. It is clear from the rest of his speech that his Lordship regards the distinction 
between direct and vicarious liability as being of very great significance in this particular 
context. Not only does he make his whole discussion of the Caparo test, and in particular 
the 'fair, just and reasonable' requirement, subject to it, but he also bases his final 
conclusions around it. In view of this, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that he actually 
spends very little time elaborating on the significance of the distinction itself. That the 
distinction has since been carried on into later decisions and continued to substantially 
affect final outcomes makes his brevity here all the more unfortunate. For all that he 
actually says is that the two fmms of liability are not mutually exclusive, and that the extent 
of the duties owed to the claimant under each may differ. 
Given that public bodies, as legal entities rather than natural persons, can only act 
through their employees, the concept of direct liability on their part takes on a unique 
meaning that, moreover, would appear to overlap significantly with that of vicarious 
liability. There is also an apparent link with the concept of third party liability, but it is one 
that is not at all easy to pinpoint. In short, the distinction is apt to confuse and thus warrants 
a detailed explanation. According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson, it is really only as regards 
the attribution of the duty of care that the direct liability of the defendant authorities will 
differ from their vicarious liability for the acts of their employees primarily, for otherwise, 
under both forms of liability, he envisages the breach requirement will always be 
determined by reference to the acts of individual employees. 30 Thus, with direct liability, 
29 Stovin v Wise [1996] 3 All ER 801 and Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2000]4 All ER 504 are the only ones so 
far to have involved full trials. 
30 
[ 1995] 3 All ER 353 at p.3 72. 
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the focus will be on the defendant body as regards the duty and on the employees as regards 
breach, whereas for vicarious liability, the focus will be on the employees for both. 
Consequently, both would appear to be forms of no-fault liability. Indeed, Peter Cane has 
commented that Lord Browne-Wilkinson's formulation of direct liability in this instance 
appears to resemble the "long-abandoned" master's tort theory of vicarious liability. 31 
Depending on the basis for the authority's direct duty, however, the scope of liability may 
vary significantly between the two approaches. As is clear from his speech, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson would regard the foundation for the direct duty as being the status of the local 
authorities as providers of public services. He draws an analogy with the direct liability of 
hospitals, but unfortunately he does not elaborate upon it to any useful degree. His most 
glaring omission here is an explanation of the particular nature of the direct duties that may 
be owed by hospitals, for there are several. From the authorities he provides, however, it 
would seem evident that the type of direct duty that he is referring to specifically is what is 
known as the 'non-delegable' duties of hospitals to ensure that reasonable care is taken of 
their patients,32 for this is the only direct duty owed by hospitals that may actually be 
breached by individual staff members. What is surprising about this is that at that time, the 
existence of the non-delegable duty was a matter of some controversy. 33 A much more 
obvious type of direct duty to have referred to would have been the direct duty of a hospital 
to provide a safe health care environment, which encompasses not just the provision of 
adequate equipment and facilities, including sufficient and competent staff, but also the 
idea of having in operation safe systems of care and communication. 34 The significance of 
this latter type of duty is that it can be breached even in situations where no individual can 
be shown to be at fault. This is because it is rather some kind of organisational or 
administrative failure on the part of the hospital that is required to establish breach. Taken 
in conjunction with the non-delegable duty, this makes the potential primary liability of the 
hospital very wide indeed. By implication, if local authorities were to be regarded as in a 
similar position, then from the perspective of claimants the direct liability route would 
appear to be very attractive indeed. Moreover, it may even be arguable that this would 
enable claimants to sidestep the Bolam defence. 
31 Op. cif .. p. 21. 
32 As Kennedy and Grubb would also agree, Principles of Medical Law (Butterworths, 2000), p. 461. 
33 The matter has since been settled in favour of the existence of such a duty: M v Calderdale and Kirklees HA 
[1998]4Lloyd'sRepMed 157. 
34 See, e.g., Bull v Devon AHA [ 1993] 4 Med LR 117 and Robertson v Nottingham HA [ 1997] 8 Med LR I. 
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By contrast, with the vicarious liability claims in X, the existence of a duty of care 
on the part of the individual employees was held to be dependent upon evidence of specific 
assumptions of responsibility35 on their part towards the particular claimants. The scope of 
any consequent vicarious liability arising on the part of the local authorities is thus much 
nauower and much more tightly constrained. 
(i) The significance of the direct liability/vicarious liability distinction fi'om a third party 
liability perspective 
Given that public bodies can only act through their employees, it may be thought that every 
instance of direct public authority liability is a form of third party liability. This however is 
only true in a very loose sense. For the purposes of this thesis, the only type of third party 
liability that is of any real interest is that which involves one party being held liable, on a 
personal fault basis, for harm that has been actively inflicted by another. Clearly, public 
authority employees cannot constitute separate and independent parties ti·om their 
employers for this purpose. Thus, to be relevant in the present context, there needs to be at 
least one additional party involved in the commission of the harm. Consequently, it is only 
where the direct liability of the public body is said to relate either to the failure of its 
employees, on the basis of a non-delegable duty argument, to prevent a third party from 
causing hann, or to some failure at organisational level to prevent a third party from 
causing hatm, that a true third party liability issue arises. 
As regards vicarious liability actions, these are of interest from a third party liability 
perspective only in instances where the personal liability of the employee triggering the 
vicarious liability of the authority relates again to a failure to prevent an independent third 
party from causing harm, as in Home Office v Dorset Yacht. 36 So here we are concerned 
only with the third party liability of individual public servants. 
Applying this to the five claims involved in the X litigation, it may be seen that only 
one may actually be designated as a third party liability action, and that is the eponymous X 
v Bedfordshire County Council. It may be recalled that in this case, the defendant local 
35 Although this particular phrase is not used, it is clear, from the authorities cited, that his Lordship is 
intending to refer to the application of Hedley Byrne principles: see [1995] 3 All ER 353 at p. 383, citing 
Henderson v Men·ett Syndicates Ltd [ 1994] 3 All ER 506 and White v }ones [ 1995] I All ER 691. 
36 [1970] AC 1004. 
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authority was being sued in the context of its social welfare functions for failing to remove 
sufficiently promptly the child plaintiffs from their abusive parents. The hann said to have 
been suffered by the children had clearly been inflicted by an independent third party in this 
instance, namely the parents. Significantly, however, given that the defendant had not been 
expected to act at the very outset to prevent the abuse, but only to intervene at the point at 
which it became aware that the children were at risk, it was not sought to make the 
authority liable for all of the hann resulting from the abuse, but rather only for the 
additional consequences suffered by the children after the point at which they should 
reasonably have been removed. 
It is to be noted that the other abuse case, M v Newham London Borough Council, 
involved an entirely different kind of allegation, namely that the defendant local authority 
had been negligent in removing the child plaintiff from the parental home. The type of 
liability issue at stake was one of ordinary personal fault-based liability for the positive 
infliction of fresh harm, for it was sought to hold the authority liable for psychological 
harm caused by the parent-child separation, and not for any kind of harm related to the 
abuse itself. 
Nevertheless, it is still worth examining all of the decisions in the X litigation, for 
what they reveal about the general negligence liability of public authorities will still be of 
obvious direct relevance to third party liability issues. 
(ii) The decisions in the abuse cases 
As regards the abuse cases, Lord Browne-Wilkinson concluded that both the direct duty 
arguments and the vicarious duty arguments would fail but, significantly, for different 
reasons. 
(a) The direct duty arguments 
The direct duty arguments failed on the basis that they were outweighed by five particular 
public policy arguments and that, consequently, the "fair, just and reasonable" requirement 
of the Caparo test could not be satisfied. The five arguments are: (1) that a common law 
duty of care would cut across the whole statutory system set up for the protection of 
children at risk; (2) that the task of the local authority in dealing with such children is 
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'extraordinarily delicate'; (3) that the spectre ofliability would perhaps cause local 
authorities to adopt a more cautious and defensive approach to their duties; ( 4) that the 
uneasy relationship between the social worker and the child's parents would become a 
breeding ground for ill feeling and hopeless litigation; and (5) that there were alternative 
remedies available in the fonn of the statutory complaints procedures or an investigation by 
the local government ombudsman. 37 It is important that these broad-based public policy 
considerations be distinguished from the types of policy issues discussed earlier which can 
arise in the course of the inquiry into the exercise of statutory discretion. Whereas the 
policy matters relating to the exercise of statutory discretions are essentially concerned with 
the question of whether or not the courts are fit to pronounce on the issues at stake, the 
function of the broad public policy consideration detailed just above is to determine 
whether, from the point of view of the impact upon society, there are any other general 
reasons why the imposition of liability would not be a good idea. In short, the first set of 
policy considerations is all about justiciability, while the second set is all about immunity. 38 
As mentioned briefly earlier, the application of the public policy arguments to 
itmnunise the local authority defendants in the abuse cases has been one of the most 
controversial aspects of the X litigation. A number of critical analyses of each of the five 
arguments have been undertaken39 and the general consensus is that they are not convincing 
enough to justify immunity from negligence liability. 
The problem with the use of these arguments to such effect is not so much their 
application in X itself, but rather subsequent attempts to apply them, urunodified, in entirely 
different and unsuitable circumstances. The most obvious example of this was the Court of 
Appeal decision in Osman v Ferguson. 40 The negligence claim in this case was against the 
police for failing to prevent an identified individual from inflicting serious harm on 
members of a family against whom he was known to pose a significant threat. While only a 
detailed exposition of the facts of the case could convey the extraordinary nature of the 
circumstances giving rise to this claim, a brief synopsis is unfortunately all that can be 
accommodated here. The individual in question was a secondary school teacher who 
37 A further, non public-policy, argument put forward was the absence of any analogous duty from existing 
case law. 
38 On this point seeR. A. Buckley, "Negligence in the Public Sphere: Is Cla1ity Possible?", (2000) 51 NILQ 
25. 
39 See, most notably, S. H. Bailey & M. J. Bowman, "Public Authority Negligence Revisited", (2000) 59 CLJ 
85 and B. Markesinis, J.-B. Auby, D. Coester-Waltjen and S. Deakin, Tortious Liability of Statutory Bodies: 
A Comparative and Economic Analysis of Five English Cases, (Hart Publishing, 1999). 
40 [1993] 4 All ER 344. 
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developed an unhealthy obsession for one of his young male pupils. Following a number of 
instances of highly inappropriate behaviour on his part, complaints about him were made to 
members of the school's senior management team, and these were subsequently borne out 
in their entirety by the school's internal inquiry into the matter. Reports were duly passed 
on to the Local Education Authority and to the police. There followed a catalogue of 
sinister incidents involving this teacher, including a change of name by deed poll on his 
part to that of the schoolboy in question! In addition, numerous acts of vandalism were 
perpetrated on the boy's family home. An attempt was made by the police to arrest the 
teacher, but it was unsuccessful because on the day that they turned up at his house to do so 
he was out working at another school. Three months later, he went to the claimants' house, 
shot the boy and his father and then continued on to the home of one of the deputy 
headteachers, whereupon he shot him alongside his son. On being an·ested the next 
morning, he reportedly stated: "Why didn't you stop me before I did it, I gave you all the 
warning signs?". 
In dismissing the claim for lack of duty, the Court of Appeal relied on the House of 
Lords' decision in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police. 41 As is well-known, 
this case involved an action against the police brought by the mother of the Yorkshire 
Ripper's last victim, alleging negligence on their part in failing to catch the serial killer 
before he had the chance to kill her daughter. The claim failed, firstly, on the basis that the 
proximity requirement of the Caparo test could not be satisfied. There existed no special 
relationship between the police and the victim such as would have placed them under a 
duty to protect her specifically. She had not been known to them personally, and had not 
presented as being at any greater risk than the rest of the ordinary female population in the 
area at that time. Secondly, it was held that public policy militated against the imposition of 
liability against the police in respect of their activities as concerns the investigation and 
suppression of crime. To the fore was the defensive practice concern. 
While Osman was clearly to be distinguished from Hill in the sense that the 
proximity requirement was evidently satisfied in this case, there even being some 
suggestion that individual members of the police had given personal assurances of 
protection to the Osman family, the Court of Appeal in Osman nevertheless held that the 
negligence claim failed on the alternative ground that, for reasons of public policy, the 'fair, 
41 [1989]AC53. 
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just and reasonableness' requirement could not be satisfied. For present purposes, what is 
significant is that, in feeling able to deny the claim solely on grounds of policy, the court 
had evidently taken its incentive from the decision in X and others. 
Having been denied leave to appeal to the House of Lords, the Osmans took their 
case straight to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging a breach of Articles 2, 6, 8 
and 13.42 Although the ECtHR held that there had been no violation of Articles 2 or 8, and 
that given the overall findings, no separate issue arose under Alticle 13, it is of crucial 
significance that they did conclude that there had been a violation of Article 6. The crux of 
the claimants' argument under Article 6, which concerns the right of access to a court and 
the right to a fair trial, was that the Comt of Appeal's dismissal of their negligence action 
on grounds of public policy amounted to a restriction on their right of access to a court, 
because in practice it conferred an immunity upon the police. That the ECtHR found that 
Article 6 was even applicable in the first place has outraged many black-letter judges and 
academics.43 This is because the right of access had traditionally been interpreted as a 
purely procedural right, which requires proof of a pre-existing substantive right on the part 
of the claimant to activate it, and the Osmans are said to have had no such substantive right 
host, as it were, for it was found in the Court of Appeal that not all of the constituent legal 
elements required for a negligence claim could be made out. Specifically, the 'fair, just and 
reasonable' requirement for the duty of care could not be satisfied. Thus one of the main 
arguments put forward by the UK government at Strasbourg was that the application of 
Article 6 in such circumstances would result in "the impermissible creation by the 
Convention institutions of a substantive right where none in fact existed in the domestic 
law of the respondent state". 44 
The soundness of this criticism remains to be seen, for it could equally be argued 
that the presentation of a tenable legal argun1ent is all that is required to trigger the right of 
access to an adjudication. Given that the legal merits of the Os man case were particularly 
strong, this would surely mean that the Court of Appeal's dismissal of it on the basis of 
what were essentially untested presumptions dressed up as bona fide socio-legal 
42 Os man v UK [ 1999] I FLR 193. 
43 See, in patticular: Lord Browne-Wilkinson's speech in Ban·ett v Enfield London Borough Council [1999] 3 
All ER 193 at p. 198; C. Gearty, "Unravelling Osman", (2001) 64 MLR 159; and C. Gearty, "Osman 
Unravels", (2002) 65 MLR 87. See also Lord Hoffman, "Human Rights and the House of Lords", (1999) 62 
MLR 159. 
44 ( 1998) 29 EHRR 245 at para. 133. 
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considerations would have to be regarded as an access to justice issue. In any event, what is 
important in the current context is that Alticle 6 was held to be applicable. 
Moving on from the applicability issue, in holding that Alticle 6 had indeed also 
been breached, the ECtHR incurred frnther domestic wrath. This is because the decision 
has been interpreted in some quarters as vetoing the conferral of public policy-based 
inununities altogether, and in some cases, by implication, as vetoing the use of the strike-
out procedure. However, a careful reading of the decision reveals that the disapproval of the 
Court was directed not at the existence of the exclusionary rule at all, but rather at the 
particular application of the rule in the individual circumstances of the Osman case.45 In 
this respect, it need only be pointed out that the restriction on the right of access here was 
held to constitute a violation of Alticle 6, not on the basis of one of the possible 
overarching grounds, that is that it was either legally uncertain or that it pursued 
illegitimate aims, but rather on the individual fact-based ground that it was 
disproportionate. It was disproportionate because the court was able to identify other public 
interest considerations which pulled in the opposite direction to the application of the 
exclusionary rule and which had not been weighed up by the Court of Appeal. Most 
importantly in this respect was the fact that, unlike the claimant in Hill, the Osmans were 
able to satisfy the proximity test, which the court described as "a threshold requirement 
which is sufficiently rigid to narrow considerably the nrnnber of negligence actions against 
the police which can proceed to trial".46 It was also relevant that the allegation in this case 
was one of gross negligence rather than just minor acts of incompetence, that the harm 
sustained was of the most serious nature and that there had possibly been a specific 
assumption of responsibility on the part ofthe police to ensure the safety ofthe 
applicants.47 
That the ECtHR was merely sounding a warning to the English courts to ensure 
that, in future, public-policy-based immunities would only be bestowed after an assessment 
of the individual facts at stake had been carried out and it had been determined that a denial 
of liability on that basis was warranted, has been confirmed in its recent decision in Z v 
UK. 48 The applicants in this case were the child claimants from X v Bedfordshire County 
Council, seeking to challenge that decision of the House of Lords to strike out their 
45 See L Hoyano, "Policing Flawed Police Investigations: Unravelling the Blanket", (1999) 62 MLR 912. 
46 ( 1998) 29 EHRR 245 at para. 151. 
47 Ibid. 
48 (2002) 34 EHRR 3. 
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negligence action. Although they alleged violations of several articles of the Convention, it 
is the findings of the ECtHR in respect of Atticle 6 that are of specific interest in the current 
context. In putting forward their case in relation to Article 6, to the effect that the denial of 
a duty of care on the part of the local authority on the basis of public policy considerations 
amounted to an exclusionary rule which deprived them of access to the court, the applicants 
relied heavily on the decision in Osman v UK. Implicitly distinguishing Osman, the ECtHR 
held that the there had been no violation of Article 6 in this case. Not only had the case 
been litigated up to the House of Lords, and legal aid moreover provided for that purpose, 
but the House of Lords had only conferred the immunity in this instance after carefully 
weighing in the balance the competing public policy considerations. It did not therefore 
present itself as a blanket immunity such as to effect a true restriction on the right of access. 
Key factors influencing this decision on the part of the ECtHR appeared to be the 
recent English jurisprudence in this area, and the impact of the exclusionary rule in terms of 
the multi-functional status oflocal authorities. As regards the recent jurisprudence, the 
court referred in particular to Wand Others v Essex County Council, 49 in which the Court 
of Appeal refused to strike out a negligence action against a local authority for harm caused 
by a foster child to members of the foster family in which he had been placed, and Barrett v 
Enfield London Borough Council, 50 in which the House of Lords refused to strike out a 
negligence action in respect of inadequate care received by a child while in local authority 
care. As deliberate attempts by the English courts to demonstrate to the ECtHR that they 
were heeding the warning set out in Osman, both decisions clearly had the desired effect. 
However, in view of the decision in Z itself, it may be queried whether the decision in 
Ban·ett was actually correct, for involving as it did the exercise of child protection 
functions on the part of the defendant local authority, arguably an immunity based on 
similar policy considerations to those set out in X could have been conferred. 51 While 
attempts have been made to distinguish the two decisions on the basis that X involved the 
issue of whether to take children into care, which brought into play the most delicate of 
policy concerns, while Barrett involved the supposedly less sensitive matter of the 
management of children once they are actually in care, the distinction would appear to be 
49 [1998]3 All ER Ill. 
50 [1999] 3 All ER 193. 
51 For similar reasons, doubt may be expressed about the recent decision of the Court of Appeal inS v 
Gloucestershire County Council [200 I] 2 WLR 909, to allow an action against a local authority in respect of 
sexual abuse committed by a foster carer to proceed to full trial. 
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rather artificial and unconvincing. As Atkin and McLay52 have cogently argued, policy 
should be regarded as a very great factor militating against the imposition of a duty of care 
in all child welfare cases because the imposition of tortious liability would appear to 
conflict with the family law values and principles that predominate in tllis area. Cettainly, 
more direct attention needs to be given to the matter of the interaction of tort and fanlily 
law in this field. As regards W v Esse" CC, the exceptional circumstances pertaining to that 
case, in the form of the specific assumption of responsibility on the part of the defendant 
authority not to place anyone with a history of abusing children with the claimant fanlily, 
and their reciprocal reliance on tills undettaking, set this case apart and independently 
justify the imposition of a duty. This point will be returned to presently. 
In respect of the multi-functional status of the defendant local authority in Z, the 
ECtHR apparently considered it significant that the application of the immunity in this 
instance concerned only one aspect of the authority's powers and duties, and therefore it 
did not amount to "an arbitrary removal of the court's jurisdiction to deternline a whole 
range of civil claims". 53 Thus the conferral of the child protection function immumty was 
not all that drastic because there are still plenty of other thirlgs that local authorities can be 
sued for. Tills is to be contrasted with the position of the defendant police authority in 
Os man, whose main function is the investigation and suppression of crime. The conferral of 
an immunity in this respect would consequently have had a much greater impact, for it 
would have effectively removed the police from the clutches of negligence law more or less 
altogether. 
(b) The vicarious liability arguments 
Addressing the conduct of the psychiatrist and the social worker, the House of Lords 
concluded that the particular nature of the relationsllips existing between them and the 
individual victims was not such as to give rise to a duty of care based on an assumption of 
responsibility and reasonable reliance. Since the psychiatrist and the social worker had been 
retained by the local authority for the specific purpose of advising the authority and not the 
claimants, it followed that any duties they owed were solely to the authority. In support of 
this reasoning, an analogy was drawn with the position of a doctor instructed by an 
52 B. Atkin & G. McLay, "Suing child welfare agencies- a comparative view from New Zealand", (200 I) 13 
CFLQ287. 
53 (2002) 34 EHRR 3 at para. 98. 
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insurance company to examine an applicant for life insurance, whereby it was said that, 
apart from the duty to the applicant not to damage him in the course of the examination, the 
doctor's duties were owed only to the insurance company. 
Crucially, however, tllis was an application of the Hedley Byrne principles as they 
stood prior to the decision in Spring v Guardian Assurance, 54 which effected an extension 
of these p1inciples to third party beneficiaries in certain circumstances. The factual situation 
in Spring concerned an employer providing a reference about an employee to a prospective 
employer. The reference was provided carelessly and, as a direct consequence, the 
employee did not get the job. Liability was imposed on the basis that the employer had 
assumed responsibility towards the employee to provide the reference with reasonable care. 
Significantly, it has also since been held that a doctor canying out a pre-employment 
medical assessment on a prospective employee owes a duty to the employee as well as to 
the company not to provide negligent advice. 55 Clearly, the abuse cases involve the same 
type of factual scenario, whereby A makes a statement to B about C, which B then acts 
upon to the detriment of C, which would presumably make them conducive to the same 
legal reasoning. However, it is acknowledged that the fact that the Spring principle appears 
to be limited to information that has been provided for a very specific purpose, in the sense 
that it concerned a reference in respect of a specific post, could significantly reduce the 
scope of any such analogies. In any event, it has to be noted that in X Lord Browne-
Wilkinson covers the eventuality that he is wrong about the social worker and the 
psychiatrist not assuming any responsibility towards the claimants by stating that individual 
duties on their part would always be avoided anyway on the basis of the same policy 
considerations precluding the existence of a direct duty on the part of the local authority. 
(iii) The decisions in the education cases 
(a) The direct duty arguments 
In the education cases, two separate direct duties of care were argued. The first was based 
upon specific provisions of the Education Acts and the second was said to arise from the 
provision of a psychology service. 
54 [1995) 2 AC 296. 
55 Baker v Kaye [ 1997] IRLR 219. While there has been a more recent decision to the contrary, Kapfunde v 
Abbey National plc [1999] Lloyd's Rep Med 48, it can be distinguished for present purposes on the basis that 
it did not involve any personal dealings between the defendant and the claimant. 
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Unsurprisingly, in light of the preceding discussion, the first direct duty argument 
failed. Interestingly, one of the reasons put forward by his Lordship in this respect was that 
basically the existence of such a duty was unnecessary because in most cases parents would 
be able to proceed by way of a vicarious liability argument anyway. 56 Moreover, it was 
thought that recourse to the ombudsman was the most appropriate remedy of all. And, 
falling back on some actual law, there could be identified no analogous situations in which 
a similar type of duty had already been recognised. 
His Lordship did however find the second duty argument persuasive, on the basis 
that in holding itself out as offering a service, a statutory body was in principle in the same 
position as any private individual or organisation holding itself out as offering a service. By 
opening its doors to the general public to take advantage of the service, an authority 
offering a psychology service was in much the same position as a hospital, and this meant 
that it came under a duty to all those using the service to exercise care in its conduct. 
Very significantly, however, Lord Browne-Wilkinson later retracts this statement in 
the course of his speech in Barrett v Enfield LBC. 57 The evident impetus for the retraction 
was the finding of the Court of Appeal in Phelps v Hillingdon LBC58 that a psychology 
service was not provided as an open service at all, so that a local authority providing such a 
service could not be regarded in any way as being in a similar position to a hospital. A 
psychology service was established rather to advise the local authority as to the 
performance of its functions as an education authority. As such, the children could not be 
construed as patients of the setvice. It is likely that the underlying reason for this change of 
position was a realisation on Lord Browne-Wilkinson's part of the consequences of 
recognising a duty of such a general nature on the part of a public body, as covered earlier. 
In view of the availability to claimants of the vicarious liability route, the continued 
existence of this direct route would moreover have been seen as entirely unnecessary. 
(b) The vicarious liability arguments 
In contrast to tl1e position of the psychiatrist and the social worker in the abuse cases, the 
employees of the education authority did have the necessary kind of relationships with the 
claimants to give rise to an assumption of responsibility on their part. In particular, there 
56 [ 1995) 3 All ER 353 at p. 392. 
57 [1999] 3 All ER 193. 
58 [1999] I All ER421. 
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were no potential conflicts between their duties to the claimants and those that they owed to 
the education authority. 
A final note to be made here is that, contrary to popular belief, 59 there is no problem 
with allowing recovery for pure economic loss in these cases, given that they have all been 
subject to the application of the standard Hedley Byrne principles. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE X LITIGATION FROM A THIRD PARTY 
LIABILITY PERSPECTIVE 
X & Others v Bedfordshire County Council & Others is usually interpreted as establishing 
general principles of public authority liability in negligence. More specifically, it is read as 
establishing that, for reasons of public policy, negligence actions against public authorities 
will generally not succeed. Moreover, any lingering doubts about this interpretation, as 
raised by the decision in Osman v UK and Barrett v Enfield LBC, will be seen as having 
been laid to rest by the recent ruling of the ECtHR in Z v UK. 
This standard interpretation of X is not endorsed in this thesis. h1 fact, it is strongly 
contested. The decision does not set out general principles relevant to all public bodies. Its 
ratio is strictly limited, not just to local authorities, but to local authorities acting either in 
the context of their child protection functions or in their capacity as education authorities. 
Indeed, it was the particular nature of the functions in question that largely determined the 
outcomes to the claims. 
Thus it would seem that in certain social welfare contexts, notably those concerning 
delicate child protection issues, the majority of basic negligence actions against local 
authorities are likely to fail on the basis of policy. Moreover, this conclusion would appear 
to apply regardless of whether the action relates to an omission or to a commission. This is 
illustrated by the decision in M v Newham LBC, which involved clearly positive conduct on 
the part of the defendant authority. Moreover, it is highly significant in this respect that in 
pursuing their claim before the ECtHR, the claimants in M changed the basis of their 
negligence allegations altogether, from the authority's hasty decision to remove the child 
59 See A. Mullis, "Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council. A Compensation-Seeker's Charter?", (2000) 
CFLQ 185. 
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from the parental home to its withholding of the video evidence from the mother.60 It is 
submitted that this was most likely due to a realisation that the policy card would inevitably 
be used to trump the child protection argument. And if policy concerns can make even the 
omission/commission distinction inelevant in this domain, then it stands to reason that the 
fact that the harm in question has been caused by a third party will have no impact at all on 
eventual outcomes. As an exception to this general position, the Court of Appeal decision 
in W v Essex County CounciF 1 would appear to demonstrate that where there has been a 
specific undertaking on the part of a defendant authority such as to amount to an 
assumption of responsibility on their part towards the claimants, this will be enough to 
ovenide the policy issues and make a local authority liable not just for an omission, but 
even for an omission in respect of harm caused by a third party. In W v Essex CC, the 
claimant family agreed to act as foster carers, but only upon the express condition that they 
would not be allocated anyone with a history of abusing children. Despite having accepted 
this condition, the local authority went ahead and placed with them a teenage boy who was 
a known sexual abuser, and who subsequently abused the children in the family. The family 
sued the local authority in negligence. Upholding the claims of the children, 62 the Court of 
Appeal relied particularly on the fact that the parents had been given oral assurances by the 
defendant authority that a known or suspected abuser would not be placed with them and 
that they had indeed even made specific inquiries to this effect about the boy in question, 
but had been wrongly told that he had no such history. It is submitted that it will always 
take circumstances as exceptional as this to justify a duty in tllis category of case. 
Outside the delicate policy-laden areas of public authority activity, it seems that that 
the legal position is slightly different. Most significantly, the omission/commission 
distinction would appear to regain its significance, in the sense that claims framed in tenns 
of a commission will be much more easily argued in terms of duty than those based on an 
omission. As regards omissions, the one thing that is abundantly clear from the case-law is 
that an affirmative duty cannot be based upon the existence of statutory obligations alone. 
If no other convincing and independent reasons can be advanced in support of the duty, 
then the broad public policy considerations militating against the imposition ofliability will 
60 TP and KM v UK [2001] 2 FLR 549. 
61 [ 1998] 3 All ER Ill. For an insightful commentary on the decision, see J. Wightman, "The Limits of the 
Rules on Recovery for Psychiatric Damage in the United Kingdom", (2000) 8 Tort LR 169. 
62 The claims brought by the parents were for psychiatric harm, and they were struck out on the basis that the 
special duty requirements governing such hmm could not be met. This decision has, however, since been 
reversed by the House of Lords: W v Essex County Council [2000]2 All ER 237. 
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hold sway. Thus, a bare claim against a public authority based on its failure to exercise a 
statutory function, whether it be a duty or a mere power, will fail outright for lack of duty. 
An illustration of this would be Stovin v Wise. 63 In this case, a highway authority was sued 
for failing to remove a hazard to a highway. The hazard in question was a mound of earth 
on a piece of land adjacent to the highway that obscured the view of motorists using a 
junction and checking for oncoming traffic. The claimant was injured in a crash caused by a 
motorist emerging from this junction and pulling out in front of her. She sued the motorist 
in negligence, and he in turn joined the highway authority as eo-defendant on the basis that 
it had a statutory power conferred by the Highways Act 1980 to remove the hazard. Indeed, 
prior to the accident, the authority, which was well aware of the existence of the hazard, 
had actually taken steps to effect its removal but then had simply failed to follow the matter 
up. It even conceded that its conduct had been faulty, so that if a duty were held to exist 
then it certainly would have been breached. However, the authority contested the existence 
of a duty, and a bare majority of the House of Lords fotmd in its favour. There were no 
exceptional circumstances present in the case to justify a duty. Lord Hoffman did, however, 
indicate that one possible justification for a duty in claims based upon a failure to exercise a 
statutory function would be the doctrine of general reliance, although it did not apply to the 
case at hand. The doctrine of general reliance is said to apply when sections of the public 
rely on a public body to exercise a power or duty to confer upon them a benefit that they 
are unable to procure for themselves. In Stovin, Lord Hoffman qualified the doctrine further 
by suggesting that it also had to be shown that the authority had arbitrarily denied to the 
claimant a benefit that was routinely provided to others. He considered that the 
improvement of road junctions was not a uniform service, and that the claimant in this case 
was moreover in the same position as all other road users. Significantly, in his dissenting 
judgment, Lord Nicholls evidently considered that there was a strong basis for arguing 
reliance in this case. 64 
That the harm for which it was sought to make the authority liable in Stovin had 
been wholly inflicted by a third party was not actually discussed in comt. This is interesting 
because it suggests that the third party issue was simply subsumed by the general omissions 
issue. In other words, it mattered not through what medium the harm had actually been 
caused, only that it had not been caused by the defendant. If this is the case, does it then 
63 [ 1996] 3 All ER 80 I. 
64 /bid, at pp. 814-815. 
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mean that, in this area, third party liability cannot be regarded as a separate and identifiable 
category of liability in its own 1ight? It is submitted that this would be a rash conclusion to 
draw. The problem with the claim in Stovin was that it was very weak from all sides. On the 
assumption that Lord Hoffman was right to reject the general reliance argument, and in the 
absence of any other kind of special connection between the parties involved, the kind of 
liability being advocated and, more importantly, for which the case would have been setting 
a precedent, was simply much too wide and general. Thus the basic misfeasance point was 
enough to dispense with the claim without even having to advert to the third party issue. 
It is submitted that there is also another reason why the third party liability claim 
did not work in Stovin, one that is indeed more pertinent to the theme of the present thesis. 
It is, quite simply, that the targeted functions of the defendant local authority in question 
were just not conducive to the idea of third party liability. It is argued that only those public 
duties that can be said to directly relate either to the protection of the public from harm 
caused specifically by third parties, or to the control of dangerous or inesponsible 
individuals posing risks to others, can, in themselves, defensibly give rise to the kinds of 
affirmative common law duties of care necessary to support a third party liability argument. 
Statutory obligations in respect of highway maintenance certainly do not fit either bill. In 
their case, additional exceptional circumstances independently justifying an affirmative 
duty in respect of third party hann would be needed, such as evidence of an explicit 
assumption of responsibility on the part of the authority.65 
Planning authorities would also be in a similar position. In their case, the relevant 
type of negligence allegation will typically relate to a grant of planning permission in 
respect of a dangerous structure that will later be the setting for an accident involving one 
party injuring another. It is to be noted immediately, however, that this type of scenario 
differs from the paradigm, Stovin v Wise-type, scenario in relation to highway authorities in 
that it involves a degree of positive conduct on the part of the defendant authority, which 
contributes to the creation of the circumstances giving 1ise to the harm. Thus the nature of 
the allegation will differ in that it will take the fom1 of a hybrid argument, rather than a 
65 The position of the various emergency services may be instructively considered in this context also. Their 
primary functions do not relate specifically to the prevention ofhmm caused by third parties either, any role 
played by third parties being strictly incidental. Indeed, this can be clearly illustrated by reference to the stage 
at which these public services typically intervene in the harm-causing situation; namely, after the event. In 
other words, their duties relate rather to controlling the consequences of the harm, rather than to preventing 
the infliction of the harm in the first place. Thus third party liability actions will generally not arise against the 
emergency services either. 
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pure omissions one. Tllis should make it easier to establish an affirmative duty of action. 
The point is, however, that any liability that may ultimately mise will not be a form of true 
tllird party liability, even though the actual harm in question has actually been inflicted by a 
third party, because it will not be directed specifically to the hann-causing tllird party 
conduct. The fact that the harm has been inflicted by a third party will be entirely incidental 
and, by all accounts, entirely irrelevant to the liability issue. The planning authority's legal 
responsibility will be directed rather at its positive role in creating the dangerous situation 
which led to the infliction of the ham1 by the third party. The only live issue for the court 
will therefore be the ordinary omissions question rather than a specific third party liability 
one. A good illustration of these points is provided by the recent case of Kane v New Forest 
District Council. 66 The defendant planning authority in question had granted planning 
permission for a development which required the developer to construct a footpath before 
commencing development works. It was realised that the footpath would end on the inside 
of a bend in a road with impaired visibility to oncoming drivers, which would compromise 
the safety of pedestrians wishing to cross at that point to the other footpath on the opposite 
side of the road. Communications thus ensued with the local highway authority responsible 
for the roadway about improving the sightlines at the footpath exit. Before the proposed 
improvements were actually carried out by the highway authority, however, the footpath 
was opened to the public. Unfortunately for the claimant, the foreseeable risk materialised 
when he was struck by a car while trying to cross the road at the end of the footpath. He 
alleged negligence on the part of the planning authority in failing, when granting the 
planning permission, to impose a condition forbidding the opening of the footpath to the 
public until the danger had been removed. In reversing the judge's decision to dismiss the 
action on the ground that it had no real prospect of success, given the authority of Stovin v 
Wise, the Court of Appeal relied heavily on the fact that the defendant had actually created 
the source of the danger in the first place. It was thus able to easily distinguish Stovin on the 
basis of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction. 
As in Stovin, the fact that the harm for which it was sought to make the defendant 
responsible had actually been inflicted by an independent third party was not even 
mentioned in court. It is submitted that in tllis case, a key reason why the Comt of Appeal 
was able to go much further and actually impose liability without adverting to the role of 
66 [2002] I WLR 312. 
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the third party harm-doer is that the third party harm-causing conduct in question was 
entirely unintentional in nature, rather than an "act of conscious volition", as refened to by 
Lord Reid in Dorset Yacht. 67 In terms of notions of moral responsibility, the main reason 
why the idea of making one person liable for harm intentionally inflicted by another is so 
instinctively objectionable and controversial is that the person being held liable is not the 
one most obviously responsible for the ham1. With harm that has been caused accidentally 
and non-negligently,68 on the other hand, it seems only natural to cast a wider net of 
responsibility. It is all about attributing responsibility to the highest degree of fault. 
It may also be questioned at this point whether some kind of indirect link exists 
between the idea that only certain public functions are innately susceptible to third party 
liability arguments and the purely factual matter of the particular form of the negligence 
allegations constituting the basis of a claim, specifically in terms of whether or not it relates 
to a failure to exercise certain discretionary statutory functions. To put it simply, it seems 
that where claimants have to point to specific statutory provisions setting out the precise 
functions of the defendant body as the main basis of their duty arguments, the functions in 
question tend to be not very susceptible to third party liability claims. This is because 
claimants only really have to resort to the statute in cases where the functions of the body 
are not obvious or commonly known, and third party arguments are only going to work in 
respect of clear-cut public duties to control or to protect. 
Applying this reasoning, it is suggested that the most obvious candidate for a third 
party liability claim would be the police authority, given that its primary function is to 
protect the public from the hal111ful activities of third parties. 69 Indeed, to this end, they are 
specifically empowered to control the conduct of risk-producing third parties. That is not to 
suggest, however, that the mere existence of this public function of protection and control 
should ever be thought to constitute, in itself, sufficient basis for an affirmative duty in 
respect of third party harm. This would certainly open up the police to a banage of claims 
which, for the public policy reasons discussed earlier, would not be to the ultimate benefit 
of society. To say that the policing function is conducive to third party liability arguments 
67 [1970] AC 1004 at p. 1031. 
68 The claimant in Kane did not place any blame at all on the motorist who actually struck him, believing that 
he had had no chance of avoiding him. Thus he did not bring any legal proceedings against him. 
69 On this link between functions and liability, it is interesting to note also at this point the case of Hardaker v 
Newcastle Health Authority and the Chief Constable of Northumbria [200 I] Lloyd's Rep Med 512, in which 
a negligence action against the police in the respect of its provision of certain medical facilities failed 
primarily on the ground that this did not constitute one of its main functions. 
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is merely to imply that such arguments would at least have a logical foundation in this 
context, not that they should necessarily always succeed. Fmther requirements designed to 
control liability are necessary and desirable. Fortunately, a perfectly adequate control 
mechanism already exists in the law in this respect. It is the, by now familiar, requirement 
that two special relationships of close proximity be established by the claimant: one as 
between the defendant and the third party perpetrator and another as between the defendant 
and the victim. Notably, such a requirement would appear to apply to all third party actions 
against public bodies that are based on the existence of public duties to control and protect, 
as will be seen presently. 
As regards the police authority, no better example ofthe kind of factual scenario 
required to found an actionable third party liability claim can be found than the background 
to the claim in Osman v Ferguson. The police in this case had undeniably close links with 
both the Osmans and the teacher who caused the harm. They had had numerous personal 
dealings with both parties and were indeed fully aware of the risk posed by the latter to the 
former. It is precisely because the case for a duty in this instance was so overwhelmingly 
strong that the decision to strike out the claim on specific duty grounds caused the uproar 
that it did. It is also highly ironic that by being so reactionary and adopting such a 
restrictive approach to public authority liability, thus inviting European intervention, the 
English courts ended up by actually widening the scope of liability beyond the necessary 
boundaries. What is meant by this is that although a duty was clearly owed by the police in 
Osman, it is unlikely that the claimants would actually have been able to establish a breach 
on the facts, so that liability could ultimately have been avoided on this entirely legitimate 
basis. In support of this, reference need only be made to the fact that the ECtHR more or 
less exonerated the police for their investigation and decision-making, fmding that the 
evidence presented did not support the allegations directed specifically at their conduct 
under Articles 2 and 8. The ECtHR emphasised that although it had found there had been a 
violation of Article 6 in this case, this was not tantamount to saying that the Osmans would 
necessarily have won in the domestic courts. It meant merely that they had an arguable 
claim and that, consequently, they were "entitled to have the police account for their acts 
and omissions in adversarial proceedings". 70 Hoyano would regard this as a clear 
illustration of how the fault requirement may be used as an effective control mechanism. 71 
70 ( 1998) 29 EHRR 245 at para. 153. 
71 L. Hoyano, "Policing Flawed Police Investigations: Unravelling the Blanket", (1999) 62 MLR 912, p. 925. 
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That there has already been a notable shift of emphasis from duty to breach, as 
effected principally by the House of Lords decision in Barrett, 72 is for the most part to be 
welcomed. Indeed, in academic circles, there is strong support for the adoption of a fault-
led approach to public authority liability. 73 Concern is expressed however about what this 
kind of approach will actually entail for the duty concept. What will its future role be? For 
while it has inevitably been tainted by previous instances of judicial misuse, it ought not to 
be forgotten that the duty concept does function as an invaluable vetting tool, in terms of 
assessing at the outset the basic legal tenability of claims, and dismissing those that would 
represent a waste of time and money. 74 If it were to be sacrificed in the interests of allowing 
a detailed fault assessment to be carried out at full trial, by being reduced to a mere 
formality in the majority of cases, then the consequences could only be negative. 
Unfortunately, some of the recent case law on the matter would appear to indicate that this 
is already happening to some extent. The proper approach must surely be to clarify for all 
those concerned the precise role to be played by the duty concept, and to ensure that it is, in 
future, properly applied in practice. This duty requirement could then operate in 
conjunction with the breach requirement to ensure not only a fair and just approach to 
liability, but also a workable one. 
Bearing all of this in mind, it is proposed to look individually at some of the main 
public authorities whose functions are susceptible to third party liability claims. It is 
envisaged that such public authority liability would generally be invoked vicariously in 
respect of the personal negligence of individual employees. It seems appropriate to begin 
with police authorities and to accompany an elaboration of the points already made in this 
respect with a detailed expose of the relevant case law. 
72 See further, P. Craig and D. Fairgrieve, "Barrett, Negligence and Discretionary Powers", (1999) PL 626. 
73 See, in particular, M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve, "Sufficiently Serious? Judicial Restraint in Tortious 
Liability of Public Authorities and the European Influence", in M. Andenas ( ed.), English Public Law and the 
Common Law of Europe, (1998). See also S. Bailey, "Beyond the Call of Duty", ( 1987) 50 MLR 956 at p. 
963. 
74 Jane Stapleton would appear to hold a similar view about the duty function: "Tort, Insurance and Ideology", 
(1995) 58 MLR 820. 
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(i) Police authorities 
Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police75 provides a fwther example of the type 
of situation in which the third party liability of the police might arise. The claim in this case 
arose out of the theft, by persons unknown, of a folder of information from an unattended 
police car. The information in question, which related to the activities of a violent 
individual, had been supplied by an informant whose personal details were also contained 
in the folder. The folder eventually made its way into the hands of the individual 
concerned, who proceeded to issue threats against the informant and her husband. Suing the 
police for the psychiatric harm she claimed to have suffered as a result of receiving the 
threats, the informant alleged negligence on their part in failing to keep the information 
secure in the first place. Thus it was sought to make the police liable for two separate 
instances of third party misconduct: the initial act of theft by the persons unknown as well 
as the issuing of the threats by the named individual, for it was from this latter conduct that 
the harm complained was actually said to stem. Refusing to strike out the claim, the Court 
of Appeal held that there was a sufficient degree of proximity between the claimant and the 
police to place upon them a duty to take reasonable care to keep secure the information she 
had supplied to them.76 Reference was also made to the strong public policy argument in 
favour of allowing liability in this instance, to the effect of encouraging informants to 
supply to the police information that can be used to fight crime. This alone outweighed all 
the Hill immunity arguments. 
On the third party liability issue, it is to be noted that the duty of care in this 
instance was founded upon the existence of just one special relationship of close proximity, 
for this would appear to fly in the face of what had just been said about the need for two 
special relationships to be established. The facts of Swinney, however, are to be entirely 
distinguished from Hill and Osman. Indeed, the claim in Swinney cannot even be accurately 
described as a true third party liability one. The allegations of negligence were directed 
exclusively at the actions of the defendants in leaving the folder in the car. There was no 
further suggestion that they should have in some way attempted to positively control the 
75 [1996] 3 All ER449. 
76 The claim was ultimately unsuccessful at full trial, as the police were found not to have been in breach of 
their duty of care: Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria (No. 2) ( 1999) 11 Admin LR 811. This serves 
as yet another reminder that to recognise the basic tenability of a claim through the imposition of a duty is not 
necessarily to open the floodgates, for at the next stage the fault requirement can then be employed as an 
equally effective, and ostensibly more legitimate, control mechanism. 
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conduct of the third party ham1-doers. Nor indeed was such a suggestion even necessary, 
for the misfeasance on their part was clearly enough in itself to support all of the relevant 
duty, breach and causation arguments. Thus it was only a very weak, and essentially 
uncontroversial, form of third party liability that was in issue, in the sense that it was 
liability for an act of personal wrongdoing, but in respect of harm actually inflicted by a 
third party, with the link between the two being entirely indirect. The conclusion to be 
drawn from this has to be that the duty requirement that two special relationships of close 
proximity be established is limited to situations in which the duty is to control or in some 
other way actively influence the conduct of the third party. 
Whilst in the majority of cases, this requirement of two special relationships is 
likely to constitute a significant obstacle to establishing liability against the police for 
failing to prevent crime, thus making it a very effective control mechanism, there is one 
category of claimants for whom it will pose no problem at all and that is individual police 
officers themselves. Case law clearly dictates that police officers have a duty to come to the 
aid of fellow officers being attacked by third parties. In Costello v Chief Constable of 
Northumbria Police, 77 a female police officer was attacked and injured by a prisoner in a 
cell while one of her senior colleagues simply stood back and watched. In finding that the 
colleague had been under a duty to intervene and help to restrain the attacker, the Court of 
Appeal relied on the closeness of the relationship between the defendant and the claimant 
as fellow officers and on the close physical proximity of the defendant to the incident. It 
was also relevant that the defendant had been positioned close by for the specific purpose 
of lending assistance if required. The necessary special relationship between the defendant 
and the third party perpetrator would appear to have been satisfied in this instance by the 
fact that the latter was a prisoner in custody at the time and, perhaps more significantly, by 
the actual physical proximity between the two at the time of the attack. This latter factor is 
thought to be more significant because it would arguably have been sufficient in itself to 
satisfy the required relationship of close proximity. Given that the whole purpose of the 
special proximity requirements in these cases is to limit liability to the most exceptionally 
deserving cases, applying the duty to intervene to situations in which the defendant is 
actually present would seem perfectly defensible. Interestingly, in addition to being singled 
out as exceptional for the purposes of a duty to rescue, the relationship between police 
77 [ 1999] I All ER 550. 
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officers has also been made the subject of much wider duties of protection. Where these 
much broader third party liability issues are concemed, however, it seems that the relevant 
affirmative duties will be limited strictly to the most senior officers. In Waters v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 78 the House of Lords refused to strike out a 
policewoman's claim that the defendant commissioner had been negligent in failing to 
protect her from victimisation by fellow officers. That the victimisation appeared to have 
been linked to the fact that the claimant had previously reported one of her fellow officers 
for sexual assault, and was thus seen by her colleagues to have broken the team rules, was 
regarded by the House as relevant to the duty issue. This is significant in that it would 
appear to distinguish this employment relationship from other employment relationships, in 
terms of the nature ofthe intemal politics involved, and would thus limit the ratio 
according! y. 
Aside from their main function in relation to the investigation and suppression of 
crime, there is one other aspect ofthe role of the police which may expose them to third 
party liability claims, and it is that which relates to the retention of persons in custody. By 
taking persons into custody, and thus purporting to exercise total control over their whole 
environment, custodial officers place themselves under a legal duty to ensure the general 
safety of their charges. An interesting third party perspective to this duty that has emerged 
from the case law in recent years is that, in certain circumstances, it may extend to an 
obligation to protect the detainees from themselves, in tem1s of the commission of acts of 
self-harm. Of the relevant cases in point, of which there are three, the acts of self-harm 
concemed have all been of the most extreme form; that is, suicide attempts. In both moral 
and legal terms, the idea of making a person liable for harm that another has deliberately 
inflicted upon himself or herself is instinctively even more objectionable than the ordinary 
third party claim, where the perpetrator and the victim are two separate parties, not just 
because the victim has, for want of a better description, actually desired the ham1 in 
question, but also because in these cases, the party most directly responsible for the harm is 
fully within the remit of the court's judgment. It is thus entirely possible for the court to 
attribute full legal responsibility to this party by actually denying them the right to sue in 
the first place. When a duty to prevent self-ham1 was first recognised on the part of the 
police, in the case of Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police, 79 
78 [2000] 4 All ER 934. 
79 [1990] 2 QB 283. 
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controversy was for the most part avoided on the grounds that the detainee in question had 
been mentally ill. It was thus possible to justify the decision on the basis that the victim had 
not been capable of taking responsibility for his own actions. When the issue came before 
the courts again, however, in Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 80 and the 
House of Lords imposed a similar duty on the police, this time in respect of a detainee 'of 
sound mind', the uncomfortable reality that simple knowledge of a detainee's suicidal 
tendencies would be enough to give rise to the custodial obligation to prevent self-harm had 
to be faced. Tllis position has recently been confirmed in Orange v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire Police. 81 Moreover, because of the very specific nature of the duty in question in 
these cases, to prevent acts of suicide, the courts have refused to accept arguments that the 
actual commission of such acts can then be said to either amount to a novus actus 
interveniens or to permit a defence of volenti non fit injuria. 
By the same logic, the police should also have a similar third party duty, while 
acting in a custodial capacity, to protect detainees from each other. While the issue does not 
appear to have arisen directly for consideration in an action against the police, it has done 
so on numerous occasions against prison authorities. The prison authority is the more likely 
target for such third party actions, given that its custodial functions tend to relate to long-
term periods of detention and allow for greater contact between detainees. 
(ii) Prison authorities 
It was established as far back as 1953, by the Court of Appeal decision in Ellis v Home 
Office, 82 that a prison authority could be liable for harm inflicted by one of its prisoners 
upon another within the confines of the prison. A duty to protect prisoners from such harm 
seems to form an intrinsic part of the wider duty owed by prison authorities to ensure the 
general safety of their prisoners. 83 The justification for imposing an affimmtive duty of this 
nature is obviously the legal authority and physical power of control exercised by the prison 
authority over both of the parties involved; or in other words, the existence of two special 
relationships of close proximity. While the duty may be easily established, however, the 
80 [1999] 3 All ER 897. 
81 [2001] 3 WLR 736 (no duty because no actual knowledge ofpmiicular suicide risk). 
82 [1953] 2 All ER 149. 
83 See further, S. Livingstone and T. Owen, Prison Law (OUP, 1999). 
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task of demonstrating that it has actually been breached is likely to pose considerable 
problems for claimants, for in what would appear to be a concerted attempt to control 
liability, the courts have tended to set the relevant standards of care in these cases at 
exceptionally low levels. A good illustration of this point is provided by Livingston and 
Owen. They refer to the finding of the Court of Appeal in Palmer v Home Office84 that the 
actions of a prison authority in allowing a highly dangerous and violent prisoner to work in 
a tailor's workshop where he had access to scissors, which he then used to stab a fellow 
prisoner, could not be regarded as negligent. It was the opinion ofNeill LJ that "those 
responsible for prisons cannot keep prisoners pennanently locked up or segregated from 
other prisoners. In addition, it is necessary, or certainly desirable whenever possible, to 
provide suitable employment for individual prisoners". 85 
More complicated is the question of the third party liability of prison authorities in 
respect of harm caused to members of the public by escaped prisoners. In terms of duty, the 
main problem will be in establishing the necessary relationship of proximity between the 
defendant and the claimant. The principal point of reference here is obviously the seminal 
decision in Home Office v Dorset Yacht. 86 Given that the Law Lords all went to great 
lengths to emphasise the special facts of this case, in particular the highly significant 
geographical detail that the incident in question had taken place on an island, which had the 
effect not only of giving the victims the status of particularly foreseeable claimants but also 
of establishing a very clear and neat boundary to the scope of liability, the decision would 
appear to lend support only to claims brought by victims living in the immediate vicinity of 
the prison. 
Claimants in this context must also ensure that in formulating their claims they do 
not fall foul of the rule against challenging policy decisions. By way of example, a decision 
to place a prisoner with a record of previous escape attempts in an open prison, from which 
it would obviously be very easy for him to abscond, would probably be regarded as falling 
into the policy bracket and would thus be non-justiciable for this reason. 87 Similarly, it was 
84 ( 1988) The Guardian, March 31. 
85 Further cases involving similar third party liability actions against the prison service are: D 'Arcy v Prison 
Commissioners (1955) The Times, Nov 17; Egerton v Home Office [ 1978] Cri m LR 494; Porterjield v Home 
Office ( 1988)The Independent, March 9; Steele v N/0 ( 1988) 12 NIJB I; H v Home Office ( 1992) The 
Independent, May 6; Hartshorn v Home Office (unreported, CA, Jan 21, 1999), noted by S. Foster, ( 1999) 
NLJ 799. 
86 [ 1970] AC 1004. 
87 See Lord Diplock's discussion and ultimate condemnation, in Dorset Yacht (at pp. 1061 and 1069), ofthe 
decision in the earlier case of Greenwell v Prison Commissioners ( 1951) I 0 I LJ News 486, holding a prison 
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made clear by the Law Lords in Dorset Yacht that if the allegations in that case had been 
directed at the decision to mn an open Borstal, with all the 1isks that that obviously 
entailed, or presumably even to the decision to bring the boys in question onto Brownlea 
island in the first place, for the purposes of their refonnation, the claim would have 
automatically failed. Claimants must be able to point to some particular instance of 
individual faulty conduct, such as inadequate supervision, to have any chance of 
succeeding. 
(iii) Health authorities 
It will be through their relationships with risk-producing patients that health professionals 
may expose themselves to third party liability actions. While those working in the mental 
health field will obviously be the most susceptible to such litigation, there are a number of 
situations in which it is foreseeable that the third party liability of ordinary doctors could 
arise. 88 Thus, in treating an infectious disease, a doctor may come under a duty to protect 
those likely to come into contact with the patient in question. Such a duty could consist 
either of an obligation to warn of the dangers of infection, or of an obligation to ensure that 
the infected patient does not come into contact with others at all, perhaps by keeping him or 
her in total isolation for the required period.89 Of course, in individual cases, the imposition 
of such third party duties of protect will have to be reconciled with the defendant doctor's 
own professional duties of confidentiality towards his patient.90 Another likely scenario, 
one that has indeed already been litigated in Canada, is failing to advise patients suffering 
from certain medical conditions about the dangers of partaking in certain activities, such as 
driving with epilepsy, with the result that an accident occurs in which others are harmed. 91 
Obviously, similar responsibilities would attach to the prescription of medication with 
potentially dangerous performance-inhibiting side effects. 
authority liable for hann caused by an escaped prisoner on the grounds that it had been negligent in deciding 
to place him in an open prison system in the first place. 
88 See further, J. Healy, Medical Negligence: Common Law Perspectives, ( 1999), pp. 44-48 and M. A. Jones, 
"Liabilities for psychiatric patients: setting the boundaries", (2000) 16 PN 3. 
89 See, e.g., Evans v Live1pool Corporation [ 1906] I KB 160. 
90 Note W v Edge!/ [ 1990] Ch 359. 
91 Spillane v Wasserman (1992) 13 CCLT (2d) 267. 
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As indicated above, however, it is the position of mental health professionals that 
warrants the most attention here, given that their work with a category of patients who pose 
particular! y high levels of risk to others makes them prime targets for third party liability 
actions. That the actual ham1-doers in these cases will also be morally designated as 
iiTesponsible will undoubtedly be seen to lend weight to the third party argument in this 
context. However, while a bare obligation to control the actions of a psychiatric patient may 
be readily founded upon the nature of the relationship existing between the defendant 
doctor and the patient, the case law on the matter would indicate that this will only be 
transformed into a common law duty of care, such as to found an action in negligence, 
where it is accompanied by knowledge of a specific threat to a specific individual. In other 
words, a special relationship of close proximity also needs to be established between the 
defendant and the victim before the defendant will be legally required to act affirmatively 
to protect the victim by controlling the conduct of the patient. Thus in Palmer v Tees Area 
Heath Authority, 92 it was held by the Court of Appeal that a health authority owed no duty 
of care to a child in respect of her abduction, abuse and subsequent murder by an outpatient 
with a history of violence and sexual abuse, on the grounds that the child had not been 
individually identified to them as being at a specific risk of hann from tlus patient. 
Although the patient had threatened to murder a child, and the young girl in question lived 
close by, tlus was not enough to give her a special status.93 Where there is evidence of a 
specific threat to an identified individual, such as in the well-known Californian case of 
Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, 94 in which a patient confessed to his 
therapist about his feelings of violence towards a particular female who was also personally 
known to the therapist, it is likely that the duty will consist either of an obligation to alert 
the authorities about the potential threat, or if such individuals powers exist, to have the 
patient committed under the Mental Health Act 1983.95 The standard Bolam test will then 
obviously apply to determine breach. 
92 [ 1999] Lloyd's Rep Med 351. 
93 In light of this finding, the much earlier decision in Ha/gate v Lancashire Mental Hospitals Board [ 193 7] 4 
All ER 19, to hold a hospital board liable in respect of the actions of a patient in attacking a member of the 
public, must be called into doubt. 
94 551 p 2d 334 (1976). 
95 On this point, see also, F. Morris and G. Ashead, 'The liability of psychiatrists for the violent acts of their 
patients", (1997) 147 NLJ 558. 
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While health authorities will also owe duties to prevent psychiatric patients under 
their care from committing acts of self-harm,96 the courts have made it clear that they will 
not sanction an extension of these duties to further encompass the protection of such 
patients from the legal consequences of their own criminal behaviour. Thus in Clunis v 
Cam den & Islington Health Authority, 97 an action for damages brought by a discharged 
psychiatric patient who had been convicted of manslaughter against the health authority 
charged with the statutory duty of providing after-care services for him, alleging a negligent 
failure to provide him with the required treatment that would have prevented him from 
canying out the fatal attack, was dismissed by the Court of Appeal as being contrary to 
public policy. The court would not lend its aid to a claimant who relied on his own criminal 
or immoral act and so the defence of ex turpi causa non oritur actio applied. Additionally, 
it was found that public policy also prevented a duty of care from being recognised on the 
facts, on the grounds that it would not have been fair, just or reasonable. 98 
(iv) Education authorities 
The special position of authority and control occupied by those responsible for the running 
of schools has long been regarded as giving rise to third party affirmative duties to protect 
and control the pupils in their care. Consequently, schools are susceptible to two different 
forms of third patty liability in respect of their pupils: (1) liability for harm that others 
inflict on their pupils99 and; (2) liability for harm that their pupils inflict on others. 100 Thus 
in J (A Child) v Lincolnshire CC, 101 a local education authority was held liable in respect of 
serious injuries sustained by one of its young pupils upon being hit by a car after wandering 
96 Hay v Grampian Health Board [ 1995] 6 Med LR 128; Walsh v Gwynedd Health Authority (unreported, CC, 
April 27, 1998). 
97 [1998] 3 All ER 1998. For further discussion of the decision see M. A. Jones, "The violent mentally 
disordered patient: who cares?", ( 1998) 14 PN 99. 
98 TI1ere was a previous case in which a claimant had been allowed to recover damages in respect of his 
conviction of a criminal offence. In Meah v McCreamer [ 1985] I All ER 367, the claimant who had 
undergone a personality change after suffering a head injury in a road accident, was held to be entitled to 
damages in respect of his subsequent conviction oftwo offences of rape. In Clunis, however, the Court of 
Appeal refused to recognise this decision, stating that it could not be regarded as authoritative of the issue as 
it had been made without any consideration of the public policy question. As such, it is highly unlikely that 
Meah could ever be relied upon by future claimants. 
99 See, e.g., Wilson v Governers of Sacred Heart RC School [1998] I FLR 663. 
100 See, e.g., Mm·vier v Dorset CC (unreported, 4 April 1997, CC). 
101 [2000] ELR 245. 
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off the school premises, while in Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis 102 a local education 
authority was held liable to a motorist fatally injured in a road accident caused by an errant 
child. In both cases, liability was linked to their respective failures to provide adequate 
security to prevent very young pupils from making unauthorised exits from the premises. 
The applicable standard of care in such cases is said to be that of the 'careful parent' .103 
A more controversial aspect of such liability is the extent to which schools may be 
held responsible for bullying. It is almost certain that schools have a duty to take reasonable 
care to prevent bullying from taking place within their own grounds, primarily through the 
implementation and execution of sensible disciplinary policies and procedures. Moreover, 
the Court of Appeal has recently stated that, in exceptional circumstances, this duty may 
even extend to bullying taking place outside of the school premises, such as where a teacher 
actually witnesses one pupil attacking another just outside the school gates. 104 However, the 
courts have shown themselves particularly unsympathetic to claimants who try to recover 
damages for an alleged failure of this duty, in one case actually informing a claimant that 
the bringing of the case had caused her more suffering than the alleged bullying that she 
. . f 105 was smng m respect o . 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Fundamental misunderstandings about the proper nature and scope of the ratio of X v 
Bedfordshire County Council have resulted in the courts adopting an entirely misguided 
and overly restrictive approach to the tortious liability of public authorities. As regards the 
tenability of third party liability actions against public authorities, it is argued that the 
principal detenninative factor has to be the primary function of the actual body concerned 
in each individual case. Some public authorities, such as the police authority and the prison 
authorities, are by the very nature of their designated statutory roles in society, inherently 
susceptible to third party liability arguments. In general, this is because their primary 
functions relate directly to the care and control of risk-producing third parties. Where third 
102 [1955] AC 549. 
103 !bid, per Lord Goddard at p. 561. See also Barnes v Hampshire CC [1969]1 WLR 1563. 
104 Bradford-Smart v West Sussex County Council [2002] EWCA Civ 7. For a commentary on the case, see J 
Elvin, "The Liability of Schools for Bullying", [2002] CLJ 255. 
105 Walker v Derbyshire CC (1994) The Times, July 16. Note also that the claim in Bradford-Smart ultimately 
failed on the grounds that the school had not been in breach of its duty of care. 
134 
party liability actions against these particular authorities arise, special control mechanisms 
can be applied to exclude all but the most exceptional cases. At the duty of care stage, such 
mechanisms already exist in the form of a requirement that there exist two special 
relationships of close proximity; one as between the defendant and the third party harm-
doer and another as between the defendant and the victim. At the breach of duty stage, it is 
submitted that a simple lowering of the relevant standard of care would constitute a suitable 
and highly effective measure in this respect. 106 One way of effecting this would be to 
simply transfer the requirement of Wednesbury unreasonableness from the duty of care 
inquiry, where it is currently applied under X v Bedfordshire, to the breach of duty inquiry. 
Altematively, an approach similar to that taken by the French administrative courts could 
be followed whereby, as will be seen in the next chapter, a special test of 'gross' fault, as 
opposed to 'ordinary' fault, would apply to public authority actions. 107 
106 See also Andenas and Fairgrieve, "Sufficiently Serious?", op. cif. 
107 Such a suggestion was indeed made a number of years ago by S. Bailey: "Beyond the call of duty", (1987) 
50 MLR 956. 
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CHAP1'ERSEV1EN 
Liability for the Acts of Others: A French Perspective 
A striking feature of the French legal system is its victim-orientated approach to questions 
of liability for unlawfully inflicted ham1. 1 In pursuit of this principal compensatory goal, the 
French courts are quite prepared to target peripheral defendants in cases in which the actual 
perpetrator of the harm, for whatever reason, either cannot be sued or is not worth suing. 
Moreover, they are indifferent in this respect to the status of defendants, in terms of whether 
they are public authorities or private law defendants. For the English lawyer, what is 
perhaps most remarkable of all, however, is that such third party liability is often imposed 
on an entirely no-fault basis. Indeed, in recent years, there have been dramatic 
developments in the law in this respect, particularly as concems private law defendants, to 
the extent that it could now be argued that the French system has actually implemented a 
general regime of no-fault liability for the acts of others. Significantly, however, in terms of 
the actual application of its principles of third party liability, direct correlations can be 
drawn with the existing categories of such liability in English law. 
I. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN FRANCE 
In France, legal actions against public authorities do not come before the ordinary courts. 
Rather, in accordance with a strict interpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers, 
France operates an entirely separate court system, staffed by its own body of specialist 
judges, to deal exclusively with legal matters conceming the activities of the administration. 
Thus it is before these 'administrative courts' that any actions invoking the tortious liability 
of a public body will be brought. Crucially, these special courts also administer their own 
separate and distinct body of law which, wmsually for a codified regime, is almost entirely 
judge-made. In essence, the law as regards the administration is effectively whatever the 
1 F. Lambert-Faivre, "L'evolution de la responsabilite civile d'une dette de responsabilite a une creance 
d'indemnisation", RTDciv.l987.1. 
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Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative coUI1, deems it to be. That French law recognises 
no doctrine of binding precedent, moreover, means that the substantive law in this respect is 
subject to change over time, for the Conseil d 'Etat is free to change its position on any 
matter and does, as a matter of practice, frequently depm1 from its own previous decisions.2 
Such flexibility, which is characteristic of French law generally, has engendered, as will be 
seen, a judicial tendency towards creativity. 
The first point to make about the tortious liability of public bodies in France is that, 
in stark contrast to the English approach in this respect, the administrative courts take an 
extremely broad approach to the concept of fault, and will, in principle, classify as an 
administrative tort any kind of conduct on the part of a public body that results in harm 
being unfairly inflicted upon a member of the public, thus entitling the victim to 
compensation. Indeed, even where the conduct cannot be construed as unlawful in any 
sense, a particular individual who shoulders the burden of works carried out in the public 
interest will still be entitled to compensation under the principle of 'equality before public 
burdens'. From a third party liability perspective, an interesting application of this liberal 
fault interpretation is to be found in the context of claims based upon the notion of afaute 
de service. Afaute de service refers essentially to some kind of failure in the operation of a 
public service, and it is often invoked by claimants as a way of circumventing the 
restrictions imposed by the doctrine of vicarious liability, in order to make public service 
employers primarily liable for harm occasioned through the personal fault of their 
employees committed outside the scope of their employment. The argument runs to the 
effect that the public service is at fault in providing the conditions for the commission of 
the harm by the employee, for example, by providing the public vehicle that is used by the 
employee to make a private and unauthorised journey during which harm is inflicted on 
another. While such an argument may appear to English lawyers to be stretching the 
boundaries of the fault principle just a little too far, it is nevertheless one to which the 
French administrative courts have demonstrated themselves to be entirely receptive.3 
While this liberal approach to public authority liability holds for most actions for 
damages before the administrative courts, there are some public activities that are afforded 
special protection in recognition of their particularly difficult or sensitive nature. Such 
2 See L. N. Brown and J. S. Bell, French Administrative Law (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 176. 
3 See Brown and Bell, op. cit .. pp. 185-188. 
137 
protection is bestowed in the fom1 of a modified standard of care requirement that deems as 
unacceptable only conduct that is capable of being characterised as gross fault (jaute 
lourde). The activities of the police are a prime example of the kind that would fall into this 
category. In practice, this lowering of the standard of care appears to work very well as a 
control mechanism,4 a fact that undoubtedly lends great support to the suggestion in the last 
chapter that a similar approach be followed in all public authority actions in English tort 
law. 
At the other extreme again, however, there are a number of public activities in 
respect ofwhich the administrative courts operate a principle of no-fault liability, generally 
based upon the theory of risk. For present purposes, it is significant that the relevant 'risk-
producing' activities often relate to the care and control of third parties, and thus give rise to 
a number of instances of no-fault state liability for the acts of others. The most well-
established instances of such liability may be divided into 2 categories, both of which have 
significantly already been encountered in the English context: (i) Third party liability in 
respect of harm caused by prisoners; and (ii) Third party liability in respect of harm caused 
by mentally disordered patients in state care. 
(i) Third party liability in respect of harm caused by prisoners 
This form of no-fault liability on the part of the state is based upon the implementation of 
what Brown and Bell te1m 'liberal penal measures', 5 which most often refers to the 
operation of 'open' prison systems, and applies in respect of the conduct of both adult 
prisoners and young offenders. As regards adult prisoners, Brown and Bell provide, as an 
example, the decision of the Conseil d 'Etat in Guarde des Sceaux c. Ban que Populaire de 
la Region Economique de Strasbourg, 6 to the effect that the Minister for Justice was 
responsible for the actions of three criminals in robbing a bank, on the grounds that one of 
the perpetrators was a prisoner on home leave at the time, another was being held on a 
4 See B. S. Markesinis, J.-8. Auby, D. Coester-Waltjen and S. Deakin, The Tortious Liability of Statut01)' 
Bodies (1999). 
5 Op. cif., p. 196. 
6 CE,9avril1987. 
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special regime of 'semi-liberty' which allowed him to work outside the prison during the 
day and the other had just been granted parole. 
As regards young offenders, the potential for no-fault third party liability to arise on 
the part of the state on the grounds of risk theory is even greater, given that the French 
courts have long pursued a policy of applying educative solutions wherever possible to 
problems of juvenile delinquency. 7 Such solutions are designed as alternatives to traditional 
penal measures, and are aimed specifically at the rehabilitation of young offenders. 8 They 
most commonly take the fom1 of what may be termed 'open environment measures', 
whereby the child continues to live with his or her parents, but under the supervision and 
assistance of a court-appointed youth worker.9 Often, however, an order will be made for 
the child to be placed in a specialist institution, particularly where it is thought that the 
child's home-life may be a contributing factor in his or her criminal tendencies. Where such 
institutions are state-run, then liability for any harm caused by the child to others will 
automatically fall on the state. Interestingly, where the institution in question is a privately-
run one that has been licensed by the state to receive young offenders on rehabilitation 
programmes, it appears that no-fault liability will arise on the part of both it and the state 
jointly, and that the claimant will have to bring two separate actions: one before the 
administrative courts against the state and another before the ordinary civil courts against 
the private institution. 10 That the third party liability of the private institution may be 
invoked in such situations is a very significant recent development that will be discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
The nature of the state's third party liability in respect of young offenders is to be 
contrasted with that which arises on its pmt in respect of harm committed by children who 
have been taken into state care, under child protection measures. 11 The latter, based as it is 
on a presumption of fault, rebuttable by proof of lack of fault, ca11 be more accurately 
defined as a form of strict liability for the acts of others. 12 While, to the English lawyer at 
least, this would still appear to constihtte a ve1y liberal approach to third party liability, it 
7 The French law governing juvenile delinquency is contained in the Order of 2 Feburary 1945. 
8 See fm1her, C. Blatier, "Juvenile Justice in France: The Evolution of Sentencing for Children and Minor 
Delinquents", ( 1999) 39 Brit J Criminol 240. 
9 A comparison may perhaps be made here with 'supervision orders' in English criminal law. 
10 See, e.g., Civ. 2e, 9 dec. 1999, JCP.2000.IY.ll63. See also comments made by G. Yiney, JCP.2000.1.241. 
11 See Article 375 et seq of the Civil code. 
12 See, e.g., CAA Bordeaux, plen.,2 fevr. 1998, Cts Fraticola, Rdpubl. 1998, p.579, cone!. D. Peano. 
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has nevertheless been criticised by some French academics who would like to see it 
reconciled entirely with the approach to liability for young offenders. 13 
(ii) Third party liability in respect of harm caused by mentally disordered patients in state 
care 
Persons with mental disorders are the other mam category of supposedly 'dangerous' 
individuals in respect of whom special regimes of no-fault third party liability have been 
implemented in administrative law. It is a firmly established principle of French law, dating 
from the landmark Thouzellier 14 decision of the Conseil d'Etat in 1956, that the state will 
be held liable automatically for any ham1 caused by a mentally disordered patient of a 
public hospital. Significantly, it was this very decision which then prompted the dramatic 
developments referred to earlier on no-fault third party liability in French private law, for 
limited as it was to the patients of public hospitals, it created a huge disparity between the 
legal positions of public and private hospitals in this respect, which the ordinary civil courts 
then acted in response to, as will be seen in the next section. 
11. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY OF PRN ATE LAW DEFENDANTS IN FRANCE 
The French equivalent of the law oftort is contained in just five articles ofthe Civil Code. 
Articles 1382 to 13 86 set out general principles of law providing for all cases of delictual 
liability. The principle of liability for personal fault is set out in Article 1382, which 
provides quite simply that: "Any human deed whatsoever which causes harm to another 
creates an obligation in the person by whose fault it was caused to compensate it". 15 For 
present purposes, the most relevant provision is Alticle 1384. By contrast to the brevity of 
Article 1382, this provision contains eight separate paragraphs and is fairly long and 
detailed. Not only does it govem all the various instances of third party liability in French 
13 D. A11us, "Le mineur place en application des a11icles 375 et suivants du code civil et le contentieux de la 
responsabilite devant le juge administrative", 0.200 l.Cluon.l8. 
14 CE, 3 fevr. 1956, D.l956.596, note Auby. 
15 Translation taken from J. Bell, S. Boyron and S. Whittaker, Principles of French Law. (OUP, 1998), p. 355. 
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civil law, but it also sets out a general principle of 'liability for the deed of things in one's 
keeping'. The significance of Article 1384 has increased dramatically over the last century. 
Conducive to judicial manipulation, it has been the subject of numerous substantive 
changes at the hands of the courts and is consequently associated with some of the greatest 
developments in the history of the French law of delict. 
Paragraph 1 of Atiicle 1384 states: "One is responsible not only for one's own act, 
but also for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom one is responsible or by the 
things which one has in one's care". It was originally intended as a mere introduction to the 
subsequent provisions, with the reference to responsibility for the acts of others acting as a 
preface to the specific instances of third pmiy liability set out in paragraphs 4 to 8 and the 
reference to liability for things in one's care relating to Articles 1385 (liability for animals) 
and 1386 (liability for buildings). Through a process of judicial interpretation, this 
particular paragraph has been adapted to meet perceived changes in social needs. In 1896,16 
in response to the rise in the number of accidents caused by machines as a result of the 
industrial revolution, it was dramatically reformulated by the French Supreme Court, the 
Cour de Cassation, to include a general ptinciple of strict liability for the deed of things in 
one's keeping. This very famous example of judicial law-making is illustrative of the 
adventurousness of the French courts and demonstrates the relative ease with which they 
can create new legal rules. What is more impmiant for present purposes, however, is that it 
may be regarded as having paved the way for a further reinterpretation of paragraph 1 in 
recent times in order to extend the scope of liability for the acts of others. In 1991, in a 
decision that constituted a complete departure from it previous, firmly-entrenched, legal 
position, the Cour de Cassation held that the principle of liability for the acts of others 
contained in paragraph 1 was not limited to the specific instances set out in the subsequent 
paragraphs, and that it could be applied on the basis of a long-tenn relationship of authority 
and control in order to make a centre for occupational therapy responsible for harm caused 
by one of its mentally disordered patients. Moreover, by failing to delineate in any precise 
way the exact sphere of application of the principle, the Cour de Cassation also left open 
the possibility that the principle could be extended to other contexts. Not surprisingly, it 
soon was. Before charting the progress of this 'general' principle of liability for the acts of 
16 Civ., 16 juin 1896, 0.1897.1.433, note Saleilles, cone!. Sarrut; S.l897.1.17, note Esmein. 
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others based on paragraph 1 of Alticle 1384, however, it would be instructive to look at the 
specific instances of such liability set out in paragraphs 4 to 8. 
There are four separate relationships detailed by paragraphs 4 to 8 as giving rise to a 
form of third party liability: 
• Parent and child (paragraphs 4 and 7) 
e Master and servant (paragraph 5) 
e Teacher and pupil (paragraphs 6 and 8) 
e Craftsman and apprentice (paragraphs 6 and 7) 
Interestingly, each relationship gives rise to a different form of third party liability. 
Employers are subject to a regime of vicarious liability, while teachers can only be held 
liable on the basis of ordinary proven fault 17 and craftsmen are bound by a presumption of 
fault. The position of parents in this respect is of particular interest given that the basis of 
their liability for the acts of their children has undergone several major transformations in 
recent times, developing from a system of ordinary fault-based liability into a system of 
quasi-strict liability and then into a rather extreme form of no-fault liability, operating on a 
policy of automatic compensation. Indeed, parental liability has now become the single 
most important instance of third party liability in French law, and its impact on the 
principles of civil liability generally has been considerable. Moreover, it is clear that there 
are direct conelations between the developments in relation to parent liability and those in 
respect of the 'general' principle of liability for the acts of others. This makes it prudent to 
look in detail at the evolution of the principle of parental liability, before moving on to look 
at the developments in relation to paragraph 1. 
(i) The liability of parents for the acts of their children based on Article 1384, paragraph 4 
It is possible to identify three stage-posts marking the main developments in parental 
liability: 
17 New regime introduced by the Law of 5 April 1937. Prior to this, liability was based on a presumption of 
fault. 
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o The Gesbaui 8 decision in 1966. 
o The Fullenwarth 19 decision in 1984. 
® The Bertrand20 decision in 1997. 
Before discussing the changes effected by these decisions, it is necessary to consider the 
legal position existing prior to 1966. 
(a) The legal position before 1966 
Paragraph 4 of Article 1384, as created by the Law of 4 June 1970, provides that the father 
and mother, to the extent that they exercise parental authority,21 are jointly liable for 
damage caused by their minor children living with them. 22 
Paragraph 7, which was inserted into Article 1384 by the Law of 5 April 1937, 
states that such liability applies unless the father and mother prove that they could not 
prevent the act which gave rise to liability.23 
While it does not contain specific wording to that effect, until 1997, paragraph 7 
was always interpreted as creating a rebuttable presumption of fault as the basis of parental 
liability. Such a presumption was said to relate to a failure on the part of parents to 
adequately carry out their duties to supervise and educate their children as set out in Article 
371-2 of the Civil Code.24 Located in the section ofthe Code that deals with parental 
authority, this Article, at that time, provided that: "The authority belongs to the father and 
mother to protect the child in its security, health and morality. They have, with regard to the 
child, the right and duty to keep, supervise and educate".25 The notion of a duty to educate 
is to be construed in a very broad sense as relating to the general upbringing of the child. 
This is clearly a very wide-ranging duty that is open to an infinite number of subjective 
interpretations. In consequence, it has given rise to difficulties for parents as regards 
discharging the burden of proof. 
18 Civ. 2e, I 0 fevr. 1966, D.l966.332, concl. Schmelck. 
19 Ass. Plen., 9 mai 1984, D.l985.525, concl. Cabannes, note Chabas. 
2
° Civ. 2e, 19 fevr. 1997, D.l997.265, note Jourdain. 
21 Tem1 inserted by the Law of 4 March 2002. Prior to that, reference was to the exercise of a right of custody. 
22 Prior to 1970, the mother only became responsible upon the death of the father. 
23 This provision also applies to artisans. 
24 A. Benabent, Droit Civil, Les Obligations (Montchrestien, 1995), p. 569. 
25 The wording of Article 3 71-2 has since been changed, in line with the recent developments in parental 
liability. See infra, p. 152. 
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The function of the requirement set out in paragraph 4 that the child be living with 
the parents at the time the harm was caused was to ensure that liability would only be 
imposed on parents who were in a position to effectively supervise and educate their 
children. In practice, however, the cowts always took a rather broad approach to the 
operation of this criterion of liability, for fear that it would be used too easily by 
irresponsible parents as a means of avoiding liability, and their fim1 stance was always that, 
in cases where the child was not living with either parent at the time the damage was 
caused, or, alternatively, was living with only one, absence from the family home would 
only have precluded application of At1icle 1384( 4) to the non-resident parent where there 
was a legitimate reason for his or her absence. It must not have been due to what could have 
been construed as any fault on the part of that parent. For instance, the fact that one parent 
may have moved out of the family home due to a marital separation or the initiation of 
divorce proceedings or the fact that the child was not living in the family home at the 
relevant time because he or she had run away would not have been regarded as legitimate 
I . 26 exp anatwns. 
A very important point to be made is that the system of liability as applied at this 
time was designed only to impose liability on parents for the torts of their children. Conduct 
of a child resulting in harm but not amotmting to a tort did not give rise to an action in 
parental liability based on Att.1384( 4). The presumption of fault on the pat1 of the parents 
was, therefore, conditional upon proof of fault on the part of the child. When it did come 
into play, the theory was that it would operate to effect a reversal of the burden of proof 
The idea was that the commission of the tort by the child would presuppose that the parents 
had failed to carry out their parental duties properly and this would give rise to a prima 
facie finding of negligence. The parents would then be given the opportunity to rebut the 
presumption by attempting to establish that they had adequately supervised and educated 
the minor so that they could not have prevented the harm. 
Such a system was designed to benefit victims by relieving them of at least some of 
the difficulties inherent in establishing fault and placing the burden instead on the parents to 
prove that they had not been negligent. At the begitming, however, this is not how the 
doctrine was implemented in practice. Up until about 1979 the courts merely paid lip-
26 Cf: Civ. Ire, 4 dec. 1963,0.1964.159, note Voirin (separation); Crim. 21 aout 1996, D.l996.IR.235 
(divorce); Civ. 2e, 24 nov. 1996, Bull. Civ. 11, no. 922 (runaway). 
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service to the presumption without actually applying it and, in most cases, the victim was 
required to fumish proof of actual negligence on the part of the parents. By way of example, 
in one 1960 decision, 27 in which a nineteen year old bo)P crashed into the plaintiffwhile 
riding his moped at night and without any insurance, the finding of the Court of Appeal that 
it could be inferred from the facts that the boy's father had not adequately supervised or 
educated his son was quashed by the Cour de Cassation. It held that the Court of Appeal 
should have directed its attention as to whether, in the circumstances, the father had 
behaved as a reasonable man, which is a clear application of the ordinary fault principle. It 
further held that the fact that a parent allows a child to use a particular object which 
subsequently causes hann will only constitute fault on the pm1 of the parent if, by reason 
either of the age, inexperience or intellectual incompetence of the child, or of the poor 
condition or dangerous character of the object or of the abnonnal circumstances in which 
the child was using it, an accident was foreseeable. The approach of the French courts at 
this point to the issue of parental liability may thus be compared to the current UK system 
of parental liability. 
In another case the following year, the Cour de Cassation did exactly the same thing 
again. It quashed the finding of the Court of Appeal that the commission of harm by a 
thirteen-year-old boy who fired a pellet gun at his friend and hit him in the eye was 
sufficient proof, in itself, that the boy's father had failed in his duty to educate. The case 
was sent back to be retried. 
Commenting upon these two decisions, Rodiere suggested that the legal 
consequence of this approach taken by the French Supreme Court was, effectively, the 
eradication of the principle of parental liability from the Civil Code. 29 He did, however, 
also intimate that the reasoning behind the first decision may have been the age of the youth 
involved, for the position is clear that as children become older the duties of parents 
become less onerous.30 Nevertheless, both decisions illustrate a clear tendency of the courts 
to avoid the liability of parents in the absence of personal fault. 
27 Civ. 2e, 2 nov. 1960, D.l961.770. 
28 In 1960 in France the age of majority was 21. It was not lowered to 18 until 1974. 
29 
"La Disparition de I 'Alinea 4 de I' Article 1384 du Code Civil", D.1961. Chron. 209. 
3
° Civ. I re, 6 janv. 1982, JCP.1982.1V.l 07; Paris, 7e eh. B, 12 juill. 1990, JCP.1991.1V.248. 
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A third decision provides further persuasive authority to this effect. 31 It involved a 
claim for compensation for injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a large department store as 
a result of being hit by a stool which had been thrown over the railings five floors above by 
a two and a half year old child. The Court of Appeal, quite remarkably, held that the shop 
was liable and did not even consider the question of the mother's liability. It found that the 
shop had a duty to supervise the child and that this duty was made particularly onerous by 
the fact that the child was located in the children's clothing department when the incident 
occurred. The reasoning behind this was apparently that this section of the shop constituted 
a particular allurement to young children. In quashing the decision, the Cour de Cassation 
resisted this attempt to dilute even further the duties placed on parents but, unfortunately, it 
did so by stating that the Court of Appeal should have established whether the mother had 
been personally at fault by determining whether she had been in a position to prevent the 
harm occurring, instead of imposing the presumption and leaving it up to her to submit such 
evidence in her defence. 
At this stage, therefore, it can be seen that the victim had a double hurdle to clear in 
establishing liability, being required to establish the fault of both the child and the parents. 
This position was redressed to some extent by the Gesbaud decision in 1966,32 relative to 
the question of the child's liability. 
(b) The Gesbaud Decision. 
Gesbaud marked the first step in the movement towards objective liability. It established 
that where harm had been caused by the child through the mediun1 of an object, the liability 
of the child, from which the liability of the parents was to be derived, could be established 
on the basis of Art. 1384, paragraph 1, rather than on the basis of Art. 1382. In other words, 
instead ofhaving to prove actual negligence on the part of the child in accordance with Art. 
1382, plaintiffs could invoke the principle of strict liability for the deed of things in one's 
keeping contained in Art. 1384(1 ). To satisfy the requirements of liability on this basis, all 
that needed to be proven was that the child had the use, direction and control of the object 
that caused the harm. Given that, in most cases, the infliction of hann by children is to be 
31 Civ. I re, 20 dec. 1960, D.l961.141, note Esmein. 
32 Civ. 2e, I 0 fevr. 1966, D.l966.332, cone I. Schmelck. 
146 
attributed to their use of an object,33 the impact of this decision was clearly very far-
reaching. In the majority of subsequent cases, the need for the plaintiff to establish fault on 
the part of the child perpetrator was dispensed with so that the presumption of parental 
negligence contained in Article 1384( 4) could be brought into play practically 
automatically. 34 
It is significant that, at this stage, Article 13 84(1) could not be used to give rise to an 
action in personal negligence against the child,35 children having traditionally been exempt 
from such a regime of liability. Parental liability was thus evidently based on the objective 
negligence rather than the actionable negligence of the child perpetrator. 36 
The consequence of the Gesbaud decision was that in cases ofharm caused by a 
child through the medium of an object, parental liability was based on two presumptions: 
the presumption of fault on the pmt of the parent based on the presumption of the child's 
liability. 
However, an examination of the cases reveals that the courts continued for many 
years to disregard the presumption of negligence contained in Article 1384(4) and to require 
proof of fault on the pmt of defendant parents in order to impose liability. In one 1970 
decision37 the Cour de Cassation stated that the plaintiff was required to prove that the 
defendant father had acted unreasonably and it applied the increasingly familiar formula for 
determining negligence: that of inquiring whether by reason of the age or inexperience of 
the child, the state of the object used to cause the harm or the circumstances sunounding 
the activity, an accident was foreseeable. 
A change in attitude may be identified as taking place around 1979, when the courts 
began to adopt a stricter approach to parental liability and actually started to apply the 
33 This point is made by Warembourg-Auque, "L' Irresponsabilite de l'lnfans", R.T.O.civ. 1982.329. She 
suggests that this is because, otherwise, children do not generally have enough physical force to inflict 
significant harm. 
34 lt was established by the famous Jand'heur decision, Ch. Reunies, 13 fevr. 1930, 0.1930.1.57, note Ripert, 
that Article 1384(1) implements a presumption of liability rather than a presumption offault. The difference is 
that a presumption of liability may only be rebutted by proof of a force majeure or contributory negligence. 
This clearly operates to the advantage of claimants by guaranteeing a positive verdict in all but the most 
exceptional of cases. 
35 It was not until 1984 that A1i. 1384(1) could be used to impose liability on children: Ass. plen., 9 mai 1984, 
0.1984.525, cone!. Cabannes, note Chabas. 
36 Although there was no formal legal rule to this effect contained in any French text, it was the opinion of 
leading jurists in this field that this was the state of the law as applied by the courts, such conclusions being 
drawn from a detailed study of the relevant case-law. Cf. Warembourg-Auque, op. cif. and Puill, "Les 
Caracteres du Fait Non Fautif de la Yictime", 0.1980.Chron.l57. 
37 Civ.2e, 4 nov. 1970, 0.1971.205. 
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presumption in its intended form. Liability began to be imposed in circumstances in which, 
previously, parents would nearly always have been exonerated. In a decision of 7 November 
1979,38 the Cour de Cassation applied the presumption of fault to the father of a child who 
caused an accident while riding his bicycle in the street. It also held that evidence that the 
father had expressly forbidden the son to do so was insufficient to rebut the presumption.39 
Two 1980 decisions repmted together indicate that the courts had a tendency to treat 
evidence of the bad character of the child perpetrator as conclusive proof that the parents 
had failed in their duty to educate. In such cases the presumption became, to all intents and 
purposes, irrebuttable. In this way, the approach of the French courts at this stage may be 
compared with the current tendency of the common law courts to impose liability more 
readily in cases of reprehensible conduct.40 In the first case,41 the boy in question had 
aggressive tendencies which were assumed to have been known to his parents and the 
incident which gave rise to this action involved him kicking a fellow pupil at school. The 
court held the father liable due to a breach of his obligation to properly educate his son even 
though the boy was actually under the care and supervision of the pmticular educational 
establishment at the time. In the second case,42 the boy in question had committed arson 
with malicious intent and a similar decision was reached. In a commentary accompanying 
these two decisions it was suggested that basing liability on evidence of a poor upbringing 
was only a pretext for deciding that parents are generally responsible for the character of 
their children. A call was made at this early stage for the courts to state that parental 
liability was not based on a presumption of fault and that neither did it have anything to do 
with any notional duties to supervise and educate. It was argued that the courts should 
simply admit that parents are, in accordance with Starck's famous formulation of the 
'obligation de garantie ', under an obligation to act as guarantors of the character defects 
and unsociable traits of their children. It was also recognised at this stage that, if this were 
the case, there would no longer be any need for the requirement of cohabitation, given that 
it was specifically linked to the duties to supervise and educate. 
38 Civ. 2e, 7 nov. 1979, JCP.I980.IV.27. 
39 See also Ctim. I 7 oct. I 979, D. I 980.1R. I 31, although in this case the com1 took a more lenient approach to 
the application of the presumption by holding the parents not liable. 
40 See supra, Chapter 3, pp. 59-61 
41 Civ. 2e, 4 juin I 980, D. I 98l.IR.322. 
42 Cri m. I 8 juin I 980, D. I 98 I.IR.322. 
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Such a change in attitude prepared the way for the next major development in this 
area ofthe law, in the fonn oftheFullenwarth decision. 43 
(c) The Fullenwarth Decision 
Fullenwarth was one of five44 decisions examined and delivered together on the same day 
by the Cour de Cassation sitting in plenary session, a formation which lends even greater 
authority to the conclusions reached by the Court. 
In Fullenwarth, a child aged seven fired an arrow from a homemade bow and arrow 
set in the direction of his friend and blinded him in one eye as a result. Having lost before 
the Court of Appeal, the defendant father brought his case before the Cour de Cassation, 
contending that the Court of Appeal had erred in its decision in not considering whether his 
son had sufficient understanding or awareness of his actions in order to establish liability on 
his part on the basis of fault. The position in French law until then had always been that, 
fault being an essentially moral concept based on blameworthiness, an individual could 
only be capable of negligence in the legal sense if he or she was fully aware of the import of 
his or her actions. Young children lacking reason were thus generally exempt from the 
regime of liability contained in Article 1382, with no particular age limit being fixed for the 
attainment of the so-called 'age of reason'. In this case the father was arguing that the 
presumption of negligence against him contained in Article 13 84( 4) only came in to play 
upon proof of the prior liability of the child tortfeasor, so that if the child was not liable 
then the presumption could not apply. Tllis contention, although a perfectly accurate 
statement of the pre-existing law, was rejected by the Cour de Cassation, which held that to 
invoke the principle of parental liability as set out in Article 1384( 4), it sufficed that the act 
cormnitted by the minor was the 'direct cause' of the harm. The actual terminology used by 
the court was also significant in that it referred to a 'presumption of liability' rather than a 
presumption of fault, thereby reversing its previous position.45 Thus, from 1984 onwards, 
parental liability, as a mere causation-based liability, was no longer based on the prior 
liability of the child perpetrator. 
43 Ass. plen., 9 mai 1984, 0.1984.525, concl Cabannes, note Chabas. 
44 Of the 5, Fullenwarth was the only one to concem the issue of parental liability. The other 4 decisions dealt 
rather with the related issue of the personal liability of children. 
45 Cf. Civ. 2e, 15 fevr. 1956, 0.1956.410. 
149 
An important observation to make here is that, at this point, the regime for 
establishing parental liability became even stricter than the corresponding doctrine of 
employer's liability, which continues to this day to require that the liability of the employee 
be established as a prerequisite to the application of its legal principles. 46 Moreover, 
Fullenwarth also operated to place those victims who had suffered at the hands of children 
in a more favourable position than those who had been injured by adults, for they were 
afforded the opportunity of suing the parent for the act of a child which, in ordinary cases, 
would not give rise to the primary liability of an adult because it is simply not negligent 
according to ordinary standards of reasonableness. 
The concern of the French judiciary at this time was clearly to improve the situation 
of victims. This was, no doubt, at least partly in response to the declaration of the 
Constitutional Council in 1982 that all persons who suffer harm at the hands of another 
have a constitutional right to receive compensation.47 Also significant, in the sense of being 
indicative of the legal atmosphere of the time, is the law of 5 July 1985, which implemented 
a new system of liability in relation to road accidents in France. Operating largely on a no-
fault basis and awarding to victims of road accidents an essentially automatic right to 
compensation, it constituted a major inroad into the fault doctrine. It is illustrative of how 
the notion of moral imputability was being supplanted by considerations of reparation, as 
the policy of automatic compensation adopted by the courts became an important method of 
determining questions of liability. 48 
In the light of these victim-orientated developments, it is not surprising that 
following the 1984 decisions many more calls were made for a radical overhaul of the 
regime and the process of refonning this area of the law stepped up a gear. Commentators 
were more or less unanimous in the view that only the transformation of parental liability 
into a system of automatic liability based solely on the fact of parenthood and regardless of 
the actual conduct of such defendant would suffice to restore coherency to this area of 
46 Civ. 2e, 19 fevr. 1997, D.l997.265, note Jourdain. 
47 Dec. no.82-144 du Conseil Constitutionnel du 22 oct. 1982, J .0. 23 oct. 1982, Gaz Pal. 1982.2, Bull. 
Legis!. 764. It is to be noted that A1iicle 62, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of 1958 sets out that the decisions 
of the constitutional judge are binding on all public powers and on all administrative and judicial authorities. 
48 For a discussion of the French law on road accidents see T.A. Downes, "French Lessons on Motor Accident 
Compensation", in R. White & B. Smythe ( ed.s), Current Issues in European and International Law ( 1990), 
p.l73 and R. Redmond-Cooper, "The Relevance of Fault in Determining Liability for Road Accidents: The 
French Experience", ( 1989) 38 ICLQ 502. 
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law.49 It was similarly envisaged that, in order to be financially sustainable, such a proposal 
would have to be based on the existence of compulsory liability insurance. Since specific 
insurance cover had already existed in this domain for many years and was already widely 
subscribed to, it was generally considered that the jump to compulsory indemnity policies 
would not be too traumatic. Many authors also pointed to the fact that the basis of the 
presumption as it then stood was, in most cases, entirely fictitious. 50 Indeed, Fulchiron 
pointed out in this respect that while parental liability was then said to be based on the 
exercise of parental authority, such authority was actually made up of a bundle of rights and 
duties extending beyond supervision and education. The concept of the duty to educate, in 
particular, was the subject of further criticism because of its inherent ambiguity and the 
resulting inconsistencies in com1 decisions to which it gave 1ise. 51 
Initially, the courts responded to this surge of opinion by making the existing regime 
of parental liability stricter. The presumption of liability was more stringently applied 52 and 
the cohabitation requirement was broadened so that it was held to be satisfied for the 
purposes of AI1icle 1384(4) even where the child perpetrator was temporarily in the care of 
a third party when the damage occurred. 53 It was not, however, tmtil 1997, in Bertrand, that 
the Cour de Cassation took the opportunity to resolve definitively this much-debated issue. 
(d) The Bertrand54 Decision 
While the legal implications of Bertrand were to form the subject of innumerable 
commentaries and debates, the actual facts giving rise to it could hardly have been more 
mundane. The plaintiff brought an action based on Article 13 84( 4) against the father of a 
twelve-year-old boy who had collided with her while riding his bicycle. The Court of 
Appeal upheld her claim and the defendant father brought the case before the Cour de 
Cassation, contending that the Court of Appeal should have considered the evidence 
49Viney, "La reparation des dommages causes sous I 'empire d 'un etat d 'inconscience: un transfe11 necessaire 
de la responsabilite vers I 'assurance", JCP.l985.1.3189; Puill, "Vers une reforme de la responsabilite des pere 
et mere du fait de leurs enfants?", 0.1988, Chron. 185; Fulchiron, JCP.l988.1I.21 064. 
5
° Fulchiron, ibid; Oagome-Labbe, note 0.1990.519; Jourdain, note 0.1997.265. 
51 See, for example, H. et L. Mazeaud, Traite theorique et pratique de la responsabilite civile delictuelle et 
contractuelle, 6e ed., t, I par A. Tunc, ed, ( 1965), p.869. no. 756; Jourdain, note 0.1997.265; Vailard, note 
0.1990.207. 
52 Civ. 2e, 3 mars 1988, JCP.l988.1V.l76; Civ. 2e, 16 mai 1988, Gal. Pa1.1989.2.Somm.371; Lyon, 16 nov. 
1989,0.1990.207, note Vialard; Civ. 2e, 16janv. 1991, JCP.I99l.IV.97. 
53 CA Nancy, 1 re eh. civ ., 20 oct. 1993, JCP .IV .2636 ; CA Paris, 9 avr. 1996, 0.1996.1R.128. 
54 Civ. 2e, 19 fevr. 1997,0.1997.265, note Jourdain. 
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submitted by him to the effect that he had properly carried out his duties to educate and 
supervise his son. The Cour de Cassation, rejecting his argument, held that the courts were 
no longer bound to take into account such evidence because parental liability was no longer 
based on these duties to supervise and educate. It further held that, in future, the only 
defences that would be available to parents under Article 1384(4) would be those of force 
majeure and contributory negligence. The presumption of liability had been categorically 
replaced by a principle of automatic liability. 
The overall reaction to the decision from legal quarters has been one of 
overwhelming support, 55 with many calling for further legislative intervention in order to 
make parental insurance cover compulsmy. The view shared by the majority is that the 
imposition of no-fault liability is justified by sociological factors such as the strengthening 
of family links, with closer relationships developing between parents and children, and the 
fact that many children remain in the family home for longer due to the modem trend of 
embarking on extended periods of study, thus prolonging the period of dependency. 56 
It is also said that the availability of the sole defences afforce majeure and 
contributory negligence is entirely consistent with the actual wording of Article 1384, 
paragraph 7, since it does not refer to fault at all but merely states that liability is to be 
imposed unless the parents prove that they could not have prevented the act of the child 
which gave rise to the harm. It has also been pointed out that the new interpretation of these 
provisions of Article 1384 is more reconcilable with Article 482, governing the legal 
position of parents in relation to emancipated children, for it sets out that "parents are not 
automatically responsible for damage caused by an emancipated child subsequent to 
emancipation". 
Much criticism has since been directed at the cohabitation requirement, to the effect 
that it is totally inapplicable and out of step with the new regime of liability, given that its 
original purpose was to ensure that parents were in a position to exercise effective 
supervision of their children and that this consideration is no longer of any formal 
relevance. It has been pointed out, however, that it is not possible to simply remove or 
55 Jourdain, 0.1997 .265; Rade, Chron. 0.1997 .279; Mazeaud, Somm. 0.1997.290. 
56 Jourdain, ibid. 
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ignore this criterion for it is set out in black and white in Article 1384. 57 Thus, as a way of 
circumventing it, the comts have simply continued to apply to the concept an extremely 
liberal interpretation. 58 
That the wording of Alticle 3 71-2, in relation to parental authority, has just recently 
been changed, to the effect that the exercise of parental authority is no longer equated solely 
with the duties to supervise and to educate, 59 is arguably clear confirmation that the 
Bertrand approach has been fully embraced by the French legal community. More 
importantly, in the five years that have passed since Bertrand, the French courts have 
demonstrated that they are prepared to continue to apply the principle of no-fault liability in 
. full . 60 Its ngour. 
The contrast with the conesponding English approach to parental liability is thus 
now very great. For while under both regimes the actual principles underlying such liability 
are the same, based as they are on the existence of a special relationship of authority and 
control, in practice the operation of these principles could not be more different, insofar as 
the English courts will go to great lengths to avoid parental liability, even in instances of 
clear fault. 61 
(ii) Liability for the acts of others based on Article 1384, paragraph 1 
Prior to 1991, the Cour de Cassation had always presented itself as extremely hostile to the 
idea of using Article 1384(1) to create new categories ofthird party liability.62 Then, in 
57 Jourdain, ibid. He also contends that while having a child cannot be said to constitute a fault, it is 
nevertheless a personal choice which is rather selfish. As such, the consequences of this choice should not be 
imposed upon others (at 283). 
58 See, e.g., Civ. 2e, 20 janv. 2000, JCP.2000.1.404; Civ. 2e, 9 mars 2000, JCP.2000.I.730; Cass. Crim., 15 
juin 2000, JCP.2000.I.280, Chron. Yiney; Cass. Crim., 28 juin 2000; Civ. 2e, 16 nov. 2000, JCP.2001.1.340, 
Chron. Viney. 
59 Amended by the Law of 4 March 2002. The new version sets out that: "Each parent is to contribute, in 
proportion to their respective means and by reference to the needs of the child, to the maintenance and 
education of their children. This obligation does not lapse automatically upon the child's attainment of the age 
of majority". (Author's own translation). 
6
° Civ. 2e, 4 juin 1997. D.I997.IR.I59; Cri m. 25 mars 1998, D.l998. JR. I 52; Civ 2e, I er avr. 1998, 
D.I998.1R.I20; Civ 2e, 2 dec. 1998, D.I999.1R.29; Civ. 2e, 18 mai 2000, JCP.2000.1V.2187; Civ. 2e, 10 mai 
2001, JCP.2001.ll.I0613, note Mouly. See also G. Yiney, Chronique, JCP.2002.1.124. 
61 See, e.g., Donaldson v McNiven [ 1952] 2 All ER 691 and Gorely v Codd [ 1967] I WLR 19, supra Chapter 
3, p. 56. 
62 See, e.g., Civ. 2e, 24 nov. 1976, D. 1977.595, note Larroumet. 
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1991, presumably in response to mounting pressure from the academic community, it 
dramatically reversed its position on the issue, and decided in the case of Blieck, 63 that the 4 
specific relationships detailed in Article 1384 did not constitute an exhaustive list of the 
domain of application of the principle of third party liability set out in Article 1384(1) after 
all, and that the principle could rather be applied in other particular circumstances. What 
these particular circumstances were, however, it did not define in any precise fashion. That 
it not to say that the Cour de Cassation was necessarily just being careless in this respect, 
for it has a noted tendency to be deliberately vague in circumstances in which it is unsure 
about a new principle, thus leaving itself the scope to go back on its decision should it wish 
to. 64 In the event, however, it appeared to lose any reservations that it may have had about 
the decision, for it actually ended up going to the other extreme and sanctioning a number 
of further extensions to the principle, to the point that it now has a sphere of application far 
beyond what could ever have been initially anticipated. Indeed, the Court is now more 
likely to be accused of overzealousness, for it has effected one particular extension that is 
totally out of step with the rest and that cannot be reconciled at all with the original grounds 
for Blieck. For present purposes, however, the existence of this particular extension is 
highly significantly in that it may be compared directly with an existing English law 
categmy of third party liability. Indeed, there exist a number of other striking similarities 
between the two regimes in this context, to the point that, in tem1s of the foundational 
principles of third patty liability, their respective approaches may actually be regarded as 
broadly comparable. 
(a) The evolution of the Blieck principle of third party liability 
The legal action in Blieck arose out of the actions of a mentally disordered individual in 
setting fire to the claimant's forest. The individual in question was a resident patient at the 
defendant's nearby centre for occupational therapy, and at the relevant time he had been 
undertaking some work outside the centre. The work had actually been organised by the 
centre, as part of its programme of 'supervised freedom', whereby patients would be 
allowed total freedom of movement dming the day but at night would be supervised in a 
protected environment. The Cour de Cassation held that the defendant association was 
63 Ass. plen., 29 mars I 991, D. 1991.324, note Larroumet. 
64 T. Le Bars and K. Buhler, "Responsabilite civile du fait d'autrui: une derive a la jurisprudence Blieck", D. 
1996.453. 
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liable for the harm caused by its patient in this instance, on the grounds that it had 
"accepted the responsibility of organising and controlling the life of this person on a 
permanent basis". On the basis of this particular formula, it is thus possible to discern three 
separate elements to the Blieck principle: (i) the acceptance of responsibility (ii) the 
existence of authority to organise and control the day-to-day conduct of the harm-doer, and 
(iii) the exercise of such authority on a long-te1m or permanent basis. Some commentators 
have further interpreted the decision as having been based also on some degree of risk 
theory, on the grounds that the coUit refened specifically in its judgment to the fact that the 
centre had operated on an 'open' basis65 and that this anangement obviously created a risk 
for the public.66 
The first real extension of this Blieck principle was one that took many people by 
surprise. In 1995, the Cour de Cassation decided in two cases heard simultaneously that 
sporting associations could be held liable for the actions of their members in the course of a 
sporting event, on the basis of a similar, though not identical, formula to that set out in 
Blieck. Both cases involved harm caused by unidentified rugby players during the course of 
a match, and in both cases the liability of the respective rugby clubs was said to arise from 
the fact that their missions were to "organise, lead and control the activities of their 
members in sporting events in which they take part". Immediately, two distinctions with the 
Blieck formula may be identified: firstly the permanency criterion has been dropped 
altogether; and secondly, the position of authority and control in this instance is said to 
relate to the activities of the individual harm-doers in a particular context, rather than to 
their general day-to-day conduct. In the immediate aftermath, these decisions were heavily 
criticised on the grounds that they did not constitute an appropriate application of Blieck. 
However, it would appear that by this stage the French Supreme Comt was already 
beginning to reason more in tem1s of general principles of third party liability, and had 
simply identified the grounds for liability in these cases as sufficiently compelling to 
warrant an extension of the Blieck principle. Moreover, it has recently affirmed its position 
in tlus respect by delive1ing another sports liability decision to like effect.67 Clearly there is 
65 P. Jourdain, "La reconnaissance d'une responsabilite du fait d'autrui en dehors des cas particuliers enonces 
clans )'article 1384", RTDciv. 1991.541. 
66 On this basis, a comparison can then be made with the equivalent administrative law regime for such 
liability. 
67 Civ. 2e, 3 fevr. 2000, JCP.2000.1l.l 0316, note Mouly. 
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an analogy to be drawn here between these cases and the English spmts liability cases, and 
it is submitted that it is one that actually lends greater support to the latter. For arguably, the 
English approach of targeting referees and sports governing bodies rather than the actual 
clubs or associations is more directly justifiable in tenns of the actual control that these 
defendants can exercise over the conduct of the hann-doers and their consequent ability to 
prevent harm. 
Interestingly, the rather anomalous further extension of third party liability alluded 
to earlier68 occurred in a decision that was delivered on exactly the same day as the first two 
rugby club decisions. In this particular instance, the Cour de Cassation decided that liability 
based on article 1384(1) could be imposed on a building owner for harm caused by 
squatters. The men in question had started a fire in the defendant's building, which had then 
spread to neighbouring property. Liability was said to be based on the fact that the 
defendant had known that the men were there, that they had been engaging in aggressive 
and anti-social behaviour and that they had previously been lighting dangerous fires in the 
building. Crucially, the defendant was also considered to have had the ability to remove the 
men. The Blieck formula itself was not even referred to, which is significant in that it 
suggests that the Court was perhaps even hying to break away from the constraints of tllis 
principle and conserve for itself total freedom in the development of general principles of 
third party liability. Once again a striking similarity between the French and English 
regimes presents itself, for in respect of this particular French decision, the English cases of 
P. Per! V Camden LBC, 69 King V Liverpool CC70 and Smith V Littlewoods Organisation71 
automatically spring to mind. The conclusion reached in respect of these cases, when they 
were examined in conjunction with other related ones, was that they perhaps established a 
principle of third party liability based upon a defendant's positive contribution to the 
creation of the circumstances giving rise to harm, combined with the existence of a high 
degree of likelihood of the harm occurring, and this would appear to be borne out in many 
ways by the adoption of a very similar French approach. At the very least, it indicates that 
such a principle of liability has intrinsic value of universal appeal. However, just as 
happened with the English cases, the existence of this French decision has provoked a 
68 Supra p. 154. 
69 [1984] I QB342. 
70 [1986] 3 All ER 544. 
71 [1987] I AC 241. 
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rather reactionary response, 72 and as yet the principle of liability that it would appear to 
establish has not been developed any further. 
From then on, the com1s reverted to the Blieck formula in developing further 
categories of no-fault third party liability, and concentrated particularly on instances of 
ham1 caused by children. Indeed, it will be seen that the most significant extensions of the 
principle have been in the context of harm by children, and moreover, that many of these 
extensions have been effected only very recently. The first application of Blieck in this 
context was against private care homes as regards the conduct of 'problem' children in their 
care. Such children would be either young offenders who had been sent by the courts to the 
home on a rehabilitation programme, under the Order of 2 February 1945,73 or else minors 
who had come to the attention of the authorities as being potentially anti-social and who 
had been taken into care as a pre-emptive action under civil protection measures. 74 The 
latter are commonly refetTed to in France as "enfants en danger". In these cases, the courts 
have reinstated the original Blieck fonnula, and founded the liability of these private 
institutions on their "acceptance of the responsibility to organise, direct and control the day-
to-day conduct of the children in their care on a permanent basis". 75 That the courts are 
prepared to invoke the liability of these institutions even in situations in which the child 
perpetrator is not in their de facto care at the time the hmm is caused, 76 either because the 
child is on a temporary home visit, has been placed by the care home with a foster family or 
else has run away, is a clear indication that such liability is based primarily on the exercise 
of legal authority over the harm-doer. 
Initially, it was thought that this extension of the Blieck principle would be limited 
only to 'problem' children, they being readily recognised as high risk-creators. To begin 
with, the Cour de Cassation obviously thought so too, for they continually rejected attempts 
to make relatives and guardians responsible for the acts of children in their care on the basis 
of Article 1384(1).77 However, it would appear that after the Bertrand decision in relation 
72 T. Le Bars and K. Buhl~r, op. cit. 
73 It is to be noted that that the joint liability of the state will also be engaged in respect of the conduct of 
young offenders. 
74 Article 375 Code Civil. 
75 Cass. Crim., 10 oct. 1996, JCP.l997.11.22833, note Chabas; Civ. 2e, 9 dec. 1999, JCP.2000.IV.1163; Civ. 
2e, 20janv. 2000, JCP.2000.IV.l403. 
76 CA Pau, I er eh., 2 dec. 1999, JCP.2000.JV.2571. Civ. 2e, 6 juin 2002, D.2002.1R.2028 et 2029. 
77 Civ. 2e, 18 sept., 1996, D.l998.Jur.ll8, note Rebourg; Civ. 2e, 25 fevr. 1998, JCP.1998.11.10149. See also 
A. M. Galliou-Scanvion, "L' Article 1384, alinea I er, et la responsabilite du fait d'autrui: un fardeau non-
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to parents in 1997, the Court became concerned about the very great disparity that had been 
created between the position of victims injured by children living with their parents, and 
those injured by children not in the care of their parents. Thus in 2000, the Court effected a 
further complete turnaround, and decided that guardians would now be liable for the actions 
of minors 78 in their care on a no-fault basis under Article 1384(1 ). 79 Following that 
decision, the Comt of Appeal of Paris then imposed Alticle 1384( 1) liability on a non-profit 
making association running a children's holiday camp in respect of harm caused to a child 
during a sporting activity there. The formula used was similar to that invoked in the rugby 
club cases, relating as it did to the responsibility of the defendant for "organising, directing 
and controlling the activities of its members" for the duration of the camp.80 This last 
decision has been criticised by Genevieve Viney, an extremely influential academic in this 
field and an ardent supporter ofthe other Article 1384(1) developments, on the basis that 
the defendant's authority over the child perpetrator in this case was merely contractual in 
origin. Viney argues that for the purposes of Article 1384(1), a distinction should be made 
between authority conferred by contract and authority conferred by a court order, and that in 
the case of the former, application of the no-fault principle should be limited to paid 
professionals. 81 The Cour de Cassation does appear to have taken account of this concern 
to some extent, however, in the sense of allowing some concessions to be made in non-
commercial contractual contexts, for in a recent case involving a mentally disordered youth 
canying out a sexual assault at a train station on his way back to his special school, it held 
that the liability of the school82 could not be engaged on the basis of Article 1384(1) in this 
instance because, at the relevant time, it did not have de facto control of the boy. 
This development in French law of a general principle of third party liability for the 
acts of children in one's care demonstrates the potential scope of the English law principle 
transferable sur les epaules du tuteur", D. 1998. Chron.240. Some commentators also interpreted this refusal 
as meaning that the A1ticle 1384( I) principle was only to be applied against legal entities and not against 
natural persons, W. van Gerven, J. Lever and P. Larouche, Tort Law, (Hmt Publishing, 2000) p. 519. 
78 It is probably sti 11 the case that guardians of incompetent adults are not subject to Article 1384(1 ), their role 
being distinguishable from that of guardians of children. 
79 Cass. Cri m., 28 mars 2000, JCP .200 I.II.I 045, note Robaczewski. 
8
° CA Paris, 9 juin 2000, JCP.2001.I.340, Chron. Viney. 
81 Ibid. 
82 The regime of ordinary fault-based liability set out in AI1icle 1384, paragraphs 6 and 8, applies only to 
individual schoolteachers. 
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of liability based upon the existence of a relationship of authority and control over an 
irresponsible other. 83 
IlL CONCLUSION 
While the French law regime of third party liability is clearly much more radical than the 
corresponding English regime, particularly in terms of its very rigorous application of a 
general theory of no-fault liability, as regards the actual foundational principles governing 
the various existing instances of third party liability, there are some striking similarities. In 
particular, both would appear to recognise general principles of third patty liability based 
upon: (1) the long-term occupation of a position of general authority and control over the 
day-to-day conduct of an irresponsible other; and (2) the occupation of a position of 
authority and control over specific risk-producing activities of identified third parties for the 
duration of the activities in question. Moreover, it is submitted that the second principle is 
more legitimately implemented in English law. Furthermore, there would also appear to be 
some limited support in the French case law for the recognition of the proposed English law 
principle of third party liability based upon a positive facilitation of the conunission of 
harm by a third party, combined with a high degree of likelihood of the harm occurring. 
83 See supra, Chapter 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
At a time when serious concerns are being raised about the future viability of the 
English tort system, and extra vigilance needs accordingly to be employed in vetting 
all new legal developments that are likely to result in further expansions of the 
boundaries of tortious liability, the instinctive reaction to the current trend towards 
expanding the categories of third party liability is bound to be one of resistance and 
rejection. Notwithstanding that some of the existing manifestations of this trend 
would tend to fuel such a reaction, it is submitted that the recognition of a number of 
specific and strictly limited instances of third party liability in tort can be legally 
justified. Our innate hostility to the very idea of making one person liable for the acts 
of another is directed at its incongruity with our basic notions of justice and fairness, 
particularly as concerns our deep-rooted attachment to the corrective justice principle 
of individual moral responsibility and the general rule against imposing liability for 
omissions. However, this objection does not apply to the instances of third party 
liability defended in this thesis. They can be distinguished insofar as they can be 
presented, not only as legitimate exceptions to the omissions rule, but also as forms of 
liability linked directly to the personal responsibility of the defendant, in that they 
stem from the nature of his or her relationship with either the victim of the harm or 
the third party perpetrator. 
In nuisance, special duties to abate nuisances created by third parties arise on 
the part of occupiers of property simply by virtue of the fact of their occupation. It is 
argued, however, that the existence of such duties is only justifiable in respect of third 
party nuisances taking place within the defendant's property. As regards third party 
negligence actions against property owners, our analysis of the relevant case law 
resulted in the formulation of a general principle of third party liability based on a 
defendant's positive facilitation of the commission ofharm by another in 
circumstances involving a high degree oflikelihood ofhann occurring. Although 
such a principle would not be confined specifically to property owners, it is envisaged 
that through a strict interpretation of the relevant 'likelihood' requirement, it would 
be applied in only the most exceptional of circumstances. 
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The case law on parental responsibility in respect of children demonstrates 
that liability would generally be precluded on grounds of policy. It is submitted that 
third party liability arguments would be much more likely to succeed in the context of 
other relationships of authority and control in respect of an iiTesponsible other, such 
as that existing between non-parental carers and children, and that they could relate 
either to a responsibility to control the iiTesponsible other or to a duty to protect it 
from foreseeable risks. 
In the context of spm1, two separate grounds for the imposition of third party 
liability may be identified: (1) the occupation of a position of immediate authority 
with a resultant power of immediate and effective control, as in the case of a referee; 
and (2) the occupation of a position of general authority and indirect control in which 
there has been an express assumption of responsibility with concomitant reliance, as 
in the case of a rule-making body. In both cases, the affirmative duties of care can be 
further justified by the existence of two special relationships of close proximity: one 
of protection as between the defendant and the victim and another of control between 
the defendant and the harm-doer. 
Lastly, as regards public authorities, it is argued that third party actions may 
legitimately be brought in respect of certain public functions relating to the care and 
control of 1isk -producing third parties. Examples of such functions would be those 
exercised by the police and the prison authorities, to name but two. Such liability 
would generally be invoked vicariously in respect of the torts of individual 
employees. By way of control mechanisms, the affitmative duty of care in these cases 
is already subject to a requirement that there be established two special relationships 
of close proximity, and it is submitted that, at the breach of duty stage, liability could 
be limited even further through a simple lowering of the standard of care. 
Support for the existence of several of the above principles of liability is 
provided by the French regime of third party liability and its implementation of very 
similar formulae in the same kinds of circtm1stances, notwithstanding that in terms of 
their actual scope and effect, these pm1icular French principles are far more radical 
than their English counterparts. 
It is submitted that by confining the English law on third party liability to a 
strict and controlled application of the above-fonnulated plinciples, it will be possible 
to transform it into a coherent and legitimate body of law in its own light. Failure to 
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proceed on such a rigorous basis will result in additional and irreparable damage 
being done to the integrity of this area of tort law, the early warning signs of which 
are arguably already being provided by the mounting case law on third party liability 
in respect of the intoxicated. 
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